Harm v. Hale

7 Citing cases

  1. Walters v. Bank of West (In re Walters)

    No. 10-6075 (8th Cir. Jun. 2, 2011)

    Id. at 327. See also In re White, 293 B.R. 1, 6 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2003) ("As long as the funds are traceable and the transaction is carried out with the intent to preserve the exemption, this fact will not constitute abandonment of the exemption."); Harm v. Hale, 206 Iowa 920, 221 N.W. 482, 584 (Iowa 1928) (although a strict tracing is not required, there must be a "sufficient showing [. . .] that the homestead character of the proceeds from the old property continues into the new, so far as the reinvestment thereof is concerned."). Both Walters and her husband testified that they would have no way to prove that they actually used the Cerromar proceeds to acquire the Pleasant Hill property.

  2. In re Takes

    334 B.R. 642 (N.D. Iowa 2005)   Cited 6 times

    Consequently, when a debtor acquires a new homestead after the debt was incurred but did so with the proceeds of a prior, exempt homestead, the new homestead is exempt from execution to the same extent as the old homestead. See, e.g., Elliot v. Till, 259 N.W. 460, 464 (Iowa 1935); Am. Sav.Bank of Marengo v. Willenbrock, 228 N.W. 295, 298 (Iowa 1929); Harm v. Hale, 221 N.W. 582, 583-84 (Iowa 1928); Shaffer Bros. v. Cherynk, 107 N.W. 801, 801-02 (Iowa 1906); Richards v. Orr, 92 N.W. 655, 656 (Iowa 1902); Schuttloffel v. Collins, 67 N.W. 397, 398-99 (Iowa 1896); Mann v. Corrington, 61 N.W. 409, 409-10 (Iowa 1894); Thompson v. Rogers, Richardson Co., 1 N.W. 681, 684-85 (Iowa 1879); State v. Geddis, 44 Iowa 537, 539 (1876); Billsv. Mason, 42 Iowa 329, 332-33 (Iowa 1876); Benham v. Chamberlain Co., 39 Iowa 358, 359-60 (1874); Robb v. McBride, 28 Iowa 386, 387-88 (1870); Sargent v. Chubbuck, 19 Iowa 37, 39-40 (1865); Pearson v. Minturn, 18 Iowa 36, 38-39 (1864); Webster, Button Call v. Saunders, 8 Iowa 579, ___ (1858); see also In re Allen, 301 B.R. 55, 59-61 (Bankr.

  3. In re Walters

    450 B.R. 109 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011)   Cited 7 times

    Id. at 327. See also In re White, 293 B.R. 1, 6 (Bankr.N.D.Iowa 2003) (“As long as the funds are traceable and the transaction is carried out with the intent to preserve the exemption, this fact will not constitute abandonment of the exemption.”); Harm v. Hale, 206 Iowa 920, 221 N.W. 582, 584 (Iowa 1928) (although a strict tracing is not required, there must be a “sufficient showing [...] that the homestead character of the proceeds from the old property continues into the new, so far as the reinvestment thereof is concerned.”). Both Walters and her husband testified that they would have no way to prove that they actually used the Cerromar proceeds to acquire the Pleasant Hill property.

  4. Millsap v. Faulkes

    236 Iowa 848 (Iowa 1945)   Cited 29 times
    Holding net — not gross — proceeds are exempt

    Pursuant to the spirit of this statute, we have held on several occasions that one who sells his homestead may for a reasonable time hold the proceeds exempt in order to reinvest in a new homestead to the extent in value of the old. Harm v. Hale, 206 Iowa 920, 924, 925, 221 N.W. 582, and cases cited; Elliott v. Till, 219 Iowa 649, 655, 259 N.W. 460. Defendant argues that "the proceeds" from the sale to Larson are $8,450, undiminished by the mortgage debt (and that $3,500 — all above $4,950 — is liable for the payment of the judgment).

  5. Elliott v. Till

    259 N.W. 460 (Iowa 1935)   Cited 13 times
    In Elliott v. Till, 219 Iowa 649, 259 N.W. 460 (1935), a creditor attempted to sell a Des Moines property the plaintiff claimed was her homestead.

    The time that intervened between the sale of the old and the purchase of the new homestead is explained by the illness of the plaintiff's mother and her protests against plaintiff purchasing a home which would result in plaintiff leaving the neighborhood in which the mother lived." The court further said in its opinion: "The investment of the funds temporarily in mortgages which the bank agreed to at any time take off the hands of plaintiff is not such intervening use as to cause a loss of the exemption when viewed in the light of the extremely liberal construction given by our Supreme Court in such cases as Fardal v. Satre, 200 Iowa 1109, 206 N.W. 22; Harm v. Hale, 206 Iowa 920, 221 N.W. 582; Robinson v. Charleton, 104 Iowa 296, 73 N.W. 616; and cases cited in those opinions."

  6. Blakeslee v. Paul

    238 N.W. 447 (Iowa 1931)   Cited 6 times

    While there is language in some of our earlier cases to the contrary, it must now be regarded as settled in this state that the debtor may purchase the necessary lot and erect a new dwelling house thereon within a reasonable time and pay therefor out of the proceeds of the former homestead. Harm v. Hale, 206 Iowa 920; Mann v. Corrington, 93 Iowa 108; Fardal v. Satre, supra. It has likewise been held that damages assessed by a sheriff's jury for right of way over a homestead are exempt from execution (Kaiser v. Seaton, 62 Iowa 463), and that a judgment recovered for damages to a homestead is not subject to garnishment. Mudge v. Lenning, 68 Iowa 641.

  7. American Sav. Bank v. Willenbrock

    209 Iowa 250 (Iowa 1929)   Cited 23 times

    Manifestly, it is understood there that the proceeds of the old, or its equivalent, will procure the new. See Harm v. Hale, 206 Iowa 920; Benham v. Chamberlain Co., 39 Iowa 358. Proceeds are of the old and value is of the old. Obviously, it was the legislative thought that, if the proceeds of an old homestead were used to procure a new, the debtor should be protected to the full extent thereof.