Opinion
C/A No. 8:17-575-MGL-JDA
03-23-2017
Jason A. Harbin, Plaintiff, v. Lori Partin; Julian L. Stoudemire; Stoudemire & Sprouse Law, PA, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jason A. Harbin ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action alleging a violation of his federal constitutional rights. [See Docs. 1, 4, 5.] Plaintiff files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and it appears that he is a non-prisoner. The Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that he is the father of two minor children, and Lori Partin is the mother. [Doc. 4.] He appears to allege the following facts. Julian L. Stoudemire is an attorney with Stoudemire & Sprouse Law, PA, who has represented Lori Partin during family court proceedings in the Tenth Judicial Circuit of South Carolina. [Docs. 4, 5.] Plaintiff's first, fifth, and fourteenth amendment rights have been violated and "not upheld in this case from Oct. 4, 2011," which caused him to file this case and emergency motion. [Doc. 1.] In 2015, Plaintiff's parental rights with respect to the two minor children at issue in this case were terminated by a South Carolina family court. [Doc. 4, Doc. 5-5 at 10.] He alleges that the two children "are unlawfully being placed for adoption by an unloving parent the Mother Partin." [Doc. 4.]
It appears he may have other children who are not involved in this case.
It appears Plaintiff appealed the family court decision to the South Carolina Court of Appeals. [Doc. 5-5 at 1.] And, it appears he unsuccessfully filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the South Carolina Supreme Court. [Doc. 5-5 at 3; Doc. 5-4 at 40 (letter from an attorney to Jason Harbin dated Jan. 9, 2017, that Harbin had lost the case in state court).]
Plaintiff alleges that due to fraud the opposing counsel blocked his "right to obtain his parental rights as a father." [Doc. 4 at 8.] He contends "this is now a question for federal court since all options were used in state court," and this Court "must reinstate Father Harbin's right to parent his children." [Id.]
For his relief, Plaintiff requests that it "be determined by the courts." [Doc. 1 at 5.] And, in his motion for TRO, Plaintiff had requested an emergency order from this Court to halt "a future fraudulent adoption of the couple's two children" and "for a return of minor children to custody of the loving father." [Doc. 4 at 1.] The motion for TRO/preliminary injunction was denied on March 22, 2017. [Doc. 18.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) DSC, the undersigned is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal.
The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
This Complaint appears to be filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1501 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
In the instant case, Plaintiff fails to allege a plausible claim pursuant to § 1983 due to his failure to allege state action. Section 1983 "provides a cause of action against any person who deprives an individual of federally guaranteed rights 'under color' of state law." Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1661 (2012). "Anyone whose conduct is 'fairly attributable to the state' can be sued as a state actor under § 1983." Id. The allegations against Lori Partin, the mother, her attorney, Julian L. Stoudemire, and the law firm, seem to allege they are private citizens or entities. There are no allegations that the Defendants acted in any way attributable to a state. With few exceptions, purely private conduct, no matter how wrongful, is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States Constitution. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1983); Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001). Therefore, because Plaintiff fails to allege state action, the Complaint should be dismissed.
However, even if Plaintiff had alleged state action sufficient under § 1983 or some other cause of action, this case should be dismissed based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Where a plaintiff files an action in a United States district court to seek review and reversal of a state court judgment rendered before the district court proceedings commenced, the claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; only the United States Supreme Court may review state-court decisions. See Davani v. Virginia Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining how the expansive interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was limited by Exxon Mobile Corp. V. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)); see also Dukes v. Stone, No. 3:08-505-PMD-JRM, 2009 WL 398079 at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2009) (explaining that only the United States Supreme Court is empowered with appellate authority to reverse or modify a state court judgment).
The crux of Plaintiff's case seems to be seeking an order to vacate the state court's alleged wrongful order to terminate Plaintiff's parental rights because he requests a return of the minor children to his custody. Plaintiff is not satisfied with the litigation results in the state courts, and he improperly brings this action in an attempt to overrule the state court decisions. See Smalley v. Shapiro & Burson, 526 F. App'x 231, 235-36 (4th Cir. 2013) (party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of state judgment). Therefore, this case should be dismissed due to the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine.
This Court acknowledges that "[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that 'federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress.'" Martin v. Stewart, 499 F.3d 360, 363 (4th Cir. 2007). Abstention doctrines are rare exceptions to a federal court's duty to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it. Id.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page. March 23, 2017
Greenville, South Carolina
S/Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).