[¶17] It is well-established that where a defendant is tried in a single case and charged with multiple counts, each count is treated as if it were a separate indictment, and verdicts of acquittal or conviction on the various counts need not be consistent.Counts v. State, 2012 WY 70, ¶ 51, 277 P.3d 94, 109 (Wyo. 2012); Moore v. State, 2003 WY 153, ¶ 16, 80 P.3d 191, 196 (Wyo. 2003); Hankinson v. State, 2002 WY 86, ¶ 11, 47 P.3d 623, 628 (Wyo. 2002); State v. Hickenbottom, 63 Wyo. 41, 60, 178 P.2d 119, 127 (1947); Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227, 230-32 (Wyo. 1986); Eatherton v. State, 810 P.2d 93, 98 (Wyo. 1991). "An acquittal on one count does not prevent conviction on another, even though the evidence is the same and defendant could not have committed one crime without committing both, so long as the evidence is sufficient to support conviction on the count on which a guilty verdict was reached." Hankinson, ¶ 11, 47 P.3d at 628 (quoting Doud v. State, 845 P.2d 402, 407 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting 3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 514 at 14-16 (1982))).
[¶11] Here, the question before the jury was whether, at the time he set fire to the charcoal, he was “intoxicated to such a degree that he was unable to formulate the intention to destroy or damage an occupied structure when he started the fire in Walmart.” If the jury agreed that he was so intoxicated that he could not form the requisite intent, under § 6–1–202(a) he could find a legal defense for his actions.[¶12] In Hankinson v. State , 2002 WY 86, ¶ 10, 47 P.3d 623, 627–28 (Wyo.2002) this Court stated that when the actions of a defendant occur while the defendant is intoxicated, after reviewing the evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that the defendant acted with specific intent. Whether or not Hankinson was so drunk that he could not form the requisite specific intent, and whether Hankinson actually engaged in a conspiracy to commit the crime of aggravated assault and battery on Coast, were questions for the jury.
We do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a reasonable jury could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Hankinson v. State, 2002 WY 86, ¶ 6, 47 P.3d 623, 626 (Wyo. 2002); Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 368 (Wyo. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980, 121 S.Ct. 1620, 149 L.Ed.2d 483 (2001). An appellant must support his motion for judgment of acquittal with "something more than a reference to defense evidence that, if believed by the jury, would have supported acquittal."
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63-65, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1014 (1997). See also United States v. Young, 954 F.2d 614, 619 (10th Cir. 1992) (defendant "need not intend to personally distribute the marijuana so long as the conspiracy, which he has knowingly joined himself to, has the objective and intent of distributing marijuana"); Johnston, 146 F.3d at 789; Hankinson v. State, 2002 WY 86, ¶ 8, 47 P.3d 623, 627 (Wyo. 2002); Marquez v. State, 12 P.3d 711, 715 (Wyo. 2000) ("It is well established that each member of a conspiracy is criminally accountable for the acts of every other member"); and McLaughlin, 626 P.2d at 66 ("it is not necessary to a charge of conspiracy that the defendant actively participate in the substantive crime which is the object of the conspiracy"). [¶ 25] Finding sufficient evidence to sustain the appellant's conviction, we affirm.
The verdict on the various counts need not be consistent. An acquittal on one count does not prevent conviction of another, even though the evidence is the same and the defendant could not have committed one crime without committing both, so long as the evidence is sufficient to support conviction on the count on which a guilty verdict was reached.Id. (citing Hankinson v. State, 2002 WY 86, ¶ 11, 47 P.3d 623, ¶ 11 (Wyo. 2002) and 3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 514 at 14-16 (1982)). Evidentiary Issues
Moore's contention is that since the jury did not believe he committed felonious assault, it could not have convicted him of entering into a residence with the intent to commit a felony. [¶ 16] This Court has previously noted several times that consistency in a jury's verdict is not necessary. Hankinson v. State, 2002 WY 86, ¶ 11, 47 P.3d 623, ¶ 11 (Wyo. 2002). In Hankinson, the Court has specifically adopted the logic of Professor Wright:
1986); Eatherton v. State, 810 P.2d 93, 98 (Wyo.1991); Hankinson v. State, 2002 WY 86, 47 P.3d 623, 628 (Wyo.2002); Moore v. State, 2003 WY 153, [¶ 16,] 80 P.3d 191, 196 (Wyo.2003).... The United States Supreme Court has [also] refused to consider inconsistent verdicts to be grounds for reversal. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 52 S.Ct. 189 (1932); United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S.Ct. 471 (1984).