Summary
In Hansen the limitation of medical payment liability was specifically said to apply regardless of the number of automobiles insured under the policy.
Summary of this case from Carter v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co.Opinion
43092.
ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 1967.
DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 1967.
Action on insurance policy. Fulton Civil Court. Before Judge Williams.
Lokey Bowden, Hamilton Lokey, Spearman, Bynum Goodwin, W. L. Spearman, Joe Bynum, Jr., for appellant.
Swift, Currie, McGhee Hiers, Glover McGhee, for appellee.
The plaintiff insured was entitled to recover a maximum of $1,000 for medical expenses incurred and $3,000 for accidental death benefits under the policy; therefore, the court erred in rendering judgment for the plaintiff for only $2,000.
ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 1967 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 1967.
Mrs. John Hansen brought an action against Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. to recover under the medical expense and accidental death benefit coverage of her deceased husband's "automobile owners [insurance] policy." The policy provided: "The insurance afforded is only with respect to such of the following Parts or coverages as are indicated by specific premium charge or charge or by a statement that the coverage is in effect. The limit of the company's liability against each such coverage shall be as indicated herein, subject to all of the terms of the policy having reference thereto." Part I provided coverage for medical expenses up to $1,000 for each person and accidental death benefits up to $1,000 for each named insured, plus liability and uninsured motorists insurance. The annual premiums under Part I for the three named owned automobiles were as follows: (1) $117.80 (1954 Ford), (2) $58.90 (1957 Ford), and (3) $53.20 (1963 Corvair). The policy contained the following provisions relating to the coverages claimed: "Medical Expense Coverage. The company will pay all reasonable medical expense incurred within one year from the date of accident and sustained by (1) the named insured . . . (a) while occupying a non-owned automobile, . . . if such person has . . . the permission of the owner to use the automobile . . . , or (c) through being struck by a highway vehicle; . . . Accidental Death Benefit Coverage. The company will pay the accidental death benefit stated in the declaration in the event of the death of the named insured which shall result directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury (other than sickness or disease or death resulting therefrom), caused by accident and sustained by the named insured while occupying an automobile or through being struck by a highway vehicle, if death occurs within 90 days of the accident." Under "Limits of Liability," the policy provides as follows: "Regardless of the number of (1) persons or organizations who are insureds under the policy, (2) persons or organizations who sustain bodily injury or property damage, (3) claims made or suits brought on account of bodily injury or property damage, or (4) automobiles or trailers to which this policy applies, . . . (B) the limit for Medical Expense Coverage stated in the declarations as applicable to `each person' is the limit of the company's liability for all medical expense incurred by or on behalf of each person who sustains bodily injury as the result of any one accident; . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) The parties stipulated that the defendant insurer was liable to the plaintiff under the medical expense and accidental death benefit coverages up to the limits of liability of the policy and that the sole issue was whether such limits are $3,000 for each of said coverages ($1,000 each on each one of the three named owned automobiles), as contended by the plaintiff, or merely $1,000 for each of the coverages, for a maximum total of $2,000, as contended by the defendant. The case was tried before the court without a jury, resulting in a judgment in the amount of $2,000, from which judgment the plaintiff appeals.
1. Regarding the limit of liability for medical expense coverage, the policy states in plain and unambiguous language that the $1,000 limit for each person is the limit of the company's liability for all medical expense incurred by each person, regardless of the number of automobiles to which the policy applies. "Where the meaning is plain and obvious, the contract should be so construed as literally provided therein." Daniel v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 52 Ga. App. 620 (2) ( 184 S.E. 366). A different result is not required by the holding in Travelers Indem. Co. v. Watson, 111 Ga. App. 98 ( 140 S.E.2d 505), the policy in which contained the provision (which the present policy does not), that, when two or more automobiles were insured thereunder, the terms of the policy should apply separately to each. Nor is the argument — that the payment of three separate premiums under the part of the policy which includes medical expense coverage indicates a purchase of three separate such coverages — persuasive in the light of the aforesaid plain and unambiguous provisions of the policy. It cannot be ascertained from the policy what portion of the premium for each, automobile under that particular part is for the medical expense coverage, since the non-itemized premiums are for accidental death benefit, liability insurance and uninsured motorist insurance as well. The court correctly construed the policy with regard to medical expense coverage.
2. Regarding the limit of liability for accidental death benefit coverage, although the policy specifically places limits of liability upon all of the other coverages under Part I (i.e., liability, medical expense and uninsured motorists), no such limit is placed upon the accidental death benefit coverage, other than the initial "$1,000 each named insured." In the absence of such limit, the policy must be construed relative to accidental death benefit coverage as was the policy relative to medical expense coverage in Travelers Indem. Co. v. Watson, supra, p. 104 and cit., i.e., as if three separate policies had been written for three automobiles, with separate premiums charged for each policy. The fact, that the premium for the oldest automobile was double that of both of the other, newer automobiles, does not necessarily indicate that the accidental death benefit premium was paid only on the first automobile and, therefore, that the insurer was obligated to pay only under one of the "separate policies." Under Item 4 of the policy, the discount code reveals that automobiles "2" and "3" — the newer ones — were given a "multiple car discount" on their rates, which could explain their rates lower than that of automobile "1", the older one. This same code shows that a "driver training credit" was allowed in figuring the rate for automobile "1", which might indicate that it was driven by a youthful driver, under 25 years of age, for example, which could also account for the higher rate. The court, therefore, incorrectly construed the policy with regard to the accidental death benefit coverage.
The plaintiff was entitled to recover a maximum of $1,000 for medical expenses incurred and $3,000 for accidental death benefit; therefore, the court erred in rendering judgment for only $2,000.
Judgment reversed. Hall and Eberhardt, JJ., concur.