Opinion
Civil No. 03-969 (DWF/SRN)
April 12, 2004
T. Oliver Skillings, Esq., Skillings Associates, Mankato, Minnesota, for Plaintiff
Jon K. Iverson, Esq., and Jason J. Kuboushek, Esq., Iverson Reuvers, LLC, Bloomington, Minnesota, for Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Introduction
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the undersigned United States District Judge on February 13, 2004, pursuant to the Motion for Summary Judgment brought by Defendants Le Sueur County Deputies David Tietz and Thomas Doherty (collectively "the Defendants"). In Plaintiff Daniel Hansen's complaint, Hansen alleges a state tort claim of assault and battery, a state tort claim of false arrest, a state tort claim of false imprisonment, and a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are granted.
Background
Approximately one week prior to September 6, 2002, Hansen received a phone call from his brother, Tim, asking if he was interested in purchasing a tractor. Hansen expressed interest, and a man claiming to own the tractor met with Hansen. The purported owner, Gary Meyer, showed Hansen the tractor, a John Deere model 4100 Utility tractor, and told Hansen the tractor was equipped with a lawnmower deck. Hansen was interested in purchasing the tractor but wanted to find out more information about the value of the tractor and the costs of outfitting it with a front-end loader, so he visited a local tractor dealership.
At the tractor dealership, Hansen asked Sean McGraw, an employee of the dealership, about the value of the tractor, the cost of purchasing a front-end loader for the tractor, and whether the dealership would be able to trace the ownership of the tractor. Meyer had offered to sell Hansen the tractor for $6,000, but McGraw told Hansen that the retail price of the tractor was approximately $8,000. McGraw also told Hansen that in order to determine the identity of the tractor's original owner, Hansen would need the make, model, and serial number of the tractor.
Hansen then went to view the tractor for a second time. After obtaining the make, model, and serial number, Hansen called the dealership and spoke with Jeff Martinsen, another employee of the dealership, about the tractor. Martinsen alleges that Hansen stated that he [Hansen] had purchased the tractor for $8,000. Using the tractor's serial number, Martinsen was able to obtain the name and contact information of the tractor's original owner, and gave this information to Hansen.
Hansen telephoned the original owner, Ivar Tveter, inquiring about the tractor. Ivar's daughter, Ms. Vicki Tveter, informed Hansen that the tractor was missing. Hansen told Ms. Tveter that a man was trying to sell the tractor and advised Ms. Tveter to report the tractor stolen to the police. Hansen told Ms. Tveter his name was "D. Hansen," and gave her a false telephone number. Ms. Tveter called the police to report the tractor stolen and notified them of Hansen's call.
Sergeant Dave Struckman prepared the incident report regarding Ms. Tveter's call. Struckman contacted McGraw, who informed Struckman that he had met with Hansen to answer questions about the tractor. Shortly thereafter, Struckman turned the case over to Deputy David Teitz. Struckman gave Teitz the information he had obtained, and Teitz confirmed that information by contacting the dealership himself.
Tietz telephoned Hansen on September 6, 2002. ( See Affidavit of T. Oliver Skillings (hereinafter "Skillings Aff."), ¶ 4, Ex. 3 ("Telephone Transcript") at 1.) Hansen told Tietz that he had seen the tractor, but did not know the tractor's current location. ( See id. at 2-4.) Hansen also told Tietz that he did not want to become involved in the matter. ( See id. at 2.) Thereafter, Hansen refused to answer any of Tietz's questions about the location of the tractor or about the person claiming to own the tractor. ( See id.) In response to continued questioning by Tietz, Hansen told Tietz that because Teitz was the detective, Tietz should figure out where the tractor was himself. ( See id. at 3-4.) Tietz warned Hansen if he refused to cooperate, he would come to Hansen's house to "arrest your ass." ( See id. at 4.) Hansen replied that if Tietz was going to come to his house, Tietz should "bring a lot" of officers with him to make the arrest. ( See id. at 5.)
After taking the statement from Hansen, Tietz contacted the Le Sueur County Attorney's Office regarding the conversation between himself and Hansen. Tietz asserts that the County Attorney's Office advised him that he had probable cause to arrest Hansen. Tietz and Deputy Thomas Doherty went to Hansen's residence, located in Blue Earth County, to further their investigation.
The Defendants arrived at Hansen's residence in an unmarked car in plainclothes with their badges on their belts. The Defendants observed three males in Hansen's yard. Tietz approached a man sitting in the attached garage, while Doherty approached the other two men. The two men were later identified as Tim and Andrew Hansen, Hansen's brother and son, respectively. Both men were wearing tool belts that held knives and hammers.
Hansen was sitting in the garage near several long guns. After Tietz instructed Hansen not to move and allegedly told Hansen he was under arrest, Hansen rose, stating that he had to see about his grandson. ( See Affidavit of Jason J. Kuboushek (hereinafter "Kuboushek Aff") ¶ 3, Ex. B ("Hansen Dep.") at 26.) At that point, one of the Defendants grabbed Hansen's arm. Hansen attempted to pull away from the Defendants, and move toward his house. After a struggle lasting four to five minutes, the Defendants handcuffed Hansen and put him in the squad car.
During the struggle, Hansen maintains that one deputy grabbed him by the arm, and the other grabbed him by the neck and shoulders. ( See Hansen Dep. at 27.) During the conflict, Tim and Andrew Hansen came into the garage wearing their tool belts. Tim Hansen told the Defendants "If you take him down, we're going to get involved." ( See Kuboushek Aff, ¶ 5, Ex. D ("Doherty Dep.") at 38.) Hansen remained on his feet throughout the struggle. ( See Hansen Dep. at 33-34.) Once in the vehicle, Hansen complained the handcuffs were too tight, and maintains that Tietz threatened to "whoop [his] ass." ( See Hansen Dep. at 35, 36.) In response to Hansen's request, Tietz loosened Hansen's handcuffs. ( See Tietz Dep. at 37; see also Doherty Dep. at 45.)
Once inside the vehicle, Hansen agreed to take the Defendants to the location of the tractor. After directing the Defendants to the tractor, Hansen agreed to answer questions. Hansen stated that an individual going by the name of "Animal" asked Hansen if he was interested in purchasing a new tractor. Although Hansen did not know "Animal's" real name, Hansen informed the deputies that the name Gloria Meyer showed up on his caller ID when "Animal" called. Hansen was then released on his own recognizance.
Meyer later confessed to stealing the tractor. ( See Tietz Dep. at 22.) Meyer was ultimately charged in Le Sueur County District Court with Theft and Burglary in the Third Degree. ( See Defendants Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendants' Memo.") at 6.) Hansen was charged with Aiding an Offender. ( See id.) Hansen prevailed on a motion to dismiss the criminal charges for lack of probable cause. ( See id.)
Discussion
I. Motion for Summary Judgment
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court must view the evidence and the inference that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank of Missouri, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). However, as the Supreme Court has stated, "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1).
The moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Enter. Bank, 92 F.3d at 747. The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. See Krenik v. County of La Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Krenik, 47 F.3d at 957.
II. Pleading Requirements
In order for an official to be sued in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must expressly and unambiguously state so in the pleadings or it will be assumed that the defendant is sued only in an official capacity. See Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999). The Defendants argue Hansen's Amended Complaint did not give them notice that they were being sued in both their official and individual capacities. Specifically, the Defendants point to language in the Amended Complaint that accuses the Defendants of acting with the knowledge and consent of the Le Sueur County Sheriff's Office. Based on this language, the Defendants contend that the suit should be construed as having been brought against them solely in their official capacity. However, the Defendants do concede that Hansen's Amended Complaint included the abbreviation "ind." in the caption following their names.
Hansen asserts that his Amended Complaint put Defendants on notice that they were being sued in their individual capacities. As evidence of the fact that Defendants were put on notice, Hansen points out that the Defendants pled affirmative defenses that were only available to officials being sued in their individual capacity. Further, Hansen points out that the Amended Complaint included a statement that referred to Defendants "both in their private as well as official capacities." ( See Hansen Amended Complaint at 1.)
Although the Amended Complaint could have been clearer in indicating Plaintiff's intention to sue the Defendants in their individual capacities, the Amended Complaint nonetheless suggests the suit was brought against them in such a capacity. The Amended Complaint states "ind." after their names, which could certainly be construed as an abbreviation for individual or individually. Moreover, the Amended Complaint contains a clear statement that the suit was brought against the Defendants in their individual capacities. Thus, the Court finds that Hansen has sued the Defendants in both their official and individual capacities.
III. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 prohibits a person acting under color of state law from depriving another person of his or her "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. . . ." Qualified immunity shields government officials and private individuals from civil liability under § 1983. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999). A defendant is shielded from civil liability if it is shown that his or her "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court employs a three-part test to determine whether qualified immunity exists. See Goff v. Bise, 173 F.3d 1068, 1072 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 1996)). First, the plaintiff must assert a violation of a constitutional right. See id. Second, the alleged right must be clearly established. See id. Third, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there must be no genuine issues of material fact as to whether a reasonable official would have known that the alleged action violated the plaintiff's clearly established rights. See id.
A. False Arrest
The relevant inquiry in a Fourth Amendment false arrest case is whether the officers had probable cause to make an arrest. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979). Probable cause exists when the totality of the facts, based on reasonably trustworthy information, would justify a prudent person's belief that the individual arrested had committed an offense at the time of the arrest. See Smithson v. Aldrich, 235 F.3d 1058,1062 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hannah v. City of Overland, Mo., 795 F.2d 1385, 1389 (8th Cir. 1986)). Law enforcement officers are entitled to qualified immunity if they arrest a suspect under the mistaken belief that they have probable cause to do so; however, the mistake must be objectively reasonable. See id. at 1062. Therefore, the determination that must be made when considering whether law enforcement officers should be granted or denied qualified immunity is whether arguable probable cause existed for the arrest. See id.
Defendants assert they had probable cause to arrest Hansen. Defendants assert that they knew Hansen had seen the tractor on at least two occasions since it had been stolen. Defendants assert that they knew Hansen had asked a local dealer about the tractor and that Hansen had the tractor's serial number. Tietz also asserts that a dealership employee had told him [Tietz] that Hansen was representing to others that he [Hansen] had purchased the tractor. Moreover, when Hansen spoke with Ms. Tveter, Hansen had given her a false telephone number. Defendants also assert that Hansen was unresponsive, uncooperative, and aggressive when he spoke with Tietz about the tractor.
Hansen contends that the Defendants did not have probable cause to arrest him. First, Hansen asserts that the Defendants knew that he [Hansen] merely inquired about the status of a stolen tractor. Hansen asserts that McGraw informed Struckman that three other people had also asked the dealership about the same tractor. Second, Hansen asserts that his phone call to Ms. Tveter should have called into question Hansen's involvement in the matter. Third, Hansen asserts that Tietz as much as admitted that Hansen was not involved in the theft when Tietz stated "I don't think you're involved in the theft." (Telephone Transcript at 2.)
As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that Hansen and his counsel must have determined that the Defendants were acting "in the course and scope of employment" when effectuating Hansen's arrest. Minn. Stat. § 629.40 (outlining the conditions under which an arrest outside of a peace officer's jurisdiction is valid). Hansen was arrested at his home in Blue Earth County, but the Defendants were peace officers hired by Le Sueur County. Because Hansen never asserted in his Amended Complaint or in his briefs to the Court that the arrest was invalid as a result of the arrest taking place outside of the Defendants' jurisdiction, the Court need not rule on this matter.
The Court finds that Defendants had at least arguable probable cause for the arrest of Hansen. Tietz received information from employees of the dealership that Hansen told Martinsen that he [Hansen] had purchased the stolen tractor. Tietz also knew that Ms. Tveter had been contacted by a male calling himself "D. Hansen" regarding the status of the missing tractor. "D. Hansen" ended his phone call to Ms. Tveter by giving her a false telephone number. Finally, Tietz spoke with Hansen on the phone regarding the tractor. During the phone call, Hansen was uncooperative and refused to answer questions about the person selling the tractor or the tractor's whereabouts. Hansen often gave conflicting answers to Tietz's questions. Based on these facts, the Defendants determined that they had probable cause to arrest Hansen for aiding an offender pursuant to Minnesota Statute § 609.495. The Court finds that the facts were sufficient such that officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether the probable cause test was met. Thus, the Court finds that the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Hansen's § 1983 claims. Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to the federal claims.
B. Excessive Force
In determining whether the use of force is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, a court must balance "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests" against the government interests at stake. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (citation omitted). The reasonableness of the use of force must be judged from the "perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." See id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968)). Indeed, "[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers," violates the Fourth Amendment. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (1973). The reasonableness determination also must make allowances for the fact that police officers make split-second judgment in oftentimes tense situations. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. Therefore, the United States Supreme Court has set out the reasonableness inquiry as one that requires courts to determine "whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Id. at 397 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-39 (1978)).
Hansen asserts that Defendants used excessive force in effectuating his arrest. However, Hansen's Amended Complaint does little to describe the conduct that Hansen alleges was actionable. Hansen's Amended Complaint does state that as a result of the arrest, Hansen suffered physical injuries "in the form of bruising, muscle spasms, and back injuries. . . ." (Hansen Amended Complaint at ¶ 24.) Hansen also asserts that the handcuffs were placed on his arms so tightly that they resulted in bruises.
Defendants assert that they did not use excessive force in arresting Hansen. Defendants contend that the initial telephone call between Hansen and Tietz put them on notice that Hansen planned on being uncooperative in his dealings with the police. When Defendants confronted Hansen at his residence, Hansen was close to a number of long guns and Hansen refused to acquiesce to Tietzs' order that he remain still. Defendants also had two other men in close proximity to them at the time of the arrest that were threatening to enter the fray.
The Court finds that the force used by the Defendants in restraining Hansen was reasonable given the circumstances. Hansen had proved uncooperative in his dealings with Tietz and had warned Tietz that he would not willingly submit to an arrest. Once at Hansen's residence, the Defendants had reason to be concerned with the proximity of Hansen to the weapons in his garage and the refusal of Hansen to remain motionless when ordered to do so. In addition, the Defendants were concerned with the apparent willingness of Hansen's relatives to join in the melee. As a result of the proximity of Hansen's relatives to the Defendants at the time the arrest was made, the Defendants appear to have been even more cautious than usual in making sure that Hansen was not harmed during the arrest. The Court finds that in circumstances such as these, the Defendants used reasonable force in arresting Hansen.
Likewise, the Court finds that the application of handcuffs to Hansen does not amount to excessive force because he has established no permanent or long-term injury. See Crumley v. City of Saint Paul, Minn., 324 F.3d 1003, 1008 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Foster v. Metro. Airports Comm'n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir. 1990) (excessive force was not used when plaintiff did not produce any medical records indicating "long-term injury as a result of the handcuffs.")). Based on the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the force used by the Defendants in restraining Hansen was reasonable under the circumstances.
IV. State Law Claims
Defendants further allege they are entitled to official immunity from the state law claims of assault, battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment. Under Minnesota law, public officials are automatically entitled to official immunity from state law claims when their duties require the exercise of discretion, so long as the officer is not guilty of a willful or malicious wrong. See Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 41-42 (Minn. 1990); Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1988). Thus, to determine whether official immunity is available in any given context requires a determination of whether the alleged acts were discretionary or ministerial and whether the alleged acts were malicious or willful. See Davis v. County of Hennepin, 559 N.W.2d 117, 122 (Minn.Ct.App. 1997).
Malice, in the official immunity context, means intentionally committing an act that the official has reason to believe is legally prohibited. This is an objective inquiry that examines the legal reasonableness of an official's actions. See State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn. 1994). An officer does not commit a willful and malicious wrong unless the officer relies on information that the officer knows to be false. See Johnson v. County of Dakota, 510 N.W.2d 237, 240 (Minn.Ct.App. 1994). To overcome a defense based on official immunity, a plaintiff cannot rely on "bare allegations of malice"; rather, a plaintiff must present specific facts evidencing bad faith. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817.
Defendants assert that the decision to arrest Hansen was appropriate, given their determination that probable cause existed for Hansen's arrest and the potential danger posed to Defendants by the rapidly evolving situation at Hansen's residence. In effectuating the arrest, Defendants contend that the amount of force used was reasonable under the circumstances. Defendants point out that they seized and handcuffed Hansen, but that Hansen was never punched, kicked, or brought to the ground.
Hansen asserts that Defendants are not entitled to official immunity. Hansen urges the court to direct its attention to the actions of Defendants before they arrived at Hansen's home. Specifically, Hansen asserts that Tietz's statement that he [Tietz] was going to "come and arrest [Hansen's] ass" is evidence of Tietz's frustration with Hansen. Hansen contends that this statement, combined with Defendants' actions once they arrived at Hansen's residence, are evidence that Defendants were acting with malice when they seized and arrested him.
The parties do not appear to dispute that the Defendants were performing duties that required the exercise of discretion in deciding whether to arrest Hansen. Thus, the Court need only determine whether the Defendants' actions were malicious or willful. In light of the information that Defendants had at the time of the arrest and the Defendants' concern for their own safety, the Court finds that the Defendants' actions were not malicious, willful, or unreasonable under the circumstances, nor did the Defendants rely on information that they knew to be false. Therefore, the Court finds that the Defendants are entitled to official immunity from Hansen's false arrest, false imprisonment, assault, and battery claims.
Conclusion
Although the Court finds that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all of the claims asserted against it by Hansen based on the facts of this case, this order should not be read to condone some of the statements made by Tietz in the performance of his duties as a peace officer. While the Court is mindful that in certain situations peace officers must be forceful in their dealings with the public, peace officers such as Tietz should keep in mind that incendiary statements to members of the public only serve to further escalate the tension in already difficult situations.
For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement (Doc. No. 13) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff Daniel Hansen's Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.