" In Hardman v. Younkers, 15 Wn.2d 483, 489, 131 P.2d 177, 151 A.L.R. 868, we said: "Ordinarily, the mere fact that an automobile accident has occurred is not of itself proof of negligence on the part of the driver.

In such a situation we defer to the trial court, as we find no manifest abuse of discretion." See also Hardman v. Younkers, 15 Wn.2d 483, 496, 131 P.2d 177 (1942) (court allowed witness, after cross-examination, to testify on the same subject matter on rebuttal; our Supreme Court affirmed, noting, "Suffice it to say that the question of the precise limits of rebuttal evidence is a matter resting largely in the discretion of the trial court.... It is plain that there was no prejudice in this instance; the evidence was, at most, merely cumulative.").

The answer taken in its entirety, and the adjudicated cases, fail to support Crockett's position. The prayer was properly denied. Hanna v. Stoll, 1925, 112 Ohio St. 344, 147 N.E. 339; Hardman v. Younkers, 1942, 15 Wn.2d 483, 131 P.2d 177, 151 A.L.R. 868. The last contention is an objection to the granting of defendant's Prayers Nos. 3 and 5. These prayers directed the jury to find for the defendant if it found that (1) the plaintiff had failed in its duty "to make the underground installation in accordance with the recommendations of the defendant," or that (2) the damage resulted because plaintiff laid the piping without due regard for the progress of the defendant in sealing the joints.

The Court agrees with Defendants. Washington courts have determined that "unavoidable accident" does not necessarily have to be pleaded, but does not preclude the pleading of such a defense. See Hardman v. Younkers, 15 Wn.2d 483, 491-92, 131 P.2d 177 (1942). Accordingly, the Court declines to strike this defense.

[T]he res ipsa loquitur doctrine allows the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of negligence when he cannot prove a specific act of negligence because he is not in a situation where he would have knowledge of that specific act. Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant must then offer an explanation, if he can. "`If then, after considering such explanation, on the whole case and on all the issues as to negligence, injury and damages, the evidence still preponderates in favor of the plaintiff, plaintiff is entitled to recover; otherwise not.'"Id. at 441-42 (quoting Covey v. W. Tank Lines, 36 Wn.2d 381, 392, 218 P.2d 322 (1950) (quoting Hardman v. Younkers, 15 Wn.2d 483, 493, 131 P.2d 177 (1942))). As with any other permissive evidentiary inference, a jury is free to disregard or accept the truth of the inference.

In our judgment, it makes little sense to deny an instruction on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur simply because the defendant offers evidence that provides a possible explanation of the event. As noted above, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine allows the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of negligence when he cannot prove a specific act of negligence because he is not in a situation where he would have knowledge of that specific act. Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant must then offer an explanation, if he can. "`If then, after considering such explanation, on the whole case and on all the issues as to negligence, injury and damages, the evidence still preponderates in favor of the plaintiff, plaintiff is entitled to recover; otherwise not.'" Covey, 36 Wn.2d at 392 (quoting Hardman v. Younkers, 15 Wn.2d 483, 493, 131 P.2d 177 (1942)). If the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were inapplicable when a defendant offered a possible explanation that was not completely explanatory of the cause of the injury, and the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of negligence because he or she does not know how the injury was caused, then the defendant could avoid liability by simply submitting evidence of a possible cause of the injury. This would be the case notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff has shown all of the above-stated elements of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Such a result would allow the defendant to escape responsibility where an inference of negligence is the only tool with which the plaintiff may prove his or her case.

Therefore, the question of admissibility of evidence on rebuttal rests largely on the trial court's discretion, and error in denying or allowing it can be predicated only upon a manifest abuse of that discretion. Croft v. Northwestern S.S. Co., 20 Wn. 175, 55 P. 42 (1898); Pylate v. Hadman, 151 Wn. 245, 275 P. 559 (1929); W.E. Roche Fruit Co. v. Northern Pac. R.R., supra; Hardman v. Younkers, 15 Wn.2d 483, 131 P.2d 177, 151 A.L.R. 868 (1942). Where rebuttal witnesses are called by the prosecuting attorney for the purpose of meeting new matters raised by the defense in its case in chief, it is not error to admit the testimony even though the witness's name has not been endorsed upon the information or furnished to the defendant in advance of trial for genuine rebuttal witnesses need not be listed.

Messrs. McDonald McDonald, of Winnsboro, and Nelson, Mullins, Grier Scarborough, of Columbia, forAppellant, cite: As to rule that the defense of unavoidableaccident is available under a general denial, if raised by theevidence, and need not be specifically pleaded: 15 Wn.2d 483, 131 P.2d 177; 183 Ala. 195, 62 So. 759; 98 Cal.App. 101, 276 P. 389; (Mo.) 256 S.W. 819; 45 N.M. 176, 113 P.2d 320; 128 Or. 310, 284 P. 915; 37 S.W.2d 219; 184 N.E.2d 530; 190 Okla. 558, 125 P.2d 1003; 227 Ark. 260, 298 S.W.2d 338; 83 N.J.L. 88, 83 A.2d 783; 78 Wyo. 1, 318 P.2d 368; 45 C.J. 1140 Neg., Sec. 730; 5 Am. Jur., Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Sec. 895, 65 A.L.R.2d 49; 8 S.C. 258; 112 S.C. 205, 99 S.E. 828. As to the trialJudge properly charging the law of unavoidable accident: 79 Ariz. 122, 285 P.2d 165; 102 Ga. App. 367, 116 S.E.2d 500; (Ky.) 277 S.W.2d 49; 69 Ohio L. Abs. 378, 125 N.E.2d 758; 17 Tenn. App. 375, 67 S.W.2d 751; 5 A.D.2d 950, 171 N.Y.S.2d 212; 149 Md. 281, 131 A. 350; (Tex.Civ.App.) 95 S.W.2d 1342; 350 Ill. App. 504, 113 N.E.2d 178; 244 Minn. 108, 69 N.W.2d 98; 104 Mont. 63, 65 P.2d 3; 155 Conn. 352; 161 A. 665; 283 F.2d 766; 283 F.2d 411; 57 Wn.2d 317, 356 P.2d 712; 186 Okla. 9, 95 P.2d 897; 298 Mich. 18, 298 N.W. 388; 67 N.M. 10, 350 P.2d 1028; 105 Ga. App. 809, 12

It would be inaccurate to say we find the language of all of them to be entirely consistent. See: Hardman v. Younkers, 15 Wn.2d 483, 493, 131 P.2d 177, 151 A.L.R. 868 (1942), for discussion of the theory of "unavoidable accident" in actions tried before the court. Generally, our prior decisions fall into two categories: the first, cases in which the instruction was given to the jury, and the judgment of the court, based upon the verdict was either affirmed or reversed; the second, cases in which the trial court refused to give the instruction, and the judgment, in accordance with the verdict, was either affirmed or reversed.

5A Am.Jur., Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 895. This principle is supported by many cases, some of which are Hardman v. Younkers, 15 Wn.2d 483, 131 P.2d 177, 151 A.L.R. 868; Scott v. Burke, 39 Cal.2d 388, 247 P.2d 313; Fulton v. Huguet, 113 Cal.App.2d 692, 248 P.2d 954; Tesone v. Reiman, 117 Cal.App.2d 211, 255 P.2d 48; Johnston v. Orlando, 131 Cal.App.2d 705, 281 P.2d 357; Lilley v. Key System Transit Lines, 136 Cal.App.2d 737, 289 P.2d 517; Slovick v. James I. Barnes Construction Co., 142 Cal.App.2d 618, 298 P.2d 923; Gray v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 143 Cal.App.2d 537, 299 P.2d 900. The case of Powell v. Bartmess, 139 Cal.App.2d 394, 294 P.2d 150, 157, not only supports the above rule but goes further in holding against a contention that an unavoidable accident instruction could not be given where evidence was lacking on the subject — indicating that negligence, proximate cause, and inevitable accident are all questions for the jury.