Moreover, we do not view the Iowa statute as requiring an adversary proceeding where school officials are required to formally place witnesses on the stand and assume a burden of proof justifying a teacher's termination. Under § 279.13 we believe that formal charges or accusations may be made by written document as they were here. Cf. Hanson v. Michigan State Board of Registration, 253 Mich. 601, 236 N.W. 225, 228 (1931). The fundamental purpose of the statute is to provide a teacher with notice of charges and opportunity to be heard.
" Jaffe v. State Department of Health, 135 Conn. 339, 352, 64 A.2d 330. See, generally, Andrus v. Church, 117 Wash. 627, 201 P. 917; 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, 360; 78 C.J.S., Schools and School Districts, 204 (c). It has been noted that the function of sufficient notice is "to notify the adverse party of the claims that are to be adjudicated so that he may prepare his case, and to set a standard of relevance which shall govern the proceedings at the hearing." Douds v. International Longshoremen's Assn., 241 F.2d 278, 283 (2d Cir.); see also 1 Davis, Administrative Law, 8.04. Notice will not ordinarily be held insufficient for nonprejudicial deficiencies, as where, for example, the record discloses that the person actually knew what the charges against him were. See, e.g., Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 494, 123 A.2d 747; Hanson v. Michigan State Board, 253 Mich. 601, 236 N.W. 225, cert. denied, 284 U.S. 637, 52 S.Ct. 19, 76 L.Ed. 542; 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, 131. But it is not uncommon for courts to set aside the order of an agency for deficiency of notice where the person does not learn of all the charges against him prior to the hearing, even though he later presents evidence in cross-examining witnesses on the issue with respect to which the notice is deficient. See, e.g., Petition of Village Board of Wheatland, 77 N.D. 194, 42 N.W.2d 321. In this case, the letter Mrs. Murphy received from the Berlin board notifying her of the charges against her and the time and place of the hearing on these charges included only the specific complaints lodged by Mrs. Szymanoski involving Mrs. Murphy's conduct toward the student James Szymanoski. The board based its decision to take disciplinary action against Mrs. Murphy, however, not only upon a determination of these charges, but also on the basis of her general attitude toward students o
We have held that one who is brought into a contest with the government in a quasi-judicial proceeding is entitled, among other things, to be fairly advised of what the government proposes. Hanson v. Michigan State Board of Registration in Medicine (1931), 253 Mich. 601, 607; Dation v. Ford Motor Co. (1946), 314 Mich. 152, 163 et seq.; Napuche v. Liquor Control Commission (1953), 336 Mich. 398, 404; Milford v. People's Community Hospital Authority (1968), 380 Mich. 49. See also Morgan v. United States (1938), 304 U.S. 1 ( 58 S Ct 773, 82 L Ed 1129); Gonzales v. United States (1955), 348 U.S. 407 ( 75 S Ct 409, 99 L Ed 467).
"`(5) The right to produce witnesses in his own behalf. "`(6) A full consideration and a fair determination according to the evidence of the controversy by the body before whom the hearing is had.' Hanson v. State Board of Registration in Medicine (1931), 253 Mich. 601, 607." In the case of Osius v. City of St. Clair Shores (1956), 344 Mich. 693, the Court struck down as unconstitutional an ordinance of the city of St. Clair Shores as a deprivation of substantive due process of law.
C. Plaintiff claims he was denied the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, which is an essential element of due process. He cites Hanson v. Michigan State Board of Registration, 253 Mich. 601, 236 N.W. 225; 2 Am. Jur.2d 229-234, Administrative Law, sections 418, 419, 424; 70 C.J.S., Physicians and Surgeons, section 18, page 894. At the proceedings before the credentials committee and the medical staff no witnesses were present. At the hearing before the board of trustees, all witnesses whose statements were used were present except Sharon Vriezelaar, Charmain Gibson, Frances Yockey and Veda M. Davenport. Most of the objections are addressed to the failure to have the witnesses present at the credentials committee and staff proceedings.
The board determined that issue, as it had a right to do. Conviction of a criminal offense in a court of competent jurisdiction was not essential to the right to revoke the license. Hanson v. Michigan State Board of Registration in Medicine, 253 Mich. 601, 608. In the case cited this Court held that in a proceeding to review the revocation of a license granted to a medical practitioner the board's finding of facts based on competent evidence is binding upon the court.
"`(5) The right to produce witnesses in his own behalf. "`(6) A full consideration and a fair determination according to the evidence of the controversy by the body before whom the hearing is had.' Hanson v. Michigan State Board of Registration in Medicine, 253 Mich. 601, 607, 236 N.W. 225, 228." The transcript of the proceedings in question shows that Mrs. Forman appeared at the public hearing with her attorney.
Our Court has held such actions to be founded upon the State's police powers. Kennedy v. State Board of Registration in Medicine, 145 Mich. 241 (9 Ann Cas 125); Hanson v. State Board of Registration in Medicine, 253 Mich. 601; Applegate v. State Board of Dentistry, 336 Mich. 42. We do not believe that the general statute of limitations is applicable to the present proceedings.
"(6) A full consideration and a fair determination according to the evidence of the controversy by the body before whom the hearing is had." Hanson v. State Board of Registration in Medicine, 253 Mich. 601, 607. Turning to the record, it appears that adequate notice of both the hearing before the hearing examiner and before the full commission was given; that both hearings were before bodies authorized by either statute or Constitution to hear such matters; that a concise and definite statement of the charge against the licensee was served upon him prior to the hearing and that he was offered the privilege and did cross-examine witnesses who testified against him and likewise produced witnesses in his own behalf.
The statute as to directed verdict (CL 1948, § 618.56 [Stat Ann § 27.1036]), is not, by its wording, made expressly applicable to a proceeding to revoke a license. In Hanson v. State Board of Registration in Medicine, 253 Mich. 601, 606, we say: "In revoking plaintiff's license the board's action was an exercise of police power and not, at least in a strict sense, the exercise of judicial power."