Opinion
No. CV06-4020174
October 7, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff is a self-represented litigant. He filed the instant action on April 26, 2006 claiming that the defendant George Byrd, who is a parole officer, and the defendant Terri Williams, who is a parole manager, unlawfully revoked his parole and remanded him into the custody of the Commissioner of Correction. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the defendants fabricated a parole violation and had no legal basis to remand him into custody. The plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and punitive damages from the defendants.
The defendants have moved for summary judgment claiming that the plaintiff's claims in this case are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. They contend that the present action is prohibited by res judicata because a previous action filed by the plaintiff, in which final judgment has been rendered, raised similar claims. They further contend that collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of the issue of the lawfulness of the revocation of the defendant's parole because a parole violation hearing which was subsequently held determined that the revocation was proper. For the following reasons, I agree with the defendants.
"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . Scrapchansky v. Plainfield, 226 Conn. 446, 450 (1993). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather, to determine whether any such issues exist. Cortes v. Cotton, 31 Conn.App. 569, 575 (1993). [I]n deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . Johnson v. Meehan, 225 Conn. 528, 535 (1993). Once the moving party has presented evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . Hammer v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., 214 Conn. 573, 578 (1990)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Warner v. Lancia, 46 Conn.App. 150, 158 (1997). See also Practice Book § 17-49. The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts. Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 105-06 (1994).
A review of the undisputed procedural history of the claims involving the plaintiff and the defendants is necessary to resolve the motion for summary judgment. On August 17, 2005, the plaintiff was on parole under the supervision of Byrd, who was his parole officer. Williams was the parole supervisor with supervisory authority over Byrd. That day, Byrd and Williams terminated the plaintiff's parole and remanded him back into the custody of the Department of Correction. The plaintiff did not receive written notice of the basis for his alleged violation of parole nor a hearing at which he could contest the termination of his parole. The plaintiff was subsequently reinstated to parole on September 30, 2005.
On December 28, 2005, the plaintiff filed an action in Superior Court against Byrd and Williams. In that action, the plaintiff asserted three claims: (1) that the defendants violated his rights by failing to provide him with written notice of the alleged parole violation; (2) that the defendants violated his rights by denying him a preliminary hearing; and (3) the defendants violated his rights by failing to schedule a revocation hearing. The remedy sought in the plaintiff's complaint was "an administrative review of his alleged parole violation" and written notice of the reasons for his remand into custody and for the denial of a hearing.
The plaintiff also sued Robert Gillis, another parole officer, in his initial lawsuit. Gillis, however, is not a defendant in the instant action.
On April 30, 2007, the court (Silbert, J.) granted the plaintiff's request for an injunction ordering the defendants to provide the plaintiff with notice of his right to a hearing regarding his alleged parole violation and to hold such a hearing should the plaintiff exercise his right to such a hearing.
Pursuant to the court's order, the defendant was sent a notice of parole violation by Byrd on May 2, 2007. On May 10, 2007, a final revocation hearing was held before a hearing examiner for the Board of Paroles and Pardons. The hearing examiner found, based on the evidence presented, that Byrd and Williams established a proper basis for a parole violation. Specifically, the hearing examiner found that the defendants established that the plaintiff had no approved residence and he engaged in threatening conduct which resulted in a risk to the safety of his sponsor and the public. Based on his findings, the hearing examiner revoked the plaintiff's parole but reinstated it retroactive to September 30, 2005.
On May 30, 2007, the plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to add, inter alia, a claim for compensatory and punitive damages. The defendants filed an objection to the proposed amendments which was sustained, without opinion, by the court (Celotto, J.), on July 2, 2007.
On September 24, 2008, the court case was set down for trial before Judge William L. Hadden. At the request of the defendants, Judge Hadden entered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice in favor of the defendants on the ground of mootness. Since the complaint sought only injunctive relief and not damages and the plaintiff had received the written notice and administrative hearing regarding his parole violation which he sought in his complaint, the court found the lawsuit to now be moot.
On October 24, 2008, the defendant filed an appeal of the court's judgment of dismissal. The appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Court on April 28, 2009.
The instant action was filed by the plaintiff on April 26, 2006, during the pendency of his first action. In his complaint, the plaintiff asserts three claims: (1) that the defendants violated his rights by remanding him into custody for no legal reason; (2) that the defendants violated his rights by fabricating a parole violation; and (3) the defendants violated his rights by refusing to release him after the Parole Board told the defendants that they had no authority to remand him into custody. The plaintiff's complaint asks for an award of compensatory and punitive damages.
The defendants assert that this entire action is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. They contend that res judicata prohibits this lawsuit because the plaintiff could have asserted the causes of action and claims for relief which he asserts in this action in the action which he previously filed and which went to judgment. They further contend that collateral estoppel prevents the plaintiff from relitigating the issue of the lawfulness of his remand into custody because that precise issue was determined in the defendants' favor at the parole hearing.
"The doctrine of res judicata holds that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated as to the parties and their privies in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction . . . If the same cause of action is again sued on, the judgment is a bar with respect to any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made . . . Claim preclusion (res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) have been described as related ideas on a continuum . . . More specifically, collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion . . . prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action between the same parties or those in privity with them upon a different claim . . . An issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determination, and in fact determined . . . An issue is necessarily determined if, in the absence of a determination of the issue, the judgment could not have been validly rendered." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Powell v. Infinity Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 594, 600-01 (2007).
In order to determine whether res judicata prohibits the instant action, the threshold question is whether the second action stems from the same transaction as the first action. Powell v. Infinity Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 594, 604 (2007). "We have adopted a transactional test as a guide to determining whether an action involves the same claim as an earlier action so as to trigger operation of the doctrine of res judicata. The claim that is extinguished by the judgment in the first action includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose. What factual grouping constitutes a transaction, and what groupings constitute a series, are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage . . . In applying the transactional test, we compare the complaint in the second action with the pleadings and the judgment in the earlier action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
A comparison of the allegations of the two complaints conclusively establishes that both lawsuits concern the same transaction. Both complaints involve the revocation of the plaintiff's parole and his remand into custody on August 15, 2005 by the defendants. In the first action, the plaintiff claimed that the revocation was procedurally deficient in that he was not given proper notice and a hearing. In the second action, the plaintiff claims that the revocation of his parole was substantively improper in that the defendants had no legal basis to revoke his parole and they fabricated a reason to do so. It is crystal clear that both lawsuits involve the same transaction as they concern the same event and the same parties.
Pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion, the plaintiff is prohibited from pursuing in the instant action "any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or might have been made" in the earlier action. Scalzo v. Danbury, 224 Conn. 124, 128 (1992). The claims extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendants with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions out of which the action arose. 1 Restatement (Second) Judgments § 24 (1982). Because the plaintiff could have asserted his substantive claims regarding the illegality of the revocation of his parole in his first action which solely raised procedural claims against the defendants, he is precluded from asserting them here.
It matters not whether the final judgment in the first action was entered in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant. Where a judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, the claim is extinguished and merged in the judgment. 1 Restatement (Second) Judgments § 17 (1982). Where a judgment is in favor of the defendant, the claim is extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action of that claim. Id. In the plaintiff's first action, a judgment of dismissal was entered in favor of the defendants on the grounds that the plaintiff had received all the relief he had sought in his complaint. The plaintiff had obtained that relief through a court order requiring the defendants to provide the plaintiff with notice of his alleged parole violation and ultimately a hearing on the revocation of his parole. Whether the judgment in the first action is viewed as favoring the plaintiff or as favoring the defendants, it prevents the plaintiff from asserting additional claims in this lawsuit.
The claims made by the plaintiff in the instant action are also barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. The plaintiff is claiming in this action that the defendants lacked a proper legal basis to revoke his parole and they fabricated a reason for doing so. At the parole hearing held on May 10, 2007, the hearing examiner for the Board of Paroles and Pardons decided the issue of whether the defendants had a proper reason for terminating the plaintiff's parole. The hearing examiner found that the plaintiff had no approved residence and he engaged in threatening conduct which resulted in a risk to the safety of his sponsor and the public and, accordingly, that a proper basis for a parole violation had been established.
"As a general proposition, the governing principle is that administrative adjudications have a preclusive effect when the parties have an adequate opportunity to litigate." (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) Carothers v. Capozzielo, 215 Conn. 82, 94 (1990). A valid and final adjudicative determination by an administrative tribunal has the same conclusive effect, subject to the same qualifications, as a judgment of a court. Id. "For an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have been fully and fairly litigated in the first action. It also must have been actually decided and the decision must have been necessary to the judgment." Lafayette v. General Dynamics Corp./Electric Boat Div., 255 Conn. 762, 772 (2001).
The issue of whether a proper basis for a parole violation existed was actually and necessarily decided at the parole revocation hearing held on May 10, 2007. The plaintiff was also given a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of the legal and factual basis for the revocation of his parole at the parole hearing. On May 2, 2007, prior to the parole hearing, he was provided with notice of the allegations constituting the basis for the alleged parole violation. At the hearing, the plaintiff had the right to present evidence and legal argument in defense against the allegations. Section 54-124a(j)(1)-9 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. He had the right to testify, in his own defense and the right to present written materials and witnesses. Id. The hearing examiner was required to make findings regarding the violation of parole based on the evidence presented and determine whether the facts as found warrant revocation of parole. Id. There is no appeal from an administrative decision to revoke parole. Section 54-124a(j)(1)-3 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. The procedures available to the plaintiff at the parole revocation hearing satisfy the essential elements of adjudication, such as notice, the right to present evidence and legal argument, a fair opportunity to rebut evidence and argument, and finality, see 2 Restatement (Second) Judgments § 83 (1982), so as to render conclusive under the rules of collateral estoppel the issue of whether the defendants possessed a proper basis for revoking the plaintiff's parole.
"Both issue and claim preclusion express no more than the fundamental principle that once a matter has been fully and fairly litigated, and finally decided, it comes to rest." (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) New England Rehab Hospital, Inc. v. CHHC, 226 Conn. 105, 128 (1993). For that reason, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.