Howard P. Foley Co. v. Cox, 679 S.W.2d 58, 63 (Tex.App. 1984) (citation omitted). In response, Hanson cites a Tennessee case relied on by the trial court, Hardimon v. Cullum Maxey Camping Centers, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 771 .(Tenn.Ct.App. 1979). In Hardimon, the plaintiff purchased a motor home from a dealer.
Words "hidden in fine print" are generally not "conspicuous," but, logically, a disclaimer that is "stated in capital letters" and is, therefore, readily apparent to the reader, is conspicuous. Hardimon v. Cullum Maxey CampingCenters , 591 S.W.2d 771, 776 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); Xerox , 2008 WL 2278492 at *6.The warranty disclaimer at issue here is clear and conspicuous.
Id. 374 A.2d at 149. See also Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago South, 310 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1981); Hardimon v. Cullum Maxey Camping Caters, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 771, 774-75 (Tenn.App. 1979). (Buyer not precluded from revoking acceptance on ground that motor home had undergone a substantial change in condition in that it was driven 7000 miles before revocation).
About 900 of those miles had been added after the revocation letter. We considered the 6300 miles driven in the defective car in Durfee troublesome but found, under the circumstances, that it did not constitute a substantial change in condition so as to preclude revocation of acceptance. 262 N.W.2d at 353 n. 4. See also Hardimon v. Cullum Maxey Camping Centers, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 771 (Tenn.App. 1979) (7000 miles on defective motorhome); Murray, 83 Wis.2d at 428, 265 N.W.2d at 524 (3650 miles on defective motorhome). The 900 miles driven in the motorhome after revocation is not inconsistent with the necessity of checking the vehicle after repairs were made by Chevrolet.
Black v. Don Schmid Motor, Inc., 232 Kan. 458, 657 P.2d 517 (1983); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977). The mere fact that the continued use of a motor vehicle increases the mileage placed on the vehicle does not bar the buyer from revoking his acceptance of the vehicle for substantial impairment of the value of the vehicle to the buyer. Black v. Don Schmid Motor, Inc., 232 Kan. 458, 657 P.2d 517 (1983); Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago South, 310 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1981); Hardimon v. Cullum Maxey Camping Center, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 771 (Tenn.App. 1979). Also, the mere fact that the motor vehicle was used extensively does not prevent the jury from concluding that there was a breach of implied warranty of merchantability which substantially impaired the value of the goods to the buyer.
That state has identical sections of the Uniform Commercial Code on this point to those of North Carolina and applies the law the same way. See Tenn. Code Ann. 47-2-316 (4) and -2-719 (3). See also, Hardimon v. Cullum and Maxey Camping Centers, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 771 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1979); Beaunit Corp. v. Volunteer Natural Gas Co., 402 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D.Tenn. 1975).