Opinion
No. 05-11-00090-CR
01-04-2012
ANTOINE JAMAL HARDEN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
AFFIRM; Opinion issued January 4, 2012
On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F09-56379-W
OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, O'Neill, and Fillmore
Opinion By Justice Bridges
A jury convicted Antoine Jamal Harden of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit sexual assault and assessed punishment at fifty years' imprisonment. In a single issue, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm.
Evidence Presented
The complainant testified that on June 29, 2009, appellant forced his way into her apartment and tried to sexually assault her. The complainant testified her husband left for work at 8:00 a.m. each day. Sometime between 9:30 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., the complainant's two young children came inside and said a man had frightened them. The complainant went outside and saw appellant trying to take her son's bicycle. She confronted appellant, but appellant said nothing. When the complainant and her children went back inside the apartment, appellant forced his way in and said everything inside the apartment belonged to him. The complainant tried to call 911, but appellant took the telephone. Appellant pushed the complainant into the bathroom, lowered his pants, and ordered her to look at him. The complainant testified appellant touched "his privates," pushed the complainant against the sink, and "lunged his body against mine." The complainant testified her children were screaming at appellant to stop. The complainant told her children to get help. When a neighbor came to help, appellant attempted to convince the neighbor that the complainant was his wife and the children were his. When appellant loosened his grip on the complainant, she ran to the manager's office, where she called 911 and her husband. The complainant testified she did not know appellant or give him consent to enter her apartment, and she did not know appellant lived in the apartment above hers.
Patrick Murria testified that as he was walking to his motorcycle, he saw two children run out of their apartment yelling for help. Murria went with the children back to their apartment and went to the bathroom. He saw appellant holding the complainant by her hair and trying to force her to perform oral sex on appellant. Appellant's pants were down. When appellant noticed Murria there, he dragged the complainant out of the bathroom and tried to explain that she was his wife and the children were his. The complainant was "screaming and hollering." Murria ordered appellant to let the complainant go. When appellant complied, the complainant and her children ran from the apartment. Murria walked outside and used his cell phone to call 911. After ten minutes, appellant came out of the complainant's apartment and walked around the apartment complex. Murria followed him. Appellant walked to Murria's apartment, which was across the parking lot from the complainant's apartment, and grabbed the doorknob. Murria called 911 a second time. When appellant attempted to take Murria's phone, Murria physically restrained him. Murria testified that when the police arrived and searched appellant, they found the complainant's telephone in appellant's pocket.
Several 911 audiotapes were admitted into evidence and played to the jury.
Applicable Law
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). We are required to defer to the jury's credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326.
The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant, without the effective consent of the owner, intentionally or knowingly entered the complainant's habitation with the intent to commit a felony other than felony theft, or committed or attempted to commit a felony other than felony theft. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(1), (d) (West 2011).
Discussion
Appellant asserts that because he was mentally confused and thought he had entered his own apartment, the evidence is insufficient to show he knowingly and intentionally entered the complainant's apartment with the intent to commit sexual assault. The State responds that the evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction.
The jury heard the complainant's testimony that appellant forced his way into her apartment, forced her into the bathroom, pulled his pants down, and tried to sexually assault her. The jury heard Murria's testimony that he observed appellant in the complainant's apartment attempting to force her to perform oral sex on appellant. The jury heard 911 tapes that included calls from the complainant, Murria, the apartment manager, and the apartment maintenance supervisor. It was the jury's function to resolve any conflicts in the evidence, and the jury was free to accept or reject any and all of the evidence presented by either side. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (West 1979); Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Viewing the evidence under the proper standard, we conclude a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant entered the complainant's habitation without her consent and with intent to commit sexual assault. Thus, the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895. We resolve appellant's sole issue against him.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
DAVID L. BRIDGES
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
110090F.U05