3. Under the principles announced by this court in Douglas v. McCurdy, 154 Ga. 814 ( 115 S.E. 658), and Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 534, 543 ( 6 S.E.2d 328), if a taxpayer has a stock of goods and inventory of the value of $40,000, and returns only $10,000, he is a defaulter as to $30,000; and if he has notes and accounts receivable which have a value, and returns none, he is a defaulter as to such property. 4.
It is enough that all available defenses may be presented to a competent tribunal before exaction of the tax and before the command of the state to pay it becomes final and irrevocable." Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393 (2) ( 54 S.C. 743, 78 LE 1323); Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 534, 541 ( 6 S.E.2d 328). There is no merit in this contention. 2.
Since counsel has expressly abandoned the constitutional attacks upon the charter because it fails to require notice, thus denying due process, we render no decision thereon but only consider the merits of the remaining allegations of the petition. While there has been some statutory authority for the filing of cases in equity, Code ยงยง 92-6803, 92-6807; Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 534 ( 6 S.E.2d 328), to dispute the taxability of property, nevertheless, if the charter provision, Ga. L. 1909, pp. 757, 775-776, for assessment of this property by the city has been complied with, the decision on appeal from the assessors' valuation is final as ruled in City Council of Augusta v. Pearce, 79 Ga. 98 ( 4 S.E. 104). See also Bower v. Mayor c. of Bainbridge, 116 Ga. 794 ( 43 S.E. 67); Shippen Lumber Co. v. Elliott, 134 Ga. 699, 703 ( 68 S.E. 509); Richards v. Zentner, 176 Ga. 222 ( 167 S.E. 516); Swinson v. City of Dublin, 178 Ga. 323 ( 173 S.E. 93); James v. Florida Realty c. Corp., 208 Ga. 652 ( 68 S.E.2d 601).
The good faith of taxing officials and the validity of their actions are presumed, and when assailed the burden of proof is upon the complaining party. Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350 ( 38 Sup. Ct. 495, 62 L. ed. 1154), cited and applied in Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 534, 545 ( 6 S.E.2d 328); Georgia Railroad Banking Co. v. Wright, 125 Ga. 589, 604-606 ( 54 S.E. 52). The testimony on this issue, as set forth in the statement of facts, wholly fails to establish any deliberate or intentional plan or purpose of the defendants to assess some and not assess others, or to assess some for a short period and others for a longer period.
The discrimination would not be more patent had the assessors intentionally and systematically excluded from assessment all intangible properties except those of the complainant, but assessing his intangibles at fifty per cent. of its true value. Such administration by the officials comes within the inhibition of the equal-protection clause of the 14th amendment to the Federal constitution. The principle seems to have been recognized in Mayor c. of Savannah v. Fawcett, 186 Ga. 132 [197 S.E. 253], and Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 534 ( 6 S.E.2d 328), though not expressly ruled on in either case. The case differs on its facts from Nashville, Chattanooga St. Louis Railway v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 368 ( 60 Sup. Ct. 968, 84 L. ed. 1254), distinguishing the above cited cases.
The discrimination would not be more patent had the assessors intentionally and systematically excluded from assessment all intangible properties except those of the complainant, but assessing his intangibles at fifty per cent. of its true value. Such administration by the officials comes within the inhibition of the equal-protection clause of the 14th amendment to the Federal constitution. The principle seems to have been recognized in Mayor c. of Savannah v. Fawcett, 186 Ga. 132 (supra), and Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 534 ( 6 S.E.2d 328), though not expressly ruled on in either case. The case differs on its facts from Nashville, Chattanooga St. Louis Railway v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 368 ( 60 Sup. Ct. 968, 84 L.ed. 1254) distinguishing the above cited cases.
1. If an audit uncovers a taxpayer's undervaluing of returned personalty for ad valorem tax purposes, the subsequent tax bill covering the shortfall is not a reassessment or revaluation of the returned units of property, but a bill for the "default" as to that portion of the personalty not represented through the undervaluation. Garr v. E. W. Banks Co., 206 Ga. 831 ( 59 S.E.2d 400) (1950); see also Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 534 ( 6 S.E.2d 328) (1939); Fayette County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Ga. Utilities Co., 186 Ga. App. 723, 725 ( 368 S.E.2d 326) (1988). For example, if 100 bottles of aspirin have a fair market value of $100, but the 100 bottles are returned with a value of $50, there is a default as to the 50% of the aspirin not represented in the returned value.
However, the board contends that the appropriate remedy in this case was merely to reduce taxpayer's property assessment to the same proportion of fair market value that has been applied generally to similar properties. In Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 534 ( 6 S.E.2d 328), the Supreme Court opined that the Act of 1918 (the act then under consideration) was not invalid merely because it failed to provide for a hearing before the entry of assessment in view of its other procedural safeguards. The court thereafter concluded that "[i]t is sufficient if the delinquent has an opportunity to question the validity or the amount of the assessment, either before the amount is determined or in subsequent proceedings for collection."
In his report and recommendation the hearing examiner discussed section 306 of the 4R Act but found it inapplicable because "[t]he railroads offered no evidence of the prevailing level of assessment of commercial and industrial property in the State as a whole or in any county. Absent such evidence the prevailing level of assessment for such property as a discrete class is presumptively at 40% of value. Hardin v. Reynolds, 189 Ga. 534, 6 S.E.2d [328] (1939). Hence, the discrimination prohibited by 49 U.S.C. ยง 11503 has not occurred.
99, 37 S. Ct. 673, 61 L. Ed. 1280, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 88; Chicago Great Western Ry. v. Kendall, 266 U.S. 94, 45 S. Ct. 55, 69 L. Ed. 183; Bohler v. Callaway, 267 U.S. 479, 45 S. Ct. 431, 69 L. Ed. 745; Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, Neb., 260 U.S. 441, 43 S. Ct. 190, 67 L. Ed. 340, 28 A.L.R. 979; Chicago, B. Q.R. Co. v Board of Commissioners, 54 Kan. 781, 39 P. 1039; Reagan v. Farmers' L. T. Co., 154 U.S. 362, 14 S. Ct. 1047, 38 L. Ed. 1014; Nevada-California Power Co. v. Hamilton, 235 F. 317; Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Davis, 215 F. 349 (6 Cir., 131 C.C.A. 491); Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Commonwealth, 146 Va. 146, 135 S.E. 669; First Nat. Bk. v. McBride, 20 N.M. 381, 149 P. 353; Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bk. v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 76 L. Ed. 265; Central R. Co. v. Martin, 65 F.2d 613, (3 C.C.A.); Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Martin, 100 F.2d 139 (3 C.C.A.); City Ry. Co. v. Beard, 283 F. 313; Lion Coal Co. v. Bunten, 280 F. 887; Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. v. Young, 60 S.D. 291, 244 N.W. 370; Hardin v. Reynolds, Ga., 6 S.E.2d 328; Ashland County Bank v. Village of Butternut, 208 Wis. 90, 241 N.W. 638, 82 A.L.R. 865; West Penn Power Co. v. Board of Review, 112 W. Va. 442, 164 S.E. 862; State ex rel. v. Beamer, 109 Ohio 133, 141 N.E. 851; People ex rel. v. Bridge Co., 287 Ill. 246, 122 N.E. 467; Treadwell Realty Co. v. Memphis, 173 Tenn. 168, 116 S.W.2d 997; Bank of Arizona v. Howe, 293 F. 600; Spokane Eastern Trust Co. v. Spokane County, 70 Wn. 48, 126 P. 54, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 641; Yakima Valley B. T. Co. v. Yakima County, 149 Wn. 552, 271 P. 820; Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 28 S. Ct. 7, 52 L. Ed. 78, 12 Ann. Cas. 757; Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Twp., 247 U.S. 350, 38 S. Ct. 495, 62 L. Ed. 1154; Washington Power Co. v. Kootenai County, 270 F. 369, 273 F. 524; Eminence Distillery Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 178 Ky. 811, 200 S.W. 347; Munn v. Des Moines Nat. Bk., 18 F.2d 269, (8 C.C.A.); Atlanta v Wright, 119 Ga. 207, 45 S.E. 994; Brief in 60 L.R.A. 368; 1 Cooley, The Law of Taxa