Opinion
No. 10-23-00043-CV
07-19-2023
William D. HARDEN, Appellant v. US BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE, Successor-in-Interest TO BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Successor by Merger to LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee for Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-6, Appellees
Emily Stroope, McGlinchey Stafford, Dallas, for Appellee. William D. Harden, Pro Se.
Emily Stroope, McGlinchey Stafford, Dallas, for Appellee.
William D. Harden, Pro Se.
Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Johnson, and Justice Smith
(Chief Justice Gray dissenting)
MATT JOHNSON, Justice
In this appeal, William D. Harden, acting pro se , challenges the trial court's order granting the petition for bill of review filed by U.S. Bank, N.A., as Trustee, Successor-in-Interest to Bank of America, N.A., Successor by Merger to LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee for Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-6, (U.S. Bank). The order does not dispose of the merits of the underlying controversy between Harden and U.S. Bank.
Unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal, which is not the case here, appellate courts generally only have jurisdiction over final judgments. CMH Homes v. Perez , 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2011) ; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.012, 51.014 (listing interlocutory orders that may be appealed before final judgment is rendered in the case). In a bill-of-review proceeding,
[the] judgment following the granting of a bill of review must not only grant the bill of review, thereby setting aside the default judgment, but also must adjudicate the original controversy. Whether as one order standing alone or two orders taken together, structurally, in an action in which a bill of review is granted, two matters must be resolved: (1) a finding that the default judgment was wrongfully granted, and (2) a determination of whether the plaintiff in the original controversy ultimately prevails.
....
... [A] bill of review is a different procedural device—it is both filed and resolves the underlying dispute in a separate lawsuit. It does not, therefore, restore a court's plenary power over a cause of action that has been resolved by final judgment.
Alaimo v. U.S. Bank Trust Nat'l Ass'n , 551 S.W.3d 212, 217 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.). Accordingly, the Texas Supreme Court has stated: "A bill of review which sets aside a prior judgment but does not dispose of all the issues of the case on the merits is interlocutory in nature and not a final judgment appealable to the court of appeals or the supreme court." Kiefer v. Touris , 197 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting Tesoro Petroleum v. Smith , 796 S.W.2d 705, 705 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) ); Capps v. Hines , No. 10-19-00164-CV, 2020 WL 4524717, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Because the trial court's order in this proceeding does not dispose of the merits of the underlying controversy between Harden and U.S. Bank, the order is therefore interlocutory in nature and not a final judgment. See Kiefer , 197 S.W.3d at 302 ; Capps , 2020 WL 4524717, at *3 ; Alaimo , 551 S.W.3d at 217. We thus lack jurisdiction of this appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.012 ; CMH Homes , 340 S.W.3d at 447.
As noted by the dissent, the trial court did sign a "Final Order" in this proceeding. And we recognize that the Texas Supreme Court has held that a judgment is final and appealable if there is no question that the trial court intended it to be so. See Bella Palma, LLC v. Young , 601 S.W.3d 799, 801–02 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam). Here, however, the trial court's "Final Order" does not state that it is disposing of all claims and all parties. To the contrary, the order acknowledges that the underlying controversy between Harden and U.S. Bank remains unresolved. See Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001) ("An order does not dispose of all claims and all parties merely because it is entitled ‘final’, or because the word ‘final’ appears elsewhere in the order, or even because it awards costs.... Rather, there must be some other clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case.").
By letters dated February 6, 2023, and March 14, 2023, the Clerk of this Court notified Harden that this appeal was subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction because it appeared that there was no final judgment. The Clerk of this Court notified Harden that the Court may dismiss the appeal unless, within fourteen days of the date of the letter, a response was filed showing grounds for continuing the appeal. Harden filed a response, but he has not shown grounds for continuing the appeal.
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
(Chief Justice Gray dissenting)
DISSENT
TOM GRAY, Chief Justice
I cannot imagine what the trial court could do to make it any clearer that the proceeding is intended to be final, over, and done, than the "Final Order" signed in this proceeding. It states in its entirety:
FINAL ORDER
This matter was filed via an Original Petition for Bill of Review of the default Final Judgment entered in Cause Number C2012-00370 on June 13, 2013.
The Court heard the Bill of Review, granted the Bill of Review, and vacated the Default Judgment in C2012-00370 in the Order titled "Order Granting Petition for Bill of Review."
All relief requested in this matter has been granted, the November 7, 2022 order resolved all claims properly presented to the Court, and the file should be closed.
This Final Order, as well as the November 7, 2022 Order Granting Petition for Bill of Review, shall be filed in Cause Number C2012-00370; which shall be reopened for any further proceedings.
SO ORDERED,
SIGNED on ___February 17, 2023___
__________/S/_______________
I find no fault with the law presented in the Court's opinion regarding the merits of a bill of review, but that is not what determines our jurisdiction. It is not because the trial court did not properly dispose of all the facets of a completed bill of review in this proceeding that we do not have jurisdiction. Rather, it is because we have a final judgment that is clearly intended by the trial court to dispose of all issues as to all parties in this proceeding that we have jurisdiction. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001). The trial court intends that nothing more happen in this proceeding, and the Final Order makes that unmistakably clear. There will never be anything with more finality in this proceeding than the "Final Order;" so it is now or never for the appeal of this trial court proceeding. It may be erroneous or even erroneously final, but it is final. See Patel v. Nations Renovations, LLC , 661 S.W.3d 151, 154-156 (Tex. 2023). Because there is a final appealable order that the appellant wants to complain about, we not only have the jurisdiction but also have the duty to take this appeal and get the bill of review proceeding back on track if we can. Because the Court dismisses the appeal for want of jurisdiction instead of allowing the appeal to proceed, I respectfully dissent.