Hanie v. Barnett

9 Citing cases

  1. Webster v. Boyett

    269 Ga. 191 (Ga. 1998)   Cited 44 times
    Holding that, in automobile negligence action where defendant was alleged to be intoxicated, evidence of prior acts of driving while intoxicated was admissible as bearing on punitive damages

    See Goss v. Total Chipping, Inc., 220 Ga. App. 643, 645 ( 469 S.E.2d 855) (1996) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding during liability phase of trial potentially prejudicial evidence that Total Chipping's trucks were poorly maintained and unsafe and the owner had instructed them to drive the trucks despite light and brake problems); Cheevers v. Clark, 214 Ga. App. 866, 869 ( 449 S.E.2d 528) (1994) (trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant's subsequent arrest for DUI during second phase of trial); Holt v. Grinnell, 212 Ga. App. 520, 522 ( 441 S.E.2d 874) (1994) (trial court correctly ruled that evidence related to two prior DUIs, other than nolo contendere pleas, was admissible for determining the amount of punitive damages to be awarded in second phase of bifurcated trial). See, e.g., Hanie v. Barnett, 213 Ga. App. 158 ( 444 S.E.2d 336) (1994) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in severing issue of professional negligence from issue of punitive damages to avoid possible prejudice). See General Motors v. Moseley, 213 Ga. App. at 887 .

  2. Doherty v. Brown

    339 Ga. App. 567 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 7 times
    In Doherty v. Brown, 339 Ga. App. 567, 794 S.E.2d 217 (2016) this Court affirmed the jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.

    Sellers v. Burrowes , 302 Ga.App. 667, 672 (2), 691 S.E.2d 607 (2010). See Williams v. Booker , 310 Ga.App. 209, 212 (1) (ab), 712 S.E.2d 617 (2011) ("Absent a factual basis linking Williams' alcohol addiction or use to the claimed act of medical malpractice, the evidence is inadmissible because it is both irrelevant and highly prejudicial"); Hanie v. Barnett , 213 Ga.App. 158, 160 (1), 444 S.E.2d 336 (1994) ("In view of the great possibility that evidence concerning the other issues might taint the trial of the professional negligence case," trial court did not abuse discretion in omitting evidence of prior conduct during liability phase of trial.) 7. Brown also contends that the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial after Doherty placed evidence of his financial condition and liability insurance before the jury.

  3. Bolden v. Ruppenthal

    286 Ga. App. 800 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 3 times
    Permitting amendments to pretrial orders within the trial court's discretion

    It specifically excluded all of the alleged wrongdoing by the defendants of attempting to mislead the court into thinking that Bolden was dead or in otherwise taking the proceeds of the wrongful death settlement for themselves without notice to Bolden. Accordingly, the fact that Bolden did not attempt to introduce any such evidence during phase 1 cannot be held against him. Compare Hanie v. Barnett, 213 Ga. App. 158, 160(2) ( 444 SE2d 336) (1994) (plaintiffs were specifically allowed by the court to raise certain factual allegations on rebuttal or cross-examination after raising issue with court; because they failed to do so and failed to proffer allegedly excluded evidence, there was nothing for this Court to review). Second, by preventing Bolden from introducing the post-death facts that showed the defendants to be biased and lacking in credibility, Bolden's case was prejudiced.

  4. Moresi v. Evans

    257 Ga. App. 670 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 9 times
    Affirming because “the jury was adequately informed that the defendants bore the burden of proving any alternative theories of causation that they presented”

    Cantrell v. Northeast Georgia Medical Center, 235 Ga. App. 365, 368(1)(b) ( 508 S.E.2d 716) (1998) (bifurcation of liability and damages issues in wrongful death and medical malpractice action was not error). See also Hanie v. Barnett, 213 Ga. App. 158, 160(1) ( 444 S.E.2d 336) (1994) ("[a] trial court generally has broad authority in controlling the course of the trial"). As we noted in Hanie, supra, OCGA § 9-11-42(b) "specifically authorizes the trial court to exercise its discretion in ordering severance of issues to avoid prejudice."

  5. Cantrell v. Northeast Georgia Medical Center

    508 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 18 times
    Concluding that hospital did not hold physician out as its employee as evidenced by conspicuous signs posted in hospital's registration area and express language in the patient consent to treatment form

    There was no error in bifurcating the liability and damages issues. See Hanie v. Barnett, 213 Ga. App. 158, 160 (1) ( 444 S.E.2d 336) (1994). 2.

  6. Shivers v. Webster

    480 S.E.2d 304 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 3 times

    The trial court has broad discretion in determining how it will conduct a trial. See Hanie v. Barnett, 213 Ga. App. 158, 160 (1) ( 444 S.E.2d 336) (1994); Ellis v. Cameron Barkley Co., 171 Ga. App. 211 (1) ( 319 S.E.2d 38) (1984). This includes wide discretion in assigning positions of the parties, especially where there are more than two sides and more than two parties.

  7. Boyett v. Boyett

    224 Ga. App. 843 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 7 times

    1, however, prevent the trial court from ordering a further severance of the issues to avoid prejudice to either party. OCGA § 9-11-42 (b); Hanie v. Barnett, 213 Ga. App. 158, 160 ( 444 S.E.2d 336). Further, under Georgia law, for punitive damages to be authorized, there must be evidence of wilful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, or oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences.

  8. Goss v. Total Chipping

    220 Ga. App. 643 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 19 times

    1 suggests the legislature intended any restriction on OCGA § 9-11-42(b)." Hanie v. Barnett, 213 Ga. App. 158, 160(1) ( 444 S.E.2d 336) (1994). Neither does the holding in City of Monroe v. Jordan, 201 Ga. App. 332 ( 411 S.E.2d 511) (1991), relied upon by the Gosses, strip the trial court of that authority.

  9. Professional Practices Commission v. Brewer

    466 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 7 times

    On appeal, appellants argue for the first time that these claims were barred under the doctrine of res judicata by virtue of the district court's prior opinion. However, appellants' failure to raise this issue in the trial court precludes our consideration of it on appeal. Hanie v. Barnett, 213 Ga. App. 158, 160 ( 444 S.E.2d 336) (1994). As we are presented with nothing to review under this enumeration of error, the trial court's denial of the motion for summary judgment on the state tort claims is affirmed.