Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5060-14T3
02-06-2017
ROBERT HANKINS, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD, Respondent.
Robert Hankins, appellant pro se. Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Gregory R. Bueno, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3. Before Judges Nugent and Currier. On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board. Robert Hankins, appellant pro se. Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Gregory R. Bueno, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Appellant Robert Hankins appeals the final administrative action of the New Jersey Parole Board (Board), denying parole and setting a thirty-six month future eligibility term (FET). We affirm.
Appellant is serving a life sentence, with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term, for convictions of the murder of his estranged wife and other offenses. After he became eligible for parole in 2014, appellant appeared before a hearing officer who referred the matter to the full Board for a hearing.
On February 18, 2015, the full Board denied parole and established a thirty-six month FET. In support of its decision, the full Board cited the following reasons: appellant's prior criminal record; nature of criminal record increasingly serious; presently incarcerated for multi-crime conviction; prior opportunity on probation failed to deter criminal behavior; prior incarceration did not deter criminal behavior; and lack of insight into criminal behavior. The full Board stated:
[Appellant] continues to tell inconsistent stories and half-truths even today. Still gives conflicting accounts of many things including motivation for this crime. Says it is "not lying" but "confusion" that leads to multiple inconsistencies. However, even today seems to still be "trying to get around on the system."
In its decision, the full Board also evaluated the mitigating factors in appellant's favor. The Board considered that appellant had participated in programs specific to his behavior and in institutional programs; achieved average to above-average institutional reports; achieved and maintained a minimum custody status; and had a low risk assessment score.
Following an administrative appeal, a final agency decision was issued on May 27, 2015, affirming the denial of parole and establishment of a thirty-six month FET. The Board concurred that "a preponderance of the evidence indicates that there is a substantial likelihood that you would commit a crime if released on parole at this time." It further determined that based on appellant's interview with the full Board and its review of the file, he did not "demonstrate the insight necessary in order to be a viable candidate for parole release."
In this appeal appellant contends that the Board's decision to deny parole and impose a thirty-six month FET was unreasonable.
Our standard of review of administrative decisions by the Board is limited and "grounded in strong public policy concerns and practical realities." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 200, modified, 167 N.J. 619 (2001) (Baime, J., dissenting). "The decision of a parole board involves 'discretionary assessment[s] of a multiplicity of imponderables.'" Id. at 201 (alteration in original) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2105, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668, 677 (1979)). "To a greater degree than is the case with other administrative agencies, the Parole Board's decision-making function involves individualized discretionary appraisals." Ibid. (citing Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 358-59 (1973)).
Consequently, our courts "may overturn the Parole Board's decisions only if they are arbitrary and capricious." Ibid. With respect to the Board's factual findings, we do not disturb them if they "could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence in the whole record." Id. at 172 (majority opinion) (quoting Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 154 N.J. 19, 24 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because our scope of review is narrow, the determination that "there is a substantial likelihood an inmate will commit another crime if released" must be affirmed unless the Board's decision was unreasonable and unsupported by credible evidence in the record or contrary to law. Trantino, supra, 166 N.J. at 172 (citation and quotations omitted).
After considering the arguments advanced on appeal, and the record in light of all legal principles, we conclude that they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D)(E), and we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the Board's May 27, 2015 decision. We add only the following brief remarks.
The Board's findings are neither arbitrary nor unreasonable as defendant argues, but rather are supported by credible evidence verifying a high likelihood of recidivism. Such evidence includes defendant's criminal case file detailing the original charges of murder and other offenses for which he was incarcerated; responses and statements that were given by him at the February 2015 full Board hearing which evince "a lack of insight into [his] criminal behavior," and the continued presentation of "inconsistent stories and half-truths" so many years after the commission of the offenses.
The Board has the authority to make the assessment as to the substantial likelihood that an inmate will commit another crime if released on parole and extend the FET. We find that the Board's decision to impose a thirty-six month FET is supported by sufficient credible evidence found in the record.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION