Hanover Construction Co. v. Fehr

11 Citing cases

  1. Connelly Constr. Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am.

    No. 18-3631 (3d Cir. Oct. 11, 2019)   Cited 2 times

    We review that factual finding, which CCC now challenges, for clear error. See Alpha Painting, 853 F.3d at 682-83; see also Hanover Const. Co. to Use of Ede v. Fehr, 139 A.2d 656, 658 (Pa. 1958) ("[O]rdinarily the question of waiver is a question of fact for a jury[.]"). The District Court's finding was far from clear error.

  2. Western Union Tel. Co. v. F.C.C.

    541 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1976)   Cited 23 times
    In Western Union Telegraph Company v. Federal Communications Commission, 541 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1976), this court considered a petition for review of an order of the FCC determining the scope and applicability of exchange of facility contracts between Western Union and AT T. We specifically rejected Western Union's argument that the Commission's decision was "entitled to no greater deference from this court than would be due a district court in a breach of contract action."

    Rather, here ". . . where the only evidence as to waiver is a writing, its construction and interpretation and whether or not it constitutes a waiver is a question of law for the court." Hanover Construction Co. v. Fehr, 392 Pa. 199, 139 A.2d 656, 658 (1958); Griffin v. United States of America, 500 F.2d 1059, 1072 (3d Cir. 1974); Crabb v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 121 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1941). Hence the appropriate APA standard to be applied here is the standard of "not in accordance with law," a standard which requires a plenary, de novo review of the documents in question.

  3. Griffin v. United States

    500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974)   Cited 160 times
    Holding that the government may be liable "where its employees, in carrying out their duties, fail to conform to pre-existing statutory and regulatory requirements"

    While ordinarily the question of waiver is a question of fact for a jury . . . yet, where the only evidence as to waiver is a writing, its construction and interpretation and whether or not it constitutes a waiver is a question of law for the court. Hanover Construction Co. v. Fehr, 392 Pa. 199, 139 A.2d 656 (1958). The above-cited clause of the Pfizer-Griffin agreement is unambiguous.

  4. Faw v. Villanova Univ.

    Civil Action 23-3897 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 28, 2024)

    . Sabatini v. Its Amore Corp., 455 Fed.Appx. 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Hanover Const. Co. to Use of Ede v. Fehr, 139 A.2d 656, 658 (Pa. 1958)); see also Meng v. New Sch., 686 F.Supp.3d 312, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (“The only fact defendant points to in support of its waiver argument is plaintiff's continued attendance of TNS after it moved online and received credits towards her degree. This act is equivocal at best and is not necessarily inconsistent with an intent to later sue for damages.”).

  5. Archway Insurance Services, LLC v. James River Ins. Co.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-2711 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 21, 2010)

    Because reasonable people could disagree in answering this question, the evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact. See Hanover Const. Co. to Use of Ede v. Fehr, 139 A.2d 656, 658 (Pa. 1958) (holding that the question of waiver is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury). I will accordingly deny defendant's motion for summary judgment on this ground.

  6. Galbraith v. A.G. Edwards Sons, Inc.

    Civil Action No. 04-870 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2005)

    "[O]rdinarily the question of waiver is a question of fact for a jury"; however, "where the only evidence as to waiver is a writing, its construction and interpretation and whether or not it constitutes a waiver is a question of law for the court." Hanover Const. Co. to Use of Ede v. Fehr, 139 A.2d 656, 658 (Pa. 1958). In opposing summary judgment on this issue, the plaintiff argues that he had not asserted any claims against A.G. Edwards when he executed the stipulation of dismissal; that he did not expressly abandon his right to initiate future legal proceedings against A.G. Edwards relating to Keeney's account, and the stipulation of dismissal contains no language releasing future claims which the parties may have; and that since the stipulation of dismissal was drafted by counsel for A.G. Edwards, any ambiguity in the language of the stipulation should be construed against A.G. Edwards which drafted it.

  7. Cedrone v. Unity Sav. Ass'n

    609 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1985)   Cited 10 times

    See Batchelder v. Standard Plunger Elevator Company, 227 Pa. 201, 207, 75 A. 1090, 1092 (1910). See also In re Metropolitan International, Inc., 616 F.2d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1980); Linda Coal and Supply Co. v. Tasa Coal Co., 416 Pa. 97, 101, 204 A.2d 451, 454 (1964); Hanover Construction Company v. Fehr, 392 Pa. 199, 139 A.2d 656 (1958); Cole v. Philadelphia Co., 345 Pa. 315, 26 A.2d 920 (1942). Waiver can be determined as a matter of law, however, in cases "where only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn from the undisputed facts."

  8. Cowen v. Krasas

    438 Pa. 171 (Pa. 1970)   Cited 15 times

    This conclusion was based solely on a reading of Cowen's letter. Thus, in interpreting such a writing and determining whether or not that writing constituted an offer, the chancellor was passing on a question of law. Hanover Const. Co. v. Fehr, 392 Pa. 199, 139 A.2d 656 (1958); Sheesley v. Bisbee Linseed Co., 337 Pa. 197, 10 A.2d 401 (1940); Meaker Galvanizing Co. v. McInnes Co., Inc., 272 Pa. 561, 116 A. 400 (1922). His conclusion, therefore, is subject to our review, and we rule it was erroneous.

  9. Linda Coal & Supply Co. v. Tasa Coal Co.

    416 Pa. 97 (Pa. 1964)   Cited 44 times
    In Linda Coal and Supply Co. v. Tasa Coal Co., 416 Pa. 97, 204 A.2d 451 (1964), the court reversed a lower court's ruling that a coal company which had renegotiated a mining contract with another company for a higher price had impliedly waived its right to sue for fraud in the inducement of the original contract.

    Despite the fact that intent is normally a question for the trier of facts ( Cole v. Philadelphia Co., 345 Pa. 315, 26 A.2d 920 (1942), and Priester v. Milleman, 161 Pa. Super. 507, 55 A.2d 540 (1947)), waiver can be determined, as a matter of law, where only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn from the undisputed facts: 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 131 (1943); 56 Am. Jur. Waiver § 23 (1947). Cf. Hanover Construction Co. v. Fehr, 392 Pa. 199, 139 A.2d 656 (1958); Peoples Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Commonwealth, 359 Pa. 622, 60 A.2d 53 (1948); Grant v. Lovekin, 285 Pa. 257, 132 A. 342 (1926). However, the court below fell into error in equating knowledge of the falsity of the representations with knowledge of their fraudulent character.

  10. State v. Bishop

    108 N.M. 105 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 10 times
    In State v. Bishop, 108 N.M. 105, 766 P.2d 1339 (Ct.App. 1988), the court did not address a defendant's default of the issue on appeal by failing to raise it properly in the trial court.

    Where, however, the evidence as to waiver is a written instrument, its construction and interpretation may be decided as a question of law. See Hanover Constr. Co. v. Fehr, 392 Pa. 199, 139 A.2d 656 (1958). We read defendant's motion as a limited waiver for the period of 35 days resulting from his requested continuance.