Similar writings were held to be sufficient in Franklin v. Welt, 98 N.J. Eq. 602, 131 A. 585, and Padula v. Komishane, 104 N.J. Eq. 409, 146 A. 200. The intention of the parties must be determined from a consideration of the entire instrument, and not of detached portions thereof. 17 C.J.S., Contracts, section 297; Page on Contracts, 2d ed., section 2038; Hardin v. Dimension Lbr. Co., 140 Or. 385, 13 P.2d 602. In our opinion, the contract, under fair and reasonable interpretation, shows with sufficient certainty, despite the absence of apt and specific language of sale, an agreement of the parties respectively to sell and to purchase the described property.
The contracts must be construed as a whole, and effect given, if possible, to every word and phrase. Fendall v. Miller, 99 Or. 610, 196 P. 381 (1921); Hardin v. Dimension Lumber Co., 140 Or. 385, 13 P.2d 602 (1932). Plaintiff's arguments that the original telephone conversation constituted a valid contract and that the court should not go beyond that arrangement, is tenuous in the extreme.
It is a fundamental rule in the construction of contracts that it is the duty of a court to construe a contract as a whole employing any reasonable method of interpretation so that no part of it is ignored and effect can be given to every word and phrase. Automotive Equip. v. 3 Bees Logging, 251 Or. 105, 111, 444 P.2d 1019 (1968); Hardin v. Dimension Lbr. Co., 140 Or. 385, 389, 13 P.2d 602 (1932). As a necessary consequence, the court in performing this function must reconcile inconsistent provisions if it is at all possible. Hardin supra at 388; Lachmund v. Lope Sing, 54 Or. 106, 111, 102 P. 598 (1909).
It is the duty of the court to interpret a document so that no part of it is ignored, if by any reasonable method of interpretation effect can be given to such part as well as to the remaining parts. Hardin v. Dimension Lbr. Co., 140 Or. 385, 390, 13 P.2d 602 (1932). The interpretation requested by Farnam would require that the words "as scheduled" be ignored entirely.
Pointing to the duty of the court to give effect to every provision of a contract where that is possible: Moore v. Schermerhorn, 210 Or. 23, 31, 307 P.2d 483, 308 P.2d 180, 65 ALR2d 715; Hardin v. Dimension Lbr. Co., 140 Or. 385, 389, 13 P.2d 602, plaintiff argues that the construction of the insurance clause urged by it will bring harmony out of this seeming conflict. But this would be to put a meaning upon fire insurance contrary to common understanding, and, so far as we know, to the universal practice of insurance companies.
If the construction urged by petitioner were adopted, the effect would be to nullify the general language in the fourth paragraph of the agreement, because it would then add nothing to the specific language which precedes it. A construction which renders any part meaningless should be avoided, if possible. Hardin v. Dimension Lumber Co., 140 Or. 385, 13 P.2d 602. In State v. Standard Oil Co., 61 Or. 438, 448, 123 P. 40, in discussing the application to statutes of the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," the court said:
We have held many, many times that where a written document is ambiguous, we must look to the entire instrument to ascertain the intent of the parties. Eggen v. Wetterborg, 237 P.2d 970, 193 Or. 145, Hardin et al. v. Dimension Lumber Co., 140 Or. 385, 13 P.2d 602. In my opinion this well-established rule has been totally disregarded by the majority.
Thus, in the instant case, the salary provision, which fixes the amount of compensation appellee is to be paid each year in his employment, is the dominant clause and overrides the provision for method of payment, which is included for the convenience and guidance of the parties but is not essential to the contract. See Hardin v. Dimension Lumber Co., 13 P.2d 602, 604 (Ore. 1932). See generally Savannah c. R. Co. v. Callahan, 56 Ga. 331 (1) (1876); Nice Ball Bearing Co. v. Lescure, 227 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1955).