Opinion
22-3293-JWL-JPO
12-28-2022
PAEDEN HARLEY, Plaintiff, v. TAMMY ALEXANDER, Lieutenant, Franklin County Jail, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff filed this pro se case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff is in custody at the Franklin County Jail in Ottawa, Kansas (“FCJ”). On December 5, 2022, the Court entered a Memorandum and Order to Show Cause (Doc. 4) (“MOSC”) ordering Plaintiff to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons set forth in the MOSC. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's response (Doc. 6) to the MOSC.
Plaintiff claims that during his detention at the FCJ he was sold nicotine patches that had the Surgeon General's warning label removed by staff. (Doc. 1, at 2.) Plaintiff names Tammy Alexander, FCJ Lieutenant, as the sole defendant. Plaintiff seeks $80,000 in compensatory damages and to have all medical bills paid. Id. at 5.
The Court found in the MOSC that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief based on his conditions of confinement. The Tenth Circuit has held that a pretrial detainee's claims regarding conditions of confinement are governed by the Due Process Clause, and that “the Eighth Amendment standard provides the benchmark for such claims.” Routt v. Howard, 764 Fed.Appx. 762, 770 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (quoting Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir. 1998)); see also Hooks v. Atoki, 983 F.3d 1193, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 2020) (declining to extend Kingsley's exclusively objective standard for pretrial detainees' excessive force claims to Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claims). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). “First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.'” Id. To satisfy the objective component, a prisoner must allege facts showing he or she is “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id.; Martinez v. Garden, 430 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 2005).
The Eighth Amendment requires prison and jail officials to provide humane conditions of confinement guided by “contemporary standards of decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Constitution “‘does not mandate comfortable prisons,' and only those deprivations denying ‘the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities' are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, prison conditions may be “restrictive and even harsh.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). “Under the Eighth Amendment, (prison) officials must provide humane conditions of confinement by ensuring inmates receive the basic necessities of adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care and by taking reasonable measures to guarantee the inmates' safety.” McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
The second requirement for an Eighth Amendment violation “follows from the principle that ‘only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.'” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Prison officials must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” and in prison-conditions cases that state of mind is “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. Id. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. “The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions'; it outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.'” Id. It is not enough to establish that the official should have known of the risk of harm. Id.
Because the sufficiency of a conditions-of-confinement claim depends upon “the particular facts of each situation; the ‘circumstances, nature, and duration' of the challenged conditions must be carefully considered.” Despain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000)). “While no single factor controls . . . the length of exposure to the conditions is often of prime importance.” Id. As the severity of the conditions to which an inmate is exposed increases, the length of exposure required to make out a constitutional violation decreases. Accordingly, “minor deprivations suffered for short periods would not rise to an Eighth Amendment violation, while ‘substantial deprivations. . .' may meet the standard despite a shorter duration.” Id. (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs' allegations fail to allege a “sufficiently serious” deprivation or facts showing he is “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Plaintiff has also failed to allege “deliberate indifference” by the defendant.
Plaintiff has failed to allege a constitutional violation, and his claims suggest, at most, mere negligence. Claims under § 1983 may not be predicated on mere negligence. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986). Plaintiff's allegations of negligence must be presented in a state court action. Furthermore, an allegation regarding the violation of state statutes fails to state a valid claim for relief. State statutes do not provide a basis for liability under § 1983 which only protects rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. D.L. v. United Sch. Dist. No. 497, 596 F.3d 768, 776 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding that “Plaintiffs' citations to Kansas case law to support their claim . . . is unavailing, as § 1983 affords a remedy for violations of federal law and does not ‘provide a basis for redressing violations of state law.' ”) (citation omitted).
In his response, Plaintiff attaches his Inmate Communication Forms (“ICF”) which he claims show that staff acknowledged that the nicotine patches lacked the surgeon general warning labels. (Doc. 6-1.) Staff responded to Plaintiff's ICFs by stating that: Plaintiff ordered several patches in the past that contained the warning label; Plaintiff's medical intake shows prior tobacco use which is a common substance with nicotine; Plaintiff may ask the nursing staff for assistance regarding his addiction; adjustments will be made for the flavors of pouches that failed to contain the warning label; Plaintiff's last purchase of a pouch was May 13, 2022; and nicotine pouches will no longer be available for Plaintiff to purchase to prevent any further issues. Id.
Plaintiff's response fails to address the deficiencies set forth in the MOSC and fails to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that this matter is dismissed for failure to state a claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.