Hardy v. Arcemont

5 Citing cases

  1. Dept. of Transp. v. Dupree

    256 Ga. App. 668 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 58 times
    In Department of Transportation v. Dupree, 256 Ga. App. 668 (2002), the decedent's family filed suit against the Department of Transportation after the decedent attempted to cross the street at a busy intersection after dark.

    Thus, the trial court may hear evidence to determine the defense in abatement or may defer such determination until trial. OCGA § 9-11-12 (d); Hardy v. Arcemont, 213 Ga. App. 243 ( 444 S.E.2d 327) (1994); Myers v. McLarty, 150 Ga. App. 432, 433 ( 258 S.E.2d 56) (1979); Marvin L. Walker Assoc. v. A. L. Buschman, Inc., 147 Ga. App. 851, 852 (1) ( 250 S.E.2d 532) (1978). Likewise, the trial court must determine such factual issues as to jurisdiction in a motion to set aside judgment.

  2. Dept. of Transp. v. Dupree

    A02A1573 (Ga. Ct. App. Jun. 3, 2002)

    Thus, the trial court may hear evidence to determine the defense in abatement or may defer such determination until trial. OCGA § 9-11-12 (d); Hardy v. Arcemont, 213 Ga. App. 243 ( 444 S.E.2d 327) (1994); Myers v. McLarty, 150 Ga. App. 432, 433 ( 258 S.E.2d 56) (1979); Marvin L. Walker Assocs., Inc. v. A. L. Buschman, Inc., 147 Ga. App. 851, 852(1) ( 250 S.E.2d 532) (1978). Likewise, the trial court must determine such factual issues as to jurisdiction in a motion to set aside judgment.

  3. Coleman v. Grimes

    553 S.E.2d 185 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 7 times

    O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24 (a) (2); In re Ashmore, 163 Ga. App. 194 ( 293 S.E.2d 457) (1982) (any interested party may file objection to legitimation petition). See also Hardy v. Arcemont, 213 Ga. App. 243, 246 (3) ( 444 S.E.2d 327) (1994).Macuch v. Pettey, supra at 469; Miller v. Charles, supra at 387-388.

  4. Ghrist v. Fricks

    219 Ga. App. 415 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 30 times
    Applying collateral estoppel to mother's statement of paternity contained in settlement agreement because "[p]arties to stipulations and agreements entered into in the course of judicial proceedings are estopped from taking positions inconsistent therewith"

    The public policy of this state favoring the institution of marriage and the legitimacy of children born during a marriage is the strongest public policy recognized by law. This Court's holding in Hardy v. Arcemont, 213 Ga. App. 243, 245(1) ( 444 S.E.2d 327) (1994), that "(a)ll children born in wedlock or within the usual period of gestation thereafter are legitimate, but the legitimacy of such a child may be disputed; where possibility of access exists, the strong presumption is in favor of legitimacy and the proof must be clear to establish the contrary," citing OCGA § 19-7-20(a) and (b), is but one of the latest of a long series of decisions rendered by the appellate courts of Georgia recognizing this public policy and evincing the commitment of Georgia's courts to enforcing it. "This presumption of legitimacy is one of the strongest and most persuasive known to our law." Stephens v. State, 80 Ga. App. 823, 825 ( 57 S.E.2d 493) (1950).

  5. Dept. of Human Resources v. Gelinas

    455 S.E.2d 76 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)

    The 1982 order expressly states that the paternity issue was not decided so the issue was not res judicata. Compare East v. Pike, 163 Ga. App. 374, 376 ( 294 S.E.2d 597) (1982) (paternity issue was decided in previous divorce proceeding and, therefore, was res judicata in the subsequent URESA petition); Macuch v. Pettey, 170 Ga. App. 467, 468 ( 317 S.E.2d 262) (1984); Hardy v. Arcemont, 213 Ga. App. 243, 245 ( 444 S.E.2d 327) (1994); see Dept. of Human Resources v. Fleeman, 263 Ga. 756, 757-758 ( 439 S.E.2d 474) (1994). The trial court erred by dismissing the petition.