Harding v. Indust. Comm

118 Citing cases

  1. Nagl v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office of State

    351 P.3d 577 (Colo. App. 2015)   Cited 1 times

    ¶ 13 An apparent purpose of adjudicating each separation is to prevent the “depletion of the insurance fund account of the past employer who in no way contributed to the job separation of the worker who voluntarily separates under conditions of disqualification.” Harding v. Indus. Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52, 61, 515 P.2d 95, 100 (1973). As the court in Harding noted:

  2. No. 79-56

    No. 79-56 (Ops.Colo.Atty.Gen. Oct. 22, 1979)

    Words in a statute are to be construed according to their generally accepted meaning. Harding v. Industrial Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52, 515 P.2d 95 (1973). The word "retired" usually refers to the status of having withdrawn from business or public life so as to live at leisure on one's income, savings or pension.

  3. Greer v. Intercole Automation, Inc.

    553 F. Supp. 275 (D. Colo. 1982)   Cited 5 times

    People ex rel. Marks v. District Court, 161 Colo. 14, 420 P.2d 236, 241 (1966); Jones v. People, 155 Colo. 148, 393 P.2d 366, 369 (1964). Where clear and unambiguous, statutory language must be applied as written; and forced, subtle, or strained interpretations are to be avoided. Harding v. Industrial Comm., 183 Colo. 52, 515 P.2d 95 (1973). The UCATA is clear and unequivocal in its requirement that joint or common liability in tort exist as a precondition to the right of contribution. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-50.

  4. Concerned Parents of Pueblo v. Gilmore

    47 P.3d 311 (Colo. 2002)   Cited 24 times
    Finding that court "must avoid adopting a forced or strained construction, as well as any construction that leads to an absurd result"

    See, e.g., AviComm, Inc. v. Colo. PUC, 955 P.2d 1023, 1031 (Colo. 1998); Harding v. Indus. Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52, 59, 515 P.2d 95, 98 (1973). Additionally, the court is not to substitute its own public policy determinations for those of the General Assembly. See, e.g., Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213, 1216 (Colo.

  5. Concerned Parents of Pueblo v. Gilmore

    No. 00SC950 (Colo. Apr. 22, 2002)   Cited 1 times

    See, e.g., AviComm, Inc. v. Colo. PUC, 955 P.2d 1023, 1031 (Colo. 1998); Harding v. Indus. Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52, 59, 515 P.2d 95, 98 (1973). Additionally, the court is not to substitute its own public policy determinations for those of the General Assembly. See, e.g., Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213, 1216 (Colo.

  6. Total Audio-Visual Systems, Inc. v. Department of Labor

    360 Md. 387 (Md. 2000)   Cited 36 times
    Reviewing whether an unemployment benefits claimant's departure from an employer for a higher-paying position qualifies as "good cause"

    As stated, infra, there is a certain, if not complete, practical uniformity in the unemployment insurance statutes amongst the fifty states because they are modeled after the English statutes. Several of our sister states, although some have more specific statutory language, are in accord with the view I here express.Harding v. Industrial Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52, 57, 515 P.2d 95, 97 (1973) ("[A] worker who voluntarily separates from a job to accept a better job, as defined by statute, shall be eligible for a full award of benefits in the event of subsequent unemployment . . . ."); Kortz v. Industrial Comm'n, 38 Colo. App. 411, 413, 557 P.2d 842, 843 (1976) (holding that an individual separated from a job for the purpose of accepting a better job was entitled to full unemployment benefits); Pugh v. Regal Development Corp., 662 So.2d 1355, 1356 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1995) (holding that a claimant who left a temporary position for another job that paid more and was more permanent left with good cause); Schafer v. Ada Co. Assessor, 111 Idaho 870, 872, 728 P.2d 394, 396 (1986) (holding that a claimant who leaves a job with a firm offer of employment from another employer has left with good cause); Pazzaglia v. Review Board of Indiana Dep't of Employment and Training Servs., 608 N.E.2d 1375, 1376 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993) (discussing Indiana Code 22-4-15-1, which mandates that an indi

  7. Adams v. Farmers Ins. Group

    983 P.2d 797 (Colo. 1999)   Cited 16 times
    In Adams, the Colorado Supreme Court stated that this "statutory definition of who constitutes a `successful' party in the substantive proceedings is in need of no additional clarification."

    Saint Luke's Hosp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 142 Colo. 28, 32, 349 P.2d 995, 997 (1960); see also Smith v. Myron Stratton Home, 676 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Colo. 1984) (noting that, in construing statutes, "[w]e must choose the construction that best effectuates the purposes of the legislative scheme"); Harding v. Industrial Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52, 59, 515 P.2d 95, 98 (1973) (noting that "forced . . . or unusual interpretation should never be resorted to where the language is plain, its meaning is clear, and no absurdity is involved"). The legislature's express purpose in enacting the No-Fault Act was "to avoid inadequate compensation to victims of automobile accidents."

  8. Pace Membership Warehouse v. Axelson

    938 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1997)   Cited 28 times
    In Axelson, Justice Hobbs partially concurred and partially dissented. He argued the constitutional question could and should be avoided by construing the statutory scheme, including § 8-73-110(5), as requiring respondents to reimburse the UI Fund for UI benefits paid during the pendency of the litigation.

    Unlike TTD benefits which compensate for wage loss due to an injury and originate under the Workers' Compensation Act, UI benefits are designed to compensate for wage loss after an employee has become unemployed through no fault of his or her own and originate under the Unemployment Security Act, §§ 8-70-101 to 8-82-105, 3B C.R.S. (1986 1995 Supp.). See Harding v. Industrial Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52, 60, 515 P.2d 95, 99 (1973). Here, the parties agree that Axelson was entitled to a total of fifty-two weeks of UI benefits for her separation from employment with Pace.

  9. Willer v. Thornton

    817 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1991)   Cited 24 times
    Holding that there was no waiver of immunity under the CGIA where the plaintiff's injuries resulted from a sharp dip in the roadway that was part of the initial design and construction of the intersection

    1983), forced, subtle, strained or unusual interpretations should never be employed where the language of a statute is plain and its meaning is clear. Harding v. Industrial Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52, 515 P.2d 95 (Colo. 1973). The Act was adopted by the General Assembly in 1971 in response to three decisions of this court eliminating the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity as a defense in tort actions.Stephen v. City and County of Denver, 659 P.2d at 668 n. 3. The Act established a defense of sovereign immunity for governmental entities in most tort actions, but provided six categories of acts for which such immunity was waived, including: "[a] dangerous condition which interferes with the movement of traffic on the traveled portion and shoulders or curbs of any public highway . . . ."

  10. ORR v. PEOPLE

    803 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1990)   Cited 3 times

    The statute does not expressly prohibit checkpoint stops, as the defendant concedes, and we are not willing to impose an interpretation on the statute that its terms do not express. See District Court, 161 Colo. at 24, 420 P.2d at 241; see also Harding v. Industrial Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52, 59, 515 P.2d 95, 98 (1973) (where language is plain and meaning is clear, court should not make "[f]orced, subtle, strained or unusual interpretation"). We conclude that section 42-4-1202.1 does not require that checkpoint stops be grounded on reasonable suspicion.