Under the common law a warehouseman was entitled only to a specific lien on the goods in storage but under the Uniform Act and the Florida statute which followed it the lien was made general. Harbor View Corporation v. Brandy, 1 Cir., 1951, 189 F.2d 481; 4 Williston on Contracts, § 1058, n. 2 (Rev.Ed. 1936). The Referee in Bankruptcy found that these commodities were not represented by warehouse receipts and were not deposited with appellant in accordance with the statute, and thus were not subject to the lien of appellant to the detriment of the Trustee in Bankruptcy.
If the person on whose account the goods are held is liable for similar charges or expenses in relation to other goods whenever deposited and it is stated in the warehouse receipt or storage agreement that a lien is claimed for charges and expenses in relation to other goods, the warehouse also has a lien against the goods covered by the warehouse receipt or storage agreement ... for those charges and expenses, whether or not the other goods have been delivered by the warehouse. To create a general lien, (1) the bailor must be liable for storage charges in relation to goods other than those at issue in the receipt, and (2) the receipt or storage agreement must state that the lien is claimed for charges in relation to those other goods. U.C.C. § 7–209(a); cf.Harbor View Marine Corp. v. Braudy, 189 F.2d 481, 485 (1st Cir.1951) (in cases of non-negotiable receipts, customer may withdraw part of goods from warehouse without paying charges, so long as warehouse retains other goods of customer to serve as security for debt on general account); Robinson v. Larrabee, 63 Me. 116, 117 (Maine 1873) (“[t]here is no question but the voluntary relinquishment, by the bailee, of possession of the subject of the bailment discharges his lien, unless it is consistent with the contract, the course of business or the intention of the parties”). Courts may look to pre-UCC caselaw where the statutory provisions relied on therein are not inconsistent with the UCC. U.C.C. § 1–103(b) & cmt. 2 (2003).
If the person on whose account the goods are held is liable for similar charges or expenses in relation to other goods whenever deposited and it is stated in the warehouse receipt or storage agreement that a lien is claimed for charges and expenses in relation to other goods, the warehouse also has a lien against the goods covered by the warehouse receipt or storage agreement ... for those charges and expenses, whether or not the other goods have been delivered by the warehouse. To create a general lien, (1) the bailor must be liable for storage charges in relation to goods other than those at issue in the receipt, and (2) the receipt or storage agreement must state that the lien is claimed for charges in relation to those other goods. U.C.C. § 7-209(a); cf. Harbor View Marine Corp. v. Braudy, 189 F.2d 481, 485 (1st Cir. 1951) (in cases of non-negotiable receipts, customer may withdraw part of goods from warehouse without paying charges, so long as warehouse retains other goods of customer to serve as security for debt on general account); Robinson v. Larrabee, 63 Me. 116, 117 (Maine 1873) ("[t]here is no question but the voluntary relinquishment, by the bailee, of possession of the subject of the bailment discharges his lien, unless it is consistent with the contract, the course of business or the intention of the parties"). Courts may look to pre-UCC caselaw where the statutory provisions relied on therein are not inconsistent with the UCC. U.C.C. § 1-103(b) & cmt. 2 (2003).
The pertinent provisions of our Statute appear at Code 1935, §§ 5919 to 5922, inclusive. Statutory provisions substantially the same as ours, and likewise adopted from the Uniform Act, were minutely scrutinized in Harbor View Marine Corp. v. Braudy, 1 Cir., 189 F.2d 481. After exhaustive review of the common law, of the genesis of the Uniform Act, and of the construction of that Act in other jurisdictions, the Court there concluded that the pertinent statutory provisions give a warehouseman a general lien rather than a specific one where non-negotiable warehouse receipts are issued. I adopt the reasoning and the conclusion stated in the Braudy case. For the reasons stated therein, it is held that the Delaware Warehouse Receipts Act gives a warehouseman a general lien where non-negotiable receipts are issued. It follows that, in the instant case, the defendants properly asserted a lien against the goods on deposit for all storage charges then owing by the plaintiff to the defendants, and that such lien was not restricted to the storage charges due for goods then on hand. Turning now to the second question regarding the legal consequences when a warehouseman purchases goods at his own lien-enforcement sale, there is a surprising dearth of authority on