Harman v. Franks

6 Citing cases

  1. In re Potts

    653 B.R. 265 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2023)

    This language has been construed to mean "the difference between the actual contract price and the actual value of the land at the time of the breach." Harman v. Franks, 178 Okl. 560, 565, 63 P.2d 54, 59 (1936).

  2. Share v. Williams

    277 P.2d 775 (Or. 1955)   Cited 10 times

    It is the contention of the plaintiff that the instrument entered into was nothing more than a cancellation agreement, each party agreeing to terminate the contract as of the date of the cancellation agreement, with each party to retain the benefits or disabilities had in accordance with the terms of the contract. The plaintiff relies upon the case of Harman v. Franks, 178 Okla. 560, 63 P.2d 54, 58, where the purchasers were woefully in default. The facts in that case are entirely different from the facts in the case before us, the court there saying on page 564:

  3. Barham v. Bowman

    191 P.2d 917 (Okla. 1948)

    In the early case of Hurley v. Anicker, 51 Okla. 97, 151 P. 593, it was pointed out, in line with the general rule, that where a contract for the sale and purchase of real property is abandoned and mutually rescinded by the parties thereto, then the buyer may recover back the money previously paid under the contract. The rule so announced has been followed and applied in Bishoff v. Myers, 101 Okla. 36, 223 P. 165; Kyger v. Caudill, 115 Okla. 102, 241 P. 814, and cases therein cited; Harman et al. v. Franks, 178 Okla. 560, 63 P.2d 54, recognizing the rule. Under the rule announced plaintiff was entitled to recover the money deposited as part payment (with the seller's agent) even though the contract of purchase provided for a forfeiture of this amount in the event of a default in payment of the balance, since it was shown by the pleadings that the failure to perform resulted from mutual rescission of the contract.

  4. McClellan v. Smith

    68 P.2d 875 (Okla. 1937)   Cited 3 times

    The well-established rule of this court is that in cases of equitable cognizance the Supreme Court will not set aside the trial court's findings of facts unless it appears after consideration of the entire record that such findings are clearly against the weight of the evidence. Among some of the more recent decisions sustaining this rule are the cases of Harman v. Frank, 178 Okla. 560, 63 P.2d 54, and Murphy v. Knox, 178 Okla. 436, 63 P.2d 98. We therefore find that the judgment of the trial court should be, and is hereby, affirmed.

  5. Oltman Homes v. Mirkes

    190 P.3d 1182 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008)   Cited 21 times   1 Legal Analyses

    This language has been construed to mean "the difference between the actual contract price and the actual value of the land at the time of the breach." Harman v. Franks, 178 Okl. 560, 565, 63 P.2d 54, 59 (1936). ¶ 12 We note the measure of damages set out in §§ 28 is limiting. It is the remainder of an arithmetical subtraction operation.

  6. Reid v. Auxier

    690 P.2d 1057 (Okla. Civ. App. 1984)   Cited 7 times   1 Legal Analyses

    This language has been construed to mean "the difference between the actual contract price and the actual value of the land at the time of the breach." Harman v. Franks, 178 Okla. 560, 565, 63 P.2d 54, 59 (1936). The question, then, that evolves from this law may be framed this way: is it impracticable or would it be extremely difficult for the trial court to determine the difference between the contract price defendants agreed to pay and the actual or fair market value of the property at the time of the breach?