We view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.Hardin v. City Wide Wrecker Service, 232 Ga. App. 617 ( 502 S.E.2d 548) (1998); see O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 (c).Hardin, supra, 232 Ga. App. 617.

(Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Hardin v. City Wide Wrecker Svc., 232 Ga. App. 617, 619 (2) ( 502 SE2d 548) (1998). Factors showing sufficiently egregious conduct include a relationship in which one person has control over another, an actor's awareness of a victim's particular susceptibility, and severity of harm. Applying these factors, there is no evidence that Moore had any degree of control over Lewis, there is no evidence Moore believed Lewis to be especially vulnerable to a shove, and the severity of harm to Lewis was small.

Accordingly, we agree with Norwest that, if the evidence shows that Fowler signed and delivered a quitclaim and warranty deed conveying the property back to Lionheart Legend, the deed would be binding as between those two parties. Hardin v. City Wide Wrecker Svcs., 232 Ga. App. 617, 618(1)(a) ( 502 S.E.2d 548) (1998). Here, it is undisputed that Fowler signed such deed, intending to convey the property back to Lionheart Legend. Indeed, Lionheart Legend does not even argue otherwise on appeal. Rather, it simply asserts that implicit in the trial court's order is a finding that Fowler did have title.

The liability of both the principal and the agent is based not upon contract, but upon tort. See Hardin v. City Wide Wrecker, 232 Ga. App. 617, 619 (1) (b) ( 502 S.E.2d 548) (1998). Clearly, the relationship between a seller and an auctioneer is that of principal and agent.

" (Punctuation omitted.) Hardin v. City Wide Wrecker Svc., 232 Ga. App. 617 ( 502 S.E.2d 548) (1998). The evidence of record reveals that Etheredge, who has no independent memory of the incident, was crossing a six-lane road on foot when he ran in front of Brian Kersey's Volkswagen Beetle and was struck.

Instead, BAC cites to conversion and other intentional tort cases in which some Georgia courts, without much discussion as to why, have analyzed emotional distress claims arising from intentional torts under the heightened standard for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). See, e.g., Williams, 287 Ga.App. at 285–88, 651 S.E.2d at 196–98 (analyzing plaintiff's separate claims for conversion and IIED); Hardin v. City Wide Wrecker Serv., Inc., 232 Ga.App. 617, 619, 502 S.E.2d 548, 550–51 (1998) (same); Evans v. Willis, 212 Ga.App. 335, 336–37, 441 S.E.2d 770, 772–73 (1994) (reviewing trial court's decision on plaintiff's IIED claim in a case that also involved a conversion claim); see also DeGolyer v. Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C., 291 Ga.App. 444, 449, 662 S.E.2d 141, 147–48 (2008) (analyzing emotional distress damages claim for tort of wrongful foreclosure as claim for IIED); McCarter v. Bankers Trust Co., 247 Ga.App. 129, 133, 543 S.E.2d 755, 758 (2000) (same). Since no Georgia appellate decision has been located that is directly on point, the Court must try to predict based on existing precedent how the Supreme Court of Georgia would answer the following question: can a plaintiff recover emotional distress damages from a defendant if the plaintiff proves that the defendant intentionally converted plaintiff's property and that the conversion proximately caused plaintiff emotional distress, or must a plaintiff prove the elements for the tort of IIED to recover such emotion

The defendants' behavior must be so extreme that "the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and leave him to exclaim `Outrageous!'"Hardin v. City Wide Wrecker Serv. Inc., 232 Ga.App. 617, 502 S.E.2d 548, 550 (1998) (quoting Williams v. Stepler, 227 Ga.App. 591, 594, 490 S.E.2d 167, 170 (1997)). The Plaintiff relies on his medical records to support his contention that he has suffered severe emotional distress.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a tort that protects an individual from suffering extreme emotional distress in the face of outrageous and egregious behavior. Hardin v. City Wide Wrecker Serv., Inc., 232 Ga. App. 617, 502 S.E.2d 548, 550 (1998). The defendant's behavior must be so extreme that "the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and leave him to exclaim `Outrageous!

Secondly, Georgia's recording statutes were written to protect the interest of a bona fide purchaser. Hardin v. City Wide Wrecker Serv. , 232 Ga. App. 617, 618, 502 S.E.2d 548 (1998). Considering this, a court's analysis must be based on the purchaser's perspective.