Harara v. ConocoPhillips Co.

23 Citing cases

  1. BSD, Inc. v. Equilon Enters., LLC

    Case No: C 10-05223 SBA (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013)

    Id. The Court finds that Youstine's failure to pay monthly rent and for products constitutes a failure by Youstine "to comply with any provision ofthe franchise, which is both reasonable and of material significance to the franchise relationship," and therefore is a valid ground for termination. See Harara v. ConocoPhillips Co., 377 F.Supp.2d 779, 791 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Zipper v. Sun Co., Inc., 947 F.Supp. 62, 67 (E.D. N.Y. 1996). Instead, Youstine contends that a factual dispute exists as to whether the Notice of Termination and Supplemental Notice of Termination are defective under the PMPA. Specifically, Youstine argues that Equilon did not terminate its franchise in accordance with the PMPA, for two reasons.

  2. Kennedy Funding, Inc. v. Chapman

    Case No. C 09-01957 RS (N.D. Cal. Jun. 18, 2010)   Cited 13 times
    Dismissing cause of action, while noting that claims for accounting "are more appropriately characterized as forms of relief than independent claims"

    Plaintiff's claims for accounting of the Malpractice Judgment Proceeds, specific performance and injunctive relief are more appropriately characterized as forms of relief than independent claims. See, e.g., Santos v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. Civ. 2:09-02642, 2009 WL 3756337 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2009) ("declaratory and injunctive relief are not independent claims, but rather they are forms of relief") (citing McDowell v. Watson, 59 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1159, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 692 (1997)); Harara v. ConocoPhillips Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 779, 796 (N.D. Cal. 2005) ("[s]pecific performance is a form of contractual relief, not an independent claim.") (citing 5 Witkin, California Procedure, Pleading § 740 (4th ed. 1997)); Williams v. ARC Music Corp., 121 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[t]here is no independent cause of action for appointment of a receiver.")

  3. BP Products North America Inc. v. Walcott Enterprises

    Case No. 08-6038-CV-SJ-HFS (W.D. Mo. Sep. 30, 2009)

    However, based on the express provisions of the Jobber Contract, Walcott has failed to show that a constructive termination took place. Harara v. Conoco Phillips Co., 377 F.Supp.2d 779, 790 (N.D.Cal. 2005); citing,April Mktg. Distrib. Corp. v. Diamond Shamrock Ref. Mktg. Co., 103 F.3d 28, 30-31 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that a claim for constructive termination does not exist where the franchisor has acted within its rights under the franchise). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held that even assuming that a constructive termination claim is actionable under the PMPA, the plaintiff has not submitted sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant violated the franchise agreement.

  4. Anand v. BP West Coast Products LLC

    484 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2007)   Cited 30 times
    Considering both pre- and post-offer appraisals

    A franchisor meets the `normal course of business' requirement if the determination was the result of the franchisor['s] normal decision making process." Harara v. ConocoPhillips Co., 377 F.Supp.2d 779, 785 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting BP West Coast Products LLC v. Greene, 318 F.Supp.2d 987, 996 (E.D. Cal. 2004)). There is no dispute that BP did not renew its franchise agreement with Anand. As a result, BP bears the burden of establishing that its non-renewal was proper under the PMPA.

  5. Fazli v. Conocophillips Co.

    369 F. App'x 814 (9th Cir. 2010)   Cited 1 times

    Finally, Fazli is mistaken in asserting that courts may not consider evidence of offers and appraisals that post-date a purported bona fide offer. See Slatky v. Amoco Oil Co., 830 F.2d 476, 485-86 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that district court should have considered evidence in the record, which included pre- and post-offer appraisals, in determining whether the franchisor's sale offer was bona fide); Anand v. BP West Coast Products LLC, 484 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1097-98 (C.D.Cal. 2007) (considering both pre- and post-offer appraisals); Harara v. ConocoPhillips, 377 F.Supp.2d 779, 788 (N.D.Cal. 2005) (considering pre-offer appraisals, a post-offer bid by a third party, and the post-offer sale of the property to a third party). The district court did not err in granting summary judgment with respect to Fazli's PMPA claim.

  6. Martinez-Carranza v. Plumbers & Pipefitters Union Local No. 525 Tr. Funds

    2:20-cv-01930-VCF (D. Nev. Mar. 29, 2021)

    Specific performance is a remedy, not a claim. See Black's Law Dictionary (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 8th ed. 2004) at 1435 ("Specific performance: [A] court-ordered remedy that requires precise fulfillment of a legal or contractual obligation when monetary damages are inappropriate or inadequate ... an equitable remedy that lies within the court's discretion to award whenever the common-law remedy is insufficient, either because damages would be inadequate or because the damages could not possibly be established.") (emphasis added); see also Harara v. ConocoPhillips Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 779, 796 n.20 (N.D. Cal. 2005) ("Specific performance is a form of contractual relief, not an independent claim.") Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim for specific performance because specific performance is not an independent claim: for example, specific performance can be a form of relief in a complaint that states a breach of contract claim.

  7. United States v. Sandwich Isles Commc'ns, Inc.

    Civ. No. 18-00145 JMS-RT (D. Haw. Feb. 3, 2020)

    Given those definitions, Count Two plainly fails—none of the alleged failures to provide notice concerned "adverse actions" under the ECOA. See, e.g., Harara v. ConocoPhillips Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 779, 792 (N.D. Cal. 2005) ("As the adverse action was based on plaintiff's default, section 1691(d)(2) does not provide plaintiff with a basis for a claim."); Adams v. Bank. of Am., N.A., 237 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1210 (N.D. Ala. 2017) ("As a matter of binding precedent, when a debtor is in default at the time her note is accelerated, that acceleration is not an adverse action.") (citing Haynes v. Bank of Wedowee, 634 F.2d 266, 272 (5th Cir. 1981)); Davis v. Citimortgage, Inc., 2011 WL 891209, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 2011) ("[T]he ECOA's notice requirements do not apply where the consumer requesting credit is delinquent or in default on an existing credit arrangement with the creditor."). Because further amendment would be futile, the dismissal of Count Two of the counterclaim is with prejudice.

  8. Drake v. Niello Co.

    No. 2:17-cv-1036-JAM-EFB PS (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2018)   Cited 1 times

    Specific performance is a remedy and not a cause of action. See Harara v. ConocoPhillips Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 779, 796 n.20 (N.D. Cal. 2005) ("Specific performance is a form of contractual relief, not an independent claim."). Thus, the court construes this claim as a state law breach of contract claim.

  9. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. James in Wung Park

    Case No. 15-cv-02716-DMR (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2015)

    Specific performance and injunctive relief are forms of relief, not independent causes of action. Harara v. ConocoPhillips Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 779, 796 n.20 (N.D. Cal. 2005) ("[s]pecific performance is a form of contractual relief, not an independent claim."); Hamilton v. Bank of Blue Valley, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1182 (E.D. Cal. 2010) ("[i]njunctive relief is a remedy and not, in itself, a cause of action" (citation omitted)). Similarly, "[q]uia timet (literal translation, 'because he fears'), is an action for equitable relief against an anticipated injury."

  10. Carpenters Southwest Admin. Corp. v. Gamma Constr. Servs., Inc.

    EDCV 14-01225 JGB (SPx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2015)

    Specific performance is not itself a cause of action, but rather " a remedy for breach of contract." Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim, 25 Cal.App.4th 11, 49, 31, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 378 (Cal.Ct.App.1994) (emphasis in original); see also Harara v. ConocoPhillips Co., 377 F.Supp.2d 779, 796 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (" Specific performance is a form of contractual relief, not an independent claim"). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim for breach of the Agreements as to entitle Plaintiffs to specific performance.