Hardimon v. Cullum & Maxey Camping Centers, Inc.

6 Citing cases

  1. Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. Argo Const. Corp.

    308 S.W.3d 337 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 18 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Defining procedural unconscionability as being "deprived of a meaningful choice," and substantive unconscionability as involving "terms of the contract are overharsh or one-sided"

    Howard P. Foley Co. v. Cox, 679 S.W.2d 58, 63 (Tex.App. 1984) (citation omitted). In response, Hanson cites a Tennessee case relied on by the trial court, Hardimon v. Cullum Maxey Camping Centers, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 771 .(Tenn.Ct.App. 1979). In Hardimon, the plaintiff purchased a motor home from a dealer.

  2. Lincoln General Insurance Co. v. Detroit Diesel Corp.

    Case No. 3:08-0368 (M.D. Tenn. Sep. 14, 2009)   Cited 3 times
    Holding that the language "Except for the written warranty state above, there are no other warranties, expressed or implied . . . Provost hereby disclaims any and all such warranties" unambiguously waived "every implied warranty, without exception"

    Words "hidden in fine print" are generally not "conspicuous," but, logically, a disclaimer that is "stated in capital letters" and is, therefore, readily apparent to the reader, is conspicuous. Hardimon v. Cullum Maxey CampingCenters , 591 S.W.2d 771, 776 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); Xerox , 2008 WL 2278492 at *6.The warranty disclaimer at issue here is clear and conspicuous.

  3. Stridiron v. I.C., Inc.

    578 F. Supp. 997 (D.V.I. 1984)   Cited 5 times

    Id. 374 A.2d at 149. See also Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago South, 310 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1981); Hardimon v. Cullum Maxey Camping Caters, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 771, 774-75 (Tenn.App. 1979). (Buyer not precluded from revoking acceptance on ground that motor home had undergone a substantial change in condition in that it was driven 7000 miles before revocation).

  4. Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago South

    310 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1981)   Cited 77 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Affirming jury finding that revocation 12 months after delivery was reasonable and citing with approval case allowing "revocation 14 months after initial delivery where the dealer had attempted, unsuccessfully, to repair the major defects in the vehicle"

    About 900 of those miles had been added after the revocation letter. We considered the 6300 miles driven in the defective car in Durfee troublesome but found, under the circumstances, that it did not constitute a substantial change in condition so as to preclude revocation of acceptance. 262 N.W.2d at 353 n. 4. See also Hardimon v. Cullum Maxey Camping Centers, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 771 (Tenn.App. 1979) (7000 miles on defective motorhome); Murray, 83 Wis.2d at 428, 265 N.W.2d at 524 (3650 miles on defective motorhome). The 900 miles driven in the motorhome after revocation is not inconsistent with the necessity of checking the vehicle after repairs were made by Chevrolet.

  5. Vista Chevrlet, Inc. v. Lewis

    704 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. App. 1985)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that witness testimony as to the buyer's private valuation of the defective vehicle was not competent evidence of its market value

    Black v. Don Schmid Motor, Inc., 232 Kan. 458, 657 P.2d 517 (1983); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977). The mere fact that the continued use of a motor vehicle increases the mileage placed on the vehicle does not bar the buyer from revoking his acceptance of the vehicle for substantial impairment of the value of the vehicle to the buyer. Black v. Don Schmid Motor, Inc., 232 Kan. 458, 657 P.2d 517 (1983); Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago South, 310 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1981); Hardimon v. Cullum Maxey Camping Center, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 771 (Tenn.App. 1979). Also, the mere fact that the motor vehicle was used extensively does not prevent the jury from concluding that there was a breach of implied warranty of merchantability which substantially impaired the value of the goods to the buyer.

  6. Byrd Motor Lines v. Dunlop Tire and Rubber

    63 N.C. App. 292 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 18 times
    Viewing separately-purchased tires as the "product" where the tires were installed on plaintiff's existing trucks and caused automobile accidents resulting in property damage to the trucks, although not specifically considering the economic loss rule

    That state has identical sections of the Uniform Commercial Code on this point to those of North Carolina and applies the law the same way. See Tenn. Code Ann. 47-2-316 (4) and -2-719 (3). See also, Hardimon v. Cullum and Maxey Camping Centers, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 771 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1979); Beaunit Corp. v. Volunteer Natural Gas Co., 402 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D.Tenn. 1975).