In determining whether the article is libelous on its face the article must be measured by its natural and probable effect upon the mind of the average lay reader. Hargrove v. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co., 130 Okla. 76, 265 P. 635. In 12 O.S. 1961 § 1441[ 12-1441], libel is defined as a false publication by writing, printing, or picture, which exposes any person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, or which tends to deprive him of public confidence, or to injure him in his occupation.
A publication is actionable per se when the language used therein is susceptible of but one meaning, and that an opprobrious one, and the publication on its face shows that the derogatory statements, taken as a whole, refer to the plaintiff and not to some other person. Hargrove v. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. et al., 130 Okla. 76, 265 P. 635. 4. Same — Classes of Words Charged to Be Libelous — Words Susceptible of Defamatory as Well as Innocent Meaning.
Riley Johnson, Natchez, for appellee. I. Cited and discussed the following authorities: Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co., 145 Ky. 164, 183 S.W. 269; Conroy v. Breland, 185 Miss. 787, 189 So. 814; Flood v. News Courier Co., 71 S.C. 112, 50 S.E. 637; Floor v. Evening Post Publishing Co., 50 S.E. 641; Gardner v. Standard Oil Co., 179 Miss. 176, 175 So. 203; Hargrove v. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co., 265 P. 635; Jarnigan v. Fleming, 43 Miss. 710, 5 Am. Rep. 514; Louisiana Oil Corp. v. Renno, 173 Miss. 609, 157 So. 705; Missouri-Pacific Transfer Co. v. Beard, 179 Miss. 764, 176 So. 156; Morehead v. U.S.F. G. Co., 187 Miss. 55, 192 So. 300; Overing v. Skrmetta, 218 Miss. 648, 67 So.2d 606; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 41 L.Ed. 256, 16 S.Ct. 1138; Rodgers v. Kline, 56 Miss. 808, 31 Am. Rep. 289; Scott v. Peebles, 10 Miss. 546, 2 Sm. M. 546; Smith v. Chamberlain, 38 S.C. 529, 17 S.E. 371; Spotorno v. Fourichon (La.), 4 So. 71; Stultz v. Cousins, 242 Fed. 794, 155 C.C.A. 382; Tipps Tool Co. v. Holifield, 218 Miss. 670, 67 So.2d 609; Upton v. Times-Democrat Publishing Co., 104 La. 141, 28 So. 970; Williams v. Riddle, 145 Ky. 459, 140 S.W. 661; Secs. 263, 459, 6927, 7784-6, 7786-01, 7848, 9965, Code 1942; 33 Am. Jur., Secs. 3, 5, 56, 299 pp. 38-40, 76, 382; 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, Secs. 1, 28, 85, 201, 264 (d, e, g), 300 pp. 32, 69, 84-5, 189-90, 381-2, 285; A.L.I., Restatement of the
The article was not published about the Supreme Court, but about certain members of the Supreme Court, specifically naming Justice Mason. In the case of Hargrove v. Oklahoma Press Publication Co., 130 Okla. 76, 265 P. 635, the article there complained of was concerning one William Hargrove. The article was headed "Negro Can Leave Jail If He Keeps on Going." The article then states that Hargrove's wife appeared at the office of the United States Marshal and paid his fine.
Courts have held it libelous to call a white man a Negro. Collins v. Oklahoma State Hospital, 76 Okla. 229, 184 P. 946, 947, 7 A.L.R. 895; Spencer v. Looney, 116 Va. 767, 82 S.E. 745; Spotorno v. Fourichon, 40 La.Ann. 423, 4 So. 71; Flood v. News Courier Co., 71 S.C. 112, 50 S.E. 637, 4 Ann.Cas. 685; Jones v. R.L. Polk Co., 190 Ala. 243, 67 So. 577; Upton v. Times-Democrat Pub. Co., 104 La. 141, 28 So. 970; Hargrove v. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co., 130 Okla. 76, 265 P. 635; May v. Shreveport Traction Co., 127 La. 420, 53 So. 671, 674, 32 L.R.A., N.S., 206. To Secure These Rights (1947), pp. 79, 82.
Because WSS has failed to create a genuine issue of fact as to the final element of its defamation claim, summary judgment on that claim is appropriate. Assuming that WSS has met its burden as to the first three elements of its claim, the Court turns to the fourth element. Under Oklahoma law, whether a claimant suing for defamation is required to plead special damages depends on whether the statement is defamatory per quod or defamatory per se. Hargrove v. Okla. Press Pub. Co. , 130 Okla. 76, 265 P. 635, 636 (1928). Defamatory per quod statements are those that have "no overt opprobrious connotations" and require extrinsic facts or circumstances to find that a publication is defamatory. Trice v. Burress , 137 P.3d 1253, 1257 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006).
12 O.S. 1991 § 1441[ 12-1441]. Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 1962 OK 183, 377 P.2d 42, 48; Hargrove v. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co., 130 Okla. 76, 265 P. 635, 636 (1928). Whether a writing is libelous depends on the scope, spirit and motive of the publication taken in its entirety.
12 O.S. 1991 § 1441[ 12-1441]. Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 48 (1962); Hargrove v. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co., 130 Okla. 76, 265 P. 635, 636 (1928). Whether a writing is libelous depends on the scope, spirit and motive of the publication taken in its entirety.
While the court makes the libel per se determination as a matter of law, the material must be "measured by its natural and probable effect upon the mind of the average lay reader." Hargrove v. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co., 130 Okla. 76, 265 P. 635 (1928). The first paragraph of the four paragraphs alleged by plaintiff to be defamatory informs readers that a judge has been accused of certain conduct and that he is under investigation by the Council on Judicial Complaints.
With this statute in existence, case law of this jurisdiction has long held special damages must be alleged where the words published were not libelous per se. This Court by syllabus in Edwards v. Crane, Okla., 292 P.2d 1034 (1956), said: Illustrative of these authorities, with no attempt to be exhaustive are: Haynes v. Alverno Heights Hospital, Okla., 515 P.2d 568, 569 (1973); Carpenter v. Renner, 158 Okla. 153, 12 P.2d 688 (1932); Shaffer v. Huff, 158 Okla. 256, 13 P.2d 108 (1932); Owens v. Clark, 154 Okla. 108, 6 P.2d 755 (1931); Wimmer v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 151 Okla. 123, 1 P.2d 671 (1931); Hargrove v. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co., 130 Okla. 76, 265 P. 635 (1928); Missouri, K. T. Ry. Co. v. Watkins, 77 Okla. 270, 188 P. 99 (1920). "In an action for libel if the alleged defamatory words are not actionable upon their face and there is no allegation of special damages it is not error for the trial court to sustain a demurrer to the petition and enter judgment of dismissal."