Opinion
CV-24-08080-PHX-SPL
07-29-2024
Gerald Monte Hansen, Jr., Plaintiff, v. United States of America et al., Defendants.
ORDER
Steven P. Logan, J.
Before the Court are Defendants United States of America, United States Department of State, and unnamed Department of State officials' (“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10), Plaintiff Gerald Monte Hansen, Jr.'s (“Plaintiff') Response (Doc. 14), and Defendants' Reply (Doc. 18). The Court now rules as follows.
On June 7, 2024, the Court warned Plaintiff that he had until July 8, 2024, to file a response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 12). Plaintiff responded to Defendants' Motion on June 7, 2024. (Doc. 14). On July 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed an additional response to the Motion claiming that his initial response was a “ruling” and not a response. (Doc. 21). The Court finds that Docket 21 is untimely. Therefore, the Court will only consider Plaintiff's initial response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (See Doc. 14).
Also pending before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Subpoena (Doc. 15), Motion for Issuance of Passport (Doc. 16), and Motions for Contempt of Court (Docs. 17 and 22) which will be denied as moot due to dismissal of this claim.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 21, 2024, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed an action against Defendants in Yavapai County Superior Court asserting that Defendants violated his right to due process when they denied him a U.S. passport because of his seriously delinquent tax debt. (Doc. 1-4 at 6-7). Plaintiff identifies as a “sovereign american state National” and claims that he is not subject to income tax or government rules. (Doc. 8 at 5). Plaintiff alleges “[he] is certain that the debt belongs to a legal fiction, a Vessel.” (Doc. 8 at 7, 55). He further alleges that “[he] has offered remedy to the IRS via the Vessels [sic] estate which [P]laintiff is a signatory.” (Doc. 8 at 7). Therefore, Plaintiff claims that it was improper for Defendants to deny his passport application. (Doc. 8 at 10-11). Plaintiff asserts trespass claims under the Fifth Amendment, deprivation of rights claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241242, and discrimination claims based on his “national status” under 31 U.S.C. § 6711. (Doc. 8 at 6-8; Doc. 14 at 5).
On April 24, 2024, Defendants removed the case to this Court (Doc. 1), and on May 1, 2024, filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. 5). On May 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative Amended Complaint which does not incorporate any substantive changes. (Doc. 8). On June 5, 2024, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss which restates its original motion to dismiss in its entirety. (Doc. 10). Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and that Plaintiff failed to state a claim. (Doc. 10).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of pleading jurisdiction. Id. at 377. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a pleading contain a short statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction as well as a short and plain statement of the claim showing that a plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1), (2). Pro se litigants are equally bound to follow the rules of procedure, including Rule 8's pleading requirements. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (“pro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure”); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Pro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants”), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 2012).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially plausible when it contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference” that the moving party is liable. Id. Factual allegations in the complaint should be assumed true, and a court should then “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. Facts should be viewed “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Faulkner v. ADTSec. Servs., Inc., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013). A pro se complaint must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
To proceed, Plaintiff must show he has a right of action and entitlement to relief that falls within this Court's jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1), (2). “It is well settled that the United States is a sovereign, and, as such, is immune from suit unless it has expressly waived such immunity and consented to be sued. Such waiver cannot be implied, but must be unequivocally expressed. Where a suit has not been consented to by the United States, dismissal of the action is required . . . because the existence of such consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” Dunn & Black, P.S. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1084, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985)); S. Delta Water Agency v. U.S., Dep't of Int., Bureau of Reclamation, 767 F.2d 531, 535 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The district court lacks jurisdiction in a suit against the federal government unless Congress has consented to be sued.”).
Here, Plaintiff lists various federal statutes and provisions of the United States Constitution in his Amended Complaint. (See Doc. 8). But Plaintiff fails to allege any basis to support that Defendants waived their immunity. Instead, Plaintiff argues that the sovereign immunity clause does not apply to him because he is a self-governed national and not a U.S. citizen. (Doc. 14 at 2). He further argues that Defendants waived their right to immunity “[t]he very minute they infringed on [his] sovereignty.” (Doc. 14 at 4). Even more, Plaintiff argues that “statute and government code only has [sic] force against the government and their subjects, not [P]laintiff.” (Doc. 14 at 11). However, Plaintiff also concedes that if he was a U.S. citizen, then he would not have subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 14 at 8). To the extent Plaintiff's allegations are based on a sovereign citizen ideology-in referring to himself as a “sovereign american state National,” and describing his body as a vessel-courts uniformly and summarily have rejected arguments premised on such ideology as frivolous and meritless. See, e.g., United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejected arguments premised on the sovereign citizen ideology as “utterly meritless”); United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 233, n.1 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting courts “summarily reject[ ]” as frivolous the legal theory of individuals who consider themselves sovereign and not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts); United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 761 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[Sovereign citizen] theories should be rejected summarily, however they are presented”); see also Mackey v. Bureau of Prisons, 2016 WL 3254037, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2016). Plaintiff has failed to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity and the statutory authority he relies on cannot be fairly read to waive sovereign immunity. Thus, Plaintiff has not shown that this Court has jurisdiction to hear this case.
The statutory authority Plaintiff provides in his Amended Complaint also fail to state any claims for which relief can be granted. First, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process by denying his passport application which prohibits him from traveling to Mexico. (Doc. 8 at 6). “[T]he right of international travel has been considered to be no more than an aspect of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As such this right, the Court has held, can be regulated within the bounds of due process.” Eunique v. Powell, 302 F.3d 971, 973 (9th Cir. 2002). “Given the lesser importance of . . . freedom to travel abroad, the Government need only advance a rational, or at most an important, reason for imposing the ban.” Id. at 974.
Here, Defendants argue that they are permitted to restrict passports under 26 U.S.C. § 7345. This statute provides:
If the Secretary receives certification by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that an individual has a seriously delinquent tax debt, the Secretary shall transmit such certification to the Secretary of State for action with respect to denial, revocation, or limitation of a passport pursuant to section 32101 of the FAST Act.26 U.S.C. § 7345. Defendants argue that “[d]enying passports to individuals owing seriously delinquent tax debt is rationally related to the government's interest in collecting taxes and administering a sound and uniform tax system.” (Doc. 10 at 13). Plaintiff admits that his “vessel” has seriously delinquent tax debt, but argues that he is not subject to Title 26 because he is “not a taxpayer, an individual, a statutory citizen, [or] a U.S. Citizen.” (Doc. 14 at 10). Plaintiff has offered no argument that the collection of substantial delinquent tax debts is not a legitimate government interest. The Court finds that it is a legitimate interest. See Eunique, 302 F.3d at 975 (acknowledging that there is a longstanding policy of denying passports to those who try to escape the toils of the law or engage in conduct which would violate the laws of the United States); see also Maehr v. United States Dep't of State, 5 F.4th 1100, 1122 (10th Cir. 2021) (affirming that § 7345 is constitutional). Section 7345 also provides sufficient procedural due process protections. See 26 U.S.C. § 7345. Thus, Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim fails.
Additionally, Plaintiff's claims under the federal criminal statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242) fail because those statutes do not create privately enforceable rights. See Keyter v. McCain, 207 Fed.Appx. 801, 802 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The district court properly dismissed [plaintiff's] claims based on federal criminal statutes because statutes that provide for punishment by fine or imprisonment do not create privately enforceable rights or give rise to civil liability.”).
Finally, Plaintiff failed to state a discrimination claim under 31 U.S.C. § 6711. Section 6711 provides: “[n]o person in the United States shall be excluded from participating in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under, a program or activity of a unit of general local government because of race, color, national origin, or sex.” Here, Plaintiff claims that Defendants discriminated against him based on his national origin, that is, “sovereign american state National,” by compelling him to accept a passport as a U.S. citizen. (Doc. 8 at 5, 8). As explained earlier, Plaintiff's allegations that are based on sovereign citizen ideology are rejected. Therefore, the Court rejects this claim as frivolous and meritless.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show that this Court has jurisdiction to hear this case. The Court also finds that Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Defendants. The Court grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) and dismisses Plaintiff's Amended Complaint in its entirety (Doc. 8). Leave to amend a deficient complaint should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). When dismissing for failure to state a claim, “a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, the Court finds that leave to amend would be futile, because Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is based entirely on the sovereign citizen ideology and Plaintiff is unable to allege facts that would validate his claims. Thus, the Court denies Plaintiff leave to amend and dismisses the action with prejudice.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) is granted. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. 8)-including all of its claims against all Defendants-is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 21) is stricken.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Subpoena (Doc. 15), Motion for Issuance of Passport (Doc. 16), and Motions for Contempt of Court (Docs. 17 and 22) are denied as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall terminate this action.