Hapke v. Brandon

11 Citing cases

  1. The People v. Williams

    22 Ill. 2d 498 (Ill. 1961)   Cited 21 times
    Arguing better rule is that even when witness admits prior inconsistent statement extrinsic evidence of that prior statement should still be admissible

    Our holding in the Wade case, therefore, can not be said to be square authority for the proposition now advanced by the defendant. The better view would seem to be that a party is not foreclosed from making further proof of the former inconsistent statements even when the witness admits having made such statements, for the party may prefer to have these statements clearly brought out and emphasized. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1037; Hapke v. Brandon, 343 Ill. App. 524.) We are of the opinion that the trial court properly admitted the written statement in evidence.

  2. The People v. Flowers

    14 Ill. 2d 406 (Ill. 1958)   Cited 21 times
    In People v. Flowers (1958), 14 Ill.2d 406, 152 N.E.2d 838, one of the witnesses testified that he was the chief polygraph examiner for the State Bureau of Identification. He testified that a statement was made by the defendant.

    He merely said that the statement is incorrect as to what actually occurred. A written statement made by a witness who admits his signature thereon, which is inconsistent with his testimony on the stand, when identified by him on cross-examination, is admissible to impeach him. Gerrard v. Porcheddu, 243 Ill. App. 562; Hapke v. Brandon, 343 Ill. App. 524. Defendant additionally insists that the statement was improperly used, as it was obtained by trick in the preparation of a lie-detector test, and it suggested to the jury that a lie-detector test had been given to defendant.

  3. Phillips v. Mooney

    126 A.2d 305 (D.C. 1956)   Cited 9 times
    In Phillips the court noted that — as in the instant case — "each party testified that the other assaulted him and also that there was conflicting evidence as to who was the aggressor."

    It is not admitted as affirmative proof of fact for any other purpose. With this necessary limitation recognized, it is evident the statements in the affidavit were not offered as proof of defendant's violent temper or violent acts. Not being offered testimonially, they therefore did not violate the hearsay rule. National Labor Relations Bd. v. Quest-Shon Mark B. Co., 2 Cir., 185 F.2d 285, certiorari denied 342 U.S. 812, 72 S.Ct. 25, 96 L.Ed. 614; United States v. Biener, D.C.E.D.Pa., 52 F. Supp. 54; Byrd v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 43 A.2d 46; Kroplin v. Huston, 79 Cal.App.2d 332, 179 P.2d 575; Hapke v. Brandon, 343 Ill. App. 524, 99 N.E.2d 636; Salonen v. Paanenen, 320 Mass. 568, 71 N.E.2d 227; Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 3, § 1018(a) (3d ed. 1940). In support of his first argument defendant cites the general rule, with which we agree, that if inquiry on cross-examination is directed to the witness's prior contradictory statements about collateral matters, the cross-examiner is precluded from offering extrinsic evidence to contradict the collateral statements.

  4. Laughlin v. Chenoweth

    92 Ill. App. 3d 430 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 4 times

    246 Ill. 62, 69, 92 N.E. 575, 578. In Hapke v. Brandon (1951), 343 Ill. App. 524, 99 N.E.2d 636, Wade was cited with approval and the trial court was reversed for refusing to admit impeaching statements which the witness had admitted signing. The witness had denied saying the things attributed to him in the statements.

  5. People v. Alarshi

    57 Ill. App. 3d 464 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)   Cited 3 times

    We are unable to agree with defendant's position that these inconsistencies constitute material discrepancies impeaching the witness. Although out-of-court written or oral statements may be introduced to discredit a witness ( Hapke v. Brandon (1951), 343 Ill. App. 524, 528, 99 N.E.2d 636), these statements "must have the `reasonable tendency' to discredit the testimony of the witness on a material matter." ( People v. Brown (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 500, 504, 285 N.E.2d 515, quoting from People v. Rainford (1965), 58 Ill. App.2d 312, 321, 208 N.E.2d 314; see also Reilly Tar Chemical Corp. v. Lewis (1942), 326 Ill. App. 84, 87, 61 N.E.2d 290.) Jean Watson's testimony at the preliminary hearing that she was unable to recall the number of shots fired, as well as her omission of defendant's earlier remark and the first shot, are not contradictions of material matters bearing upon the trial issue as to whether defendant fired the shot which struck Freddi Demellow.

  6. Babington v. Bogdanovic

    7 Ill. App. 3d 593 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972)   Cited 16 times
    Surveying terminology

    • 3 The above holding from the Wade case, in our view, continues to be the controlling law in Illinois. ( Esderts v. Chicago, Rock Island Pacific R.R. Co., 76 Ill. App.2d 210, 222 N.E.2d 117, 125; Hapke v. Brandon, 343 Ill. App. 524, 99 N.E.2d 636, 638.) In the instant case, the allegedly impeaching statement was offered and admitted at the opportune time, after a correct and proper foundation had been laid. No error.

  7. People v. Mostafa

    5 Ill. App. 3d 158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971)   Cited 37 times
    In People v. Mostafa (1971), 5 Ill. App.3d 158, the court held that it was error not to give an instruction that the jury had "`[a] right to take into consideration whether [the accomplice witnesses] have been promised consideration in relation to their punishment for their testimony'" (5 Ill. App.3d at 166) even though the trial court had given IPI Criminal No. 3.17. 5 Ill. App.3d at 168.

    ( Rodenkirk v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 421, 60 N.E.2d 269; see People v. Williams, 22 Ill.2d 498, 177 N.E.2d 100, and People v. Jarrett, 57 Ill. App.2d 169, 206 N.E.2d 835.) If Myers, as a court witness, denied having made the statement, it would have been prejudicial error to refuse admission of those portions inconsistent with his testimony. ( Hapke v. Brandon, 343 Ill. App. 524, 99 N.E.2d 636; Dorf v. Egyptian Freightways, Inc., 39 Ill. App.2d 2, 188 N.E.2d 103; compare Esderts v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R. Co., 76 Ill. App.2d 210, 222 N.E.2d 117.) As a result of the trial judge's refusal, defendant was deprived of the only witness through whom, in an orderly way, he could have established his defense.

  8. Esderts v. Chicago, R.I. P.R. Co.

    222 N.E.2d 117 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966)   Cited 21 times

    It has been held that when it is desired to impeach a witness by a statement written or signed by him, and the proper foundation has been laid by permitting the witness to read the statement and proving by him or others that he wrote it himself, or that what he said was reduced to writing and was signed by him, the statement should be introduced into evidence during the cross-examiner's case and the portions contradictory to the witness' testimony read to the jury. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Wade, 206 Ill. 523, 69 N.E. 565 (1904); Hapke v. Brandon, 343 Ill. App. 524, 99 N.E.2d 636 (1951). In the Wade case one of the parties sought to use written statements in this manner and the trial court would not permit it. The Appellate Court affirmed but the Supreme Court reversed holding that the course of proof pursued by the appellant was proper.

  9. People v. Jarrett

    57 Ill. App. 2d 169 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965)   Cited 11 times
    In People v. Jarrett, (1965), 57 Ill. App.2d 169, 206 N.E.2d 835, the defendant was charged for soliciting for prostitution. Phillips, a Chicago police officer testified and during cross examination Counsel for defendants attempted to obtain the name of the man who was with him on his first visit to Jarrett's apartment.

    The court, on page 504, stated: The better view would seem to be that a party is not foreclosed from making further proof of the former inconsistent statements even when the witness admits having made such statements, for the party may prefer to have these statements clearly brought out and emphasized. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, sec 1037; Hapke v. Brandon, 343 Ill. App. 524, 99 N.E.2d 636.) Paraphrasing the Supreme Court in that case, we are of the opinion that the trial court properly admitted the written statement in evidence.

  10. Beatrice Foods Co. v. Gallagher

    47 Ill. App. 2d 9 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964)   Cited 21 times
    In Beatrice Foods Co. v. Gallagher (1964), 47 Ill. App.2d 9, 197 N.E.2d 274, the court had before it a factual situation wherein the parties had dealt with each other over a period of time.

    We cannot agree. Statements of a witness made out of Court, if contradictory on a material point to his testimony as a witness, may be introduced into evidence, not as substantive proof of the truth of such statements, but as tending to impeach or discredit the witness: Hapke v. Brandon (1951), 343 Ill. App. 524, 99 N.E.2d 636. An offer of settlement, as such, is, of course, not admissible into evidence, but independent and relevant admissions of fact are: Steiner v. Rig-A-Jig Toy Co. (1956), 10 Ill. App.2d 410, 135 N.E.2d 166; Hook v. Bunch (1913), 180 Ill. App. 39. The indicated comment by the defendant was made prior to any controversy arising from the arrangement; no differences between the parties were then being sought to be adjusted at that time; there was not then any effort by either party to compromise: Sipes v. Barlow (1915), 197 Ill. App. 239. At that time there was no suit pending and no indication of any litigation between the parties, — this suit was not brought until March, 1961, nearly two years later, — that conversation cannot be considered as having taken place in an attempt to settle, compromise, or avoid any litigation pending or then contemplated by the parties: Yowell v. Hunter (1949), 403 Ill. 202, 85 N.E.2d 674.