Opinion
Civil No. 04-4161 (PAM/RLE).
February 10, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. The Court issues this Order consistent with its oral ruling on February 10, 2005, and for the following reasons, grants the Motions.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Bonita Hansford was involved in a traffic accident on June 14, 2004, in Edina, Minnesota. Her minor son was also in the car. Police officers from the City of Edina and the Minnesota State Patrol arrived on the scene. The officers administered field sobriety tests, and Plaintiff's alcohol concentration level tested at 0.25. Plaintiff was then arrested for driving while intoxicated. Because she refused to provide any information about other possible caregivers for her minor son, he was taken to St. Joseph's Home for Children.
Plaintiff was taken to the Minneapolis chemical testing facility in Defendant Minnesota State Trooper Monica Casey's squad car. Defendant Casey administered an Intoxilyzer test, and then took Plaintiff to the Hennepin County Adult Detention Center ("ADC"). Plaintiff arrived at ADC at 10:36 p.m. and Defendant Minnesota State Trooper Chris Daas booked her on gross misdemeanor DWI charges. Both Daas and Casey left ADC that evening and had no further contact with Plaintiff. Plaintiff was placed on a 36-hour hold pursuant to the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. She was eventually released approximately 42 hours later, at 5:20 p.m. on June 26, 2004. Plaintiff later pled guilty to the charge, was sentenced to 30 days in jail, and credited for the three days she spent at ADC.
Plaintiff brings claims premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as four state tort law claims on her behalf and one state tort claim on her minor son's behalf. All Defendants bring these Motions to Dismiss.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
For the purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, the Court takes all facts alleged in the Complaint as true. Westcott v. Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). The Court must construe the allegations in the Complaint and reasonable inferences arising from the Complaint favorably to Plaintiff. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). A motion to dismiss will be granted only if "it appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief." Id.; see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Section 1983 prohibits someone acting under the color of state law from depriving another of his or her "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for violation of § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that Defendants violated a constitutionally protected right. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979). Absent a violation of a constitutional right, there is no "claim cognizable under Section 1983." Id. at 146-47.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants detained her beyond the "36-hour probable cause hold" prescribed in Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 4.02 subd. 5, thus violating her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. She further contends that Defendants could have tab charged her and released her, instead of detaining her, under the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. Plaintiff also contends that such delay is the result of an unreasonable policy or procedure.
The Court notes that various Defendants argue that they are not proper parties to this § 1983 action. Although the Court acknowledges these arguments, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss these arguments because Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants fail for want of a constitutional violation.
Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants are wholly without merit. As the Supreme Court has articulated, detention for 48-hours or less prior to judicial probable cause findings is presumptively reasonable. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). "[T]he Fourth Amendment permits a reasonable postponement of a probable cause determination while the police cope with the everyday problems of processing suspects through an overly burdened criminal justice system." Id. at 55. In this case, Plaintiff was detained for approximately 42 hours, within the presumptively reasonable time frame prescribed by the Supreme Court. Her Complaint fails to allege that any of the Defendants intentionally or purposefully delayed her release, or otherwise acted unreasonably in detaining her. See id. at 56-57. Thus, absent any allegations that arise to a constitutional violation, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants must fail.
Moreover, Plaintiff's argument that Defendants should have tab charged her and released her instead of detaining her do not merit discussion. These allegations, without more, do not arise to a constitutional violation. Indeed, simply alleging that a Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure has been violated does not bring Plaintiff's claims within the purview of a federal Constitutional violation. See Ebmeier v. Stump, 70 F.3d 1012, 1013 (8th Cir. 1995) (violation of state law "does [not] double duty as a constitutional violation"); see also Myers v. Becker County, 833 F. Supp. 1424, 1431 (D. Minn. 1993) (Doty, J.) (purported violation of Minn. R. Crim. P. 3.03, without more, does not state a claim under § 1983 or the federal Constitution). Plaintiff's allegations merely amount to a disagreement with the discretionary actions of Defendants, and do not state a constitutional violation.
Finally, Plaintiff's claims are insufficient to state a claim for an unconstitutional policy or procedure. First, absent a viable claim that Defendants deprived her of a constitutional right, there is no viable claim that Defendants utilized an unconstitutional policy or procedure. Second, even the broadest reading of the Complaint fails to allege any facts that would support the existence of an unconstitutional policy or procedure. Thus, Plaintiff's claims premised on Monell v. Department of Social Services., 436 U.S. 658 (1979), fail.
B. State law claims
Plaintiff asserts a myriad of state law claims against Defendants. However, because the federal claims have no merit, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims and will dismiss the remainder of the Complaint without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendants' Motion for Partial Dismissal and/or Summary Judgment (Clerk Doc. No. 10) is GRANTED;
2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Clerk Doc. No. 13) is GRANTED;
3. Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or in the alternative, for Summary Judgment (Clerk Doc. No. 22) is GRANTED;
4. Count I of the Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice;
5. Counts II, III, IV, V, and VI of the Complaint are DISMISSED without prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.