Opinion
No CIV-02-0306-PHX-ROS
May 13, 2003
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This action arises out of Plaintiff's, Jessica M. Hanke's, termination of employment by Defendant Horsecents Entertainment doing business as Trailhorse Adventure. Plaintiff is suing Defendant for discrimination on the basis of sex (pregnancy) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #41) filed on February 11, 2003. For the reasons explained in this Order, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.
The Court has denied Defendant's request for oral argument because the parties submitted memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support of their positions, and oral argument would not have aided the Court's decisional process. See Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999), modified, No. 97-17298, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8016; Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998); Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pacific Dev. Malibu Corp., 933 729 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 920.
I. Background
The facts are takes from Defendant's Statement of Facts (DSOF), Plaintiff's Separate Statement of Facts (PSSOF), Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Facts and Supplemental Statement of Facts (DSSOF), Plaintiff's Supplemental Reply to Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Facts and Supplemental Statement of Facts (PSuppSOF), and corresponding attachments to these documents. Because the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party on summary judgment, Defendant's Statement of Facts and THA's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Facts and Supplemental Statement of Facts are cited only when Plaintiff has admitted the relevant fact.
Defendant provides horse rides and other western-themed activities to the general public. (DSOF ¶ 1) (Doc. #42.) In March 2000, Defendant hired Plaintiff as a wrangler. (PSSOF ¶ 41) (Doc. #47.) The job duties of a wrangler depend on the location at which the wrangler works. (Id. ¶ 3.) These duties include taking clients out for rides on horses, feeding and watering the horses, moving manure into a wheelbarrow and transporting it out of the stall, moving bales of hay, receiving money from customers, and filling out paperwork. (Id.) When Defendant initially hired Plaintiff, she worked at the Tapitio location filling out paperwork. (Id.)
Around March 2000, Corrine Myers-Feeney (Ms. Myers), an employee working at Defendant's West World location, injured her knee. (Id. ¶ 31; Myers Aff. ¶ 3 (Feb. 28, 2003) attach. PSSOF, Ex. G.) Defendant had Plaintiff and Ms. Myers trade jobs, so that Plaintiff worked at West World performing Ms. Myers's responsibilities, and Ms. Myers worked at Tapitio performing Plaintiff's responsibilities. (PSSOF ¶ 31.) Usually Defendant assigned only one wrangler to West World, and his or her responsibilities included all the duties set forth above. (Id. ¶ 3.) Six weeks later in July 2000, Ms. Myers obtained a release from her doctor regarding her injury. (Myers Aff. ¶ 3 attach. PSSOF, Ex. G.) As a result, Defendant transferred Plaintiff back to Tapitio, while Ms. Myers returned to work at West World. (PSSOF ¶ 33.) However, Plaintiff continued to work at West World during Ms. Myers's scheduled absences from work. (Id.) In August 2000, Ms. Myers went on vacation and when she returned, she elected to voluntarily terminate her employment with Defendant and her employment history is not in dispute in this lawsuit. (Id. ¶ 31; Myers Aff. ¶ 4 attach PSSOF.)
At the end of July or early August of 2000, Plaintiff learned that she was pregnant from her administration of a home pregnancy test. (PSSOF ¶ 45; Jessica Hanke Dep. 58:20 (Nov. 18, 2002) attach. PSSOF, Ex. A.) On or about August 4, 2000, Plaintiff told her supervisor James Powell that she was pregnant. (PSSOF ¶ 46.) She also told him she was concerned about working at West World by herself because she was required to lift bales of hay, feed and water horses, shovel manure, and she was afraid she may suffer a miscarriage from a horse throwing her while taking customers out on rides. (Id.) It is undisputed that Defendant told Plaintiff that she needed to bring in a doctor's note stating that she was pregnant and indicating any job-related restrictions. (DSOF ¶ 8.) On August 4th or 5th of 2000, Plaintiff called Defendant's human resources representative, Meghan McLord, and told Ms. McLord that she was pregnant and had concerns about working at West World by herself. (PSSOF ¶ 47.) Ms. McLord replied that when Plaintiff submitted a doctor's note Defendant would place Plaintiff in a light-duty position. (Id.)
On August 5, 2000, Plaintiff learned that Defendant assigned her to West World on August 6th, 7th, and 8th. (Id. ¶ 51.) Plaintiff worked at West World on August 6th and 7th. On August 7, 2000, Plaintiff went to Planned Parenthood to obtain a doctor's note with job-related restrictions. (Id. ¶ 48.) Planned Parenthood provided her with a document stating only that she was pregnant but not that she was unable to perform the duties required of her employment on August 6th, 7th, and 8th. (Id.) Plaintiff did not provide the document to Defendant. (DSOF ¶ 22.) On or about August 7, 2000, Plaintiff contacted her doctor and scheduled an appointment for August 17, the doctor's earliest available appointment, to obtain a doctor's note with job-related restrictions. (PSSOF ¶ 50.)
While working at West World on August 8, 2000, Plaintiff learned that she was scheduled to take out customers on two horse rides that evening. (Id. ¶ 53.) Plaintiff called Defendant' vice president Tom Yolk and left him a message stating that she was pregnant, alone at West World, and needed assistance. (Id.) Mr. Yolk did not return her call, but Mr. Powell who worked for Mr. York and her supervisor returned the call. (Id.) Plaintiff told Mr. Powell that there were two customer horse rides scheduled and asked if he was sending someone. (Id.) When Mr. Powell told Plaintiff that he needed all the other wranglers at the Tapitio location, she replied that she was not comfortable taking the customers out on horse rides. (Id.) Mr. Powell responded stating that "if she couldn't do her job, she no longer was needed." (Id.)
During the same period of time, Michelle Weber, another employee of Defendant, was pregnant. (Id. ¶ 58.) When Ms. Weber notified Defendant of her pregnancy in August 2000, Defendant asked her to obtain and submit a doctor's note. (Id.) After she provided a doctor's note stating that she could not ride horses due to her pregnancy, Ms. Weber was placed on light-duty. (DSSOF ¶ 67) (Doc. #53.) Ms. Weber worked in the light-duty position for more than four months, from August through December 2000. (Id. ¶ 68.) There was very little demand for the products that she was selling as part of her responsibilities. (Id. ¶ 70; PSuppSOF ¶ 71 (Doc. #56).) Therefore, Defendant offered to transfer her to its main facility in Sedona to work as a receptionist. (DSSOF ¶ 72; PSuppSOF ¶ 72.) She turned down the offer because she lived in Phoenix and was nine months pregnant. (PSuppSOF ¶ 74). Defendant terminated Ms. Weber on December 5, 2000 because of financial reasons. (PSuppSOF ¶ 60.) Defendant hired four wranglers shortly before it terminated Ms. Weber. (Id.)
B. Procedural History
In late August or September of 2002, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. (Hanke Dep. 81:19-20 attach PSSOF, Ex. A.) Plaintiff received an EEOC Determination dated April 24, 2001 that found "reasonable cause that [Plaintiff] was discharged due to her pregnant condition." (EEOC Determination attach. PSSOF, Ex. C.)
Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of Maricopa County in Arizona on December 1, 2001. (Compl. attach Notice Rem.) (Doc. #1.) On February 19, 2002, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal (Notice Rem.) (Doc. #1) based on federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a), because Plaintiff's claim arises under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1).
Defendant filed an Answer (Doc. #2) on February 20, 2002, and filed an Amended Answer on December 11, 2002 (Doc. #35). On February 11, 2003, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. H 41) and Defendant's Statement of Facts (Doc. #42). On March 7, 2003, Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #46) and Plaintiff's Separate Statement of Fact (Doc. #47). On April 8, 2003, Defendant filed a Reply in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgement (Doc. #52) and THA's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Facts and Supplemental Statement of Facts (Doc. #53). On April 17, 2003, Plaintiff filed its Supplemental Reply to THA's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Facts and Supplemental Statement of Facts (Doc. #56).
II. Discussion
1. Summary Judgment
A. Legal Standards
A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);Jesinger v. Nev. Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). Substantive law determines which facts are material, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. In addition, the dispute must be genuine, that is, "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party; if the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 249-50. To show a genuine issue, the party opposing the motion "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 578 (1986) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). Furthermore, the party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party's] pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 57(e); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586-87 (1986); Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). However, because "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, . . . [t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor" at the summary judgment stage. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)); see Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995).
2. Pregnancy Discrimination
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1), prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, amending Title VII to clarify that discrimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination "on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act provides that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." Id. (emphasis added). Pregnancy discrimination cases are thus analyzed under the familiar rubric of other Title VII claims. Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1998). The analysis of a disparate treatment claim under Title VII is governed by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, then the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. See Llamas v. Butte Cmty. Coll. Dist., 238 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2001). In order to prevail, the Plaintiff must then show that the employer's purported reason for the adverse employment action is merely a pretext for a discriminatory motive. Id. The McDonnell Douglas intermediate shifting of "evidentiary burdens serves to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to [the] ultimate question" of whether plaintiff has proven that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her because of her gender. Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); accord St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). "Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under this framework, `[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
The plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination requires a showing that "give[s] rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Llamas, 238 F.3d at 1126 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). "The requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case for Title VII . . . claims on summary judgment is minimal and does not need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence." Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998); accord Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 859 (9th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by presenting direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220; see also Tempesta v. Motorola, Inc., 92 F. Supp.2d 973, 979-80 (D. Ariz. 1999). Alternatively, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case with indirect circumstantial evidence by meeting the four requirements outlined inMcDonnell Douglas: the plaintiff was (1) a member of a protected class; (2) qualified for the position; (3) subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees. See Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis. Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
"Under the McDonnell Douglas scheme," [e]stablishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee." St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 506. Thus, once Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the employer to offer evidence that the adverse action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1123-24. "This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it `can involve no credibility assessment.'" Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 509). Even though the "presumption shifts the burden of production to the defendant, `[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 507 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). "If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, " Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255), "and simply drops out of the picture.'" Id. at 511.
If the defendant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the burden then reverts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's stated reason is merely a pretext. See Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220 (9th Cir. 1998). There is not necessarily a new burden of production on the plaintiff because "[t]he factfinder may infer `the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination' without additional proof once the plaintiff has made out her prima facie case." Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotingReeves, 530 U.S. at 147); accord Chuang, 255 F.3d at 1127 ("[A] disparate treatment plaintiff can survive summary judgment without producing any evidence of discrimination beyond that constituting his prima facie case, if that evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding the truth of the employer's proffered reasons."). Plaintiff is simply afforded an opportunity to demonstrate that the "the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). "When the plaintiff offers direct evidence of discriminatory motive, a triable issue as to the actual motivation of the employer is created even if the evidence is not substantial." Godwin. 150 F.3d at 1221. However, when the plaintiff relies on indirect evidence to show that the defendant's stated motive is not the actual motive, "[s]uch evidence . . . must be `specific' and `substantial' in order to create a triable issue with respect to whether the employer intended to discriminate on the basis of sex." Id. at 1222.
B. Analysis
Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by relying on indirect evidence using the McDonnell Douglas framework. First, Plaintiff was a member of the protected class because she is female and was pregnant at the time Defendant terminated her. Second, Plaintiff was qualified for the position because she satisfactorily worked for Defendant from March through August 8 of 2000. Third, Plaintiff was subject to an adverse employment action because Defendant did not provide her with a light-duty position upon her request and terminated her when she did not perform her normal job. Fourth, Plaintiff argues that she was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees because Defendant placed other employees with temporarily limited physical capabilities on light duty until they were physically able to return to their normal job. For instance, she compares when another wrangler/assistant manager, Ms. Myers, dislocated her knee, Defendant provided her with a light-duty position until she was able to return to her, normal job. In contrast, Defendant did not provide Plaintiff with a light-duty position, but rather retained her in the same job and terminated her when she did not perform her duties in that position.
The burden shifts to Defendant to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason why it provided other employees with limited physical capabilities a light-duty position, while not providing a light-duty position to Plaintiff. Defendant satisfies this burden by providing evidence that in every instance where Defendant altered the job responsibilities of an injured employee, Defendant asked for and received from the employee a doctor's note which stated the type of injury and the limitations on the employee's ability to perform the required work responsibilities. (DSOF ¶ 38; Tom Yoke Decl. ¶ 7 (Feb. 11, 2003) attach. DSOF, Ex. A.) Defendant argues that it treated Plaintiff the same as other employees by mandating a doctor's note instructing that she could not perform her usual employment duties prior to placing her in a light-duty position. (Def.'s Mot. S. J. at 5-6.) It is undisputed that when Plaintiff notified Defendant that she was pregnant and requested a light-duty position, Defendant specifically told Plaintiff that when she obtained a doctor's note she would be provided a light-duty position. Plaintiff did not provide a doctor's note to Defendant, and Defendant terminated her when she refused to perform her normal duties. Furthermore, Defendant argues Ms. Myers, the injured employee who obtained a transfer to light-duty work, presented Defendant with a doctor's note which described her injury and limitations on her capacity to work before she was transferred. (DSSOF ¶ 42; Myers Aff. attach. DSSOF ¶ 3-4, Ex. B.)
Because Defendant has rebutted Plaintiff's prima facie case by producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendant's reason is merely a pretext. However, Plaintiff does not present any arguments that directly refute Defendant's nondiscriminatory reason. In fact, Plaintiff conceded that she has no personal knowledge of whether Defendant consistently applied its doctor's note requirement for light duty. (PSSOF ¶ 38.)
Instead of establishing pretext, Plaintiff argues that she was not provided with adequate time to see her doctor and obtain a note. (Id.) However, Plaintiff's argument does not demonstrate that she was treated differently than other employees. For instance, she does not argue or provide evidence that Defendant provided other similarly situated employees more time to obtain a doctor's note. Nor does she argue or provide evidence that other similarly situated employees were provided a light-duty job while in the process of obtaining a doctor's note. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that if all the pertinent facts were identical except for her pregnancy as for other similarly situated employees, Defendant would not have required a doctor's note prior to transferring her to a light-duty position and would not have terminated her when she refused to perform her job. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act requires only that Plaintiff be "treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (emphasis added). See also Int'l Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (company could not treat pregnant women differently than other employees by preventing them from holding certain positions due to company's fear that they would be exposed to substances that could injure their fetuses); Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that pregnant department store employee was not treated differently than other similarly situated employees when she was terminated for absenteeism and stating "[e]mployers can treat pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant employees"); Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that pregnant nurse was not treated differently than other similarly situated nurses when she was terminated for not treating an HIV patient and stating that "Title VII simply does not require employers to treat their employees with kindness").
It is noteworthy that neither side has addressed whether she could have requested sick leave or other leave to obtain the note. Plaintiff has the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that Defendant intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff. Reeves, 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).
The EEOC Determination letter, which found reasonable cause that discrimination occurred, advances only one additional argument beyond those of Plaintiff: "Respondent requires their clients to sign a statement indicating that they are not pregnant or that they [sic] have any other medical condition that would prohibit them from riding horses." (EEOC Determination attach. PSSOF, Ex. C.) However, this is irrelevant to the specific facts of this case. The manner in which Defendant treats its clients neither demonstrates that Defendant treated Plaintiff, an employee, differently than other similarly situated employees nor creates an issue of fact regarding whether Defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext. In any event, Plaintiff admitted that Defendant had no such policy. (PSuppSOF ¶ 79.) Moreover, under Ninth Circuit precedent, an EEOC cause letter does not itself create a genuine issue of material fact, and the Court must further scrutinize the cause letter to determine its usefulness in evaluating the factual circumstances. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1283 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that an EEOC cause determination does not create a genuine issue of material fact); Ogunleye v. Arizona, 66 F. Supp.2d 1104, 1108 n. 5 (D. Ariz. 1999) ("The significance of an EEOC determination necessarily rests upon the thoroughness of the EEOC investigation.").
Plaintiff's final argument is that Defendant's termination of Michelle Weber, who was pregnant at the time of her termination, demonstrates Defendant's discriminatory intent. (Plt.'s Resp. Def.'s Mot. S. J. at 8-9.) However, not only is Plaintiff's argument neither specific nor substantial, it also does not show discriminatory intent. After Ms. Weber provided Defendant with a doctor's note, Defendant transferred her into a light-duty position where she worked for four months. Plaintiff concedes that there was very little demand for the products that Ms. Weber was selling as part of her responsibilities in the light-duty position, Defendant attempted to provide her with another available light-duty position, and Defendant terminated her only after she turned down the offer. The relevant evidence shows no discriminatory animus towards pregnant employees and is not "specific and substantial" to show that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff based on her pregnancy, rather than her lack of a doctor's note. See Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221.
III. Conclusion
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #41) will be granted. Viewing the pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that Defendant terminated Plaintiff on the basis pregnancy in violation of Title VII. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #41) is GRANTED.