State ex rel. Johnstone v. District Court (1957), 132 Mont. 377, 319 P.2d 957; Cremer v. Braaten, supra. The unanimous weight of authority demonstrates that the rule is equally applicable to a defendant's failure to diligently prosecute a cross-claim or counterclaim. Seaman v. Superior Court of Marin County (1920), 183 Cal. 47, 190 P. 441; Harris v. Harris (1948), 65 Nev. 342, 196 P.2d 402; Pettine v. Rogers (1958), 63 N.M. 457, 321 P.2d 638; Hanson v. Lee (1970), 3 Wn. App. 461, 476 P.2d 550; 27 C.J.S. Dismissal Nonsuit § 65. It was initially held in Montana that mere lapse of time is sufficient in itself to justify a dismissal.
While entitled a conclusion of law, it is a mixed finding of fact and conclusion. It implies a factual determination sufficient to treat it as a mixed finding and conclusion and we do so. Hanson v. Lee, 3 Wn. App. 461, 476 P.2d 550 (1970). It was supported by substantial evidence and we are bound by it.
They also contend the claim at issue had not been joined for more than 1 year and Mr. Knapp should have noted the matter for trial himself. They cite Snohomish and Hanson v. Lee, 3 Wn. App. 461, 476 P.2d 550 (1970). [4] A. CR 41(b)(1) Is Mandatory. As stated in Gott, at 506, it has consistently been held that dismissal under CR 41(b)(1) is mandatory when the circumstances fit within the rule.
The trial court's determination as to the extinguishment of the easement is reversed and remanded for consideration of the extent and location of it. See Seattle v. Nazarenus, 60 Wn.2d 657, 374 P.2d 1014 (1962); Hanson v. Lee, 3 Wn. App. 461, 466, 476 P.2d 550 (1970). GREEN, C.J., and McINTURFF, J., concur.
Findings of fact are verities on appeal if there is substantial evidence to support them. Hays Merchandise, Inc. v. Dewey, 78 Wn.2d 343, 474 P.2d 270 (1970); Enterprise Timber, Inc. v. Washington Title Ins. Co., 76 Wn.2d 479, 457 P.2d 600 (1969). Findings of fact which are conclusions of law will be interpreted as such. State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 81 Wn.2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972); Hanson v. Lee, 3 Wn. App. 461, 476 P.2d 550 (1970). [3, 4] The Maynards contend that the Ravettis violated the usury statute, RCW 19.52, because of the $7,000 discount imposed when the Ravettis accepted the negotiable instrument from Mabel's Tavern, Inc.
If findings of fact are actually conclusions of law, they will be interpreted as such. State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 81 Wn.2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972); Hanson v. Lee, 3 Wn. App. 461, 476 P.2d 550 (1970); State v. Dorrough, 2 Wn. App. 820, 470 P.2d 230 (1970). The oral opinion of a trial court may be used to interpret the trial court's findings of fact if the findings make no statement concerning the subject or are ambiguous or vague.