Opinion
22-1054
02-16-2023
WYATT T. HANDY, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant, v. CITY & COUNTY OF DENVER; GRETA ALDRIDGE; DENVER PRETRIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Defendants - Appellees.
(D.C. No. 1:19-CV-02403-RMR-SKC) (D. Colo.)
Before McHUGH, MORITZ, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT [*]
Joel M. Carson III Circuit Judge
Wyatt T. Handy, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court's dismissal of his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and denial of his post-judgment motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Because we lack jurisdiction to review the dismissal order, we dismiss that portion of the appeal. But exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the denial of the Rule 59(e) motion.
BACKGROUND
In December 2018, Mr. Handy was arrested on domestic violence charges and placed into custody at the Denver Jail. The county court judge set bond and ordered his release under maximum pretrial supervision with GPS monitoring (the Maximum Supervision Order). Mr. Handy was released to live at his uncle's house under the supervision of the Denver Pretrial Services Department. Because he was under maximum pretrial supervision, "he was not allowed to leave his uncle's house for any reason whatsoever, with the exception of medical emergencies, to go to Court, and to appointments with his pretrial services supervisor." ROA at 10. The pretrial services supervisor, Greta Aldridge, denied Mr. Handy's requests to leave his uncle's house for other reasons, including to visit his adult daughter and grandchildren and his elderly father, to obtain groceries or food, to obtain employment, to visit the federal district court, and to visit religious and spiritual leaders and attend religious services.
The district attorney dismissed the charges against Mr. Handy in July 2019. A month later, Mr. Handy filed a federal complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As relevant to this action, he named Ms. Aldridge and the City and County of Denver (the City) as defendants. He alleged the conditions of his pretrial confinement to his uncle's house violated his First Amendment rights to freedom of association and to practice his religion, his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, his Eighth Amendment right against excessive bail, and his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.
Mr. Handy also asserted a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. He later conceded that claim, however, and it is not part of this appeal.
Ms. Aldridge and the City moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Ms. Aldridge argued that Mr. Handy could not plausibly allege that she was the "but for" cause of any constitutional violations where she was acting under the court's Maximum Supervision Order, or, to the extent he could plausibly allege causation, she was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. The City argued it was not liable because Mr. Handy did not sufficiently identify any municipal policies or practices that led to the alleged constitutional violations or show that any municipal policies or practices were the moving force behind the alleged violations.
In response, Mr. Handy argued that he set forth facts establishing Ms. Aldridge's participation in violating his constitutional rights, and that she was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. He further asserted he was not challenging the county court's order or its authority to impose conditions of release. Instead, he challenged "the house arrest rules, regulations, and policies of Denver and [Denver Pretrial Services]," which substantially burdened his constitutional rights by precluding him from associating with others and practicing his religion. ROA at 60. Mr. Handy claimed that Denver's "rules ®ulations[] are not court imposed statutory release conditions, but are rules ®ulations established by Denver and [Denver Pretrial Services], for the pretrial release program, in addition to statutor[y] release conditions." Id. at 61.
In reply, the defendants asserted that "by statute and administrative order, it is the court that determines the terms of maximum supervision. Under the statute establishing pretrial services, the court-through an order of the chief judge- approves the particular pretrial services plan," including levels of supervision under pretrial release. Id. at 78. They stated that Colorado's "Second Judicial District adopted the pretrial services plan establishing that level 5 maximum supervision includes, among other conditions, home confinement [and] electronic monitoring/surveillance." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "Thus, in approving maximum pretrial supervision for Mr. Handy, the court understood and intended such supervision to include the conditions in the guidelines adopted by the Second Judicial District." Id. The defendants further argued that because Ms. Aldridge was carrying out the county court's order, she was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. They attached a copy of the Second Amended Chief Judge Administrative Order No. 16-01, which was issued by Michael A. Martinez as the Chief Judge of the Second Judicial District (the Administrative Order).
A magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant the motion to dismiss. He opined that Ms. Aldridge was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because she was enforcing a court order when she denied Mr. Handy's requests to leave his uncle's house. He further opined that the City could not be held liable in the absence of a constitutional violation by one or more of its agents, which Mr. Handy could not establish because Ms. Aldridge was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. The magistrate judge noted that Mr. Handy's complaint did not rely on the Administrative Order, but he nonetheless opined that even if Mr. Handy's response were construed as a motion to amend his complaint, Mr. Handy could not state a claim based on the Administrative Order because it too was a judicial directive.
Mr. Handy filed timely objections. He also filed a motion to amend his complaint to allege that the Administrative Order was a policy and procedure that subjected the City to municipal liability.
The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation, holding that Ms. Aldridge was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity and that Mr. Handy could not establish liability against the City because he could not establish a constitutional violation by any individual defendant because of quasi-judicial immunity. It also denied leave to amend, holding that amendment would be futile because the magistrate judge's recommendation had already considered the Administrative Order.
Mr. Handy then filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. He argued that (1) Ms. Aldridge was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because she was not enforcing a court order, but enforcing the Administrative Order, and (2) the City was liable because the Administrative Order was an unconstitutional regulation or policy statement that it had adopted. In addition, he contended that amendment of the complaint would not be futile.
The City and Ms. Aldridge opposed the motion, asserting that Mr. Handy did not identify any new evidence or change in the law, but merely rehashed his arguments because he disagreed with the court's rulings. The district court denied the Rule 59(e) motion, holding that "[n]othing in the motion to reconsider demonstrates that the Court misapprehended the facts, Plaintiff's position, or the controlling law and that reinstatement of this action is warranted." ROA at 234.
Mr. Handy now appeals.
DISCUSSION
Because Mr. Handy proceeds pro se, we construe his filings liberally. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux &Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). But he must "follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants," and "the court cannot take on the responsibility of serving as [his] attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
I. Jurisdiction
First we must consider our jurisdiction to review the district court's orders. Mr. Handy's notice of appeal was timely as to the Rule 59(e) motion, but not the order dismissing his complaint. Therefore, we have jurisdiction to review only the denial of the Rule 59(e) motion.
"[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement." Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). The district court entered its judgment dismissing Mr. Handy's claims and denying leave to amend on December 15, 2021. Mr. Handy had 30 days from the entry of judgment-until January 14, 2022-to file his notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
A timely Rule 59(e) motion tolls the time to file a notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv); Vanderwerf v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 603 F.3d 842, 846 (10th Cir. 2010). But Mr. Handy's Rule 59(e) motion was not timely. He had 28 days after the entry of judgment to file his motion, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), making it due on January 12, 2022. He filed it one day late, on January 13, 2022.
The district court considered the motion to be timely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(d), which gives a party three extra days when service is by mail. Rule 6(d), however, applies when a party's deadline is based on the date of service of a pleading. The Rule 59(e) deadline is not based on service, but on the entry of judgment. Rule 6(d) thus does not apply to filing a Rule 59(e) motion. See Parker v. Bd. of Pub. Utilities, 77 F.3d 1289, 1291 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing Rule 6(d)'s predecessor).
Because Mr. Handy's Rule 59(e) motion was not timely, it did not toll the time to appeal. See Allender v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 439 F.3d 1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 2006). And although the notice of appeal for the dismissal order was due on January 14, 2022, he did not file his notice of appeal until February 24, 2022. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the order dismissing Mr. Handy's claims and denying leave to amend. See Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214.
In contrast, the February 24, 2022, notice of appeal was timely as to the district court's February 8, 2022, order denying the Rule 59(e) motion. We therefore have jurisdiction to review the denial of that motion.
II. Denial of Rule 59(e) Motion
As discussed above, the district court erred in holding the Rule 59(e) motion was timely. And because it could not extend the time to file a Rule 59(e) motion, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(2), it could not make the motion timely. The defendants, however, did not argue before the district court that it could not consider a late-filed Rule 59(e) motion. Nor do they make that argument here. We are not inclined to consider this as a jurisdictional issue. See Legg v. Ulster Cnty., 979 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2020) (concluding that Rule 6(b) is a claims-processing rule); Blue v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union 159, 676 F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding that Rule 59(e) is a non-jurisdictional processing rule); Lizardo v. United States, 619 F.3d 273, 277 (3d Cir. 2010) (same as to Rule 59(e)); Advanced Bodycare Sols., LLC v. Thione Int'l, Inc., 615 F.3d 1352, 1359 n.15 (11th Cir. 2010) (same as to Rule 6); Nat'l Ecological Found. v. Alexander, 496 F.3d 466, 474-75 (6th Cir. 2007) (same as to both Rule 59(e) and Rule 6). Therefore, lacking argument by the defendants that the district court erred in considering the motion on the merits, we proceed to review the merits.
We review the ruling on a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of discretion. Loughridge v. Chiles Power Supply Co., 431 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2005). "Accordingly, we will not reverse the decision of the district court unless the district court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "The abuse of discretion standard includes review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "We therefore review for errors of law de novo." Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 1044 (10th Cir. 2019).
Rule 59(e) relief is available in limited circumstances, including "(1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) [when] new evidence [was] previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). "Thus, a motion for reconsideration is appropriate where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party's position, or the controlling law. It is not appropriate to revisit issues already addressed or advance arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing." Id. (citation omitted).
A. Quasi-Judicial Immunity
In his Rule 59(e) motion, Mr. Handy argued that the court had misapprehended the facts and the law with regard to Ms. Aldridge's entitlement to quasi-judicial immunity, because Ms. Aldridge had not been executing a court order, but instead enforcing the Administrative Order. Before this court, Mr. Handy again argues that the county court judge never ordered the conditions about which he complains, but rather they stem from the Administrative Order. He has not demonstrated, however, that the district court abused its discretion in denying the Rule 59(e) motion with regard to Ms. Aldridge.
"Absolute immunity has long been available to protect judges from liability for acts performed in their judicial capacity. Over time the defense has been extended to certain others who perform functions closely associated with the judicial process." Dahl v. Charles F. Dahl, M.D., P.C. Defined Ben. Pension Tr., 744 F.3d 623, 630 (10th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This extension is referred to as quasi-judicial immunity. See id. As relevant here, state court pretrial services officers have been awarded quasi-judicial immunity. See Whitesel v. Sengenberger, 222 F.3d 861, 868 (10th Cir. 2000); see also Tripati v. U.S. I.N.S., 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir. 1986) (same as to probation officers involved with pretrial release).
In the Maximum Supervision Order, the county court judge ordered Mr. Handy's release under maximum pretrial supervision. Because the Administrative Order sets the conditions of maximum pretrial supervision in the Second Judicial District, the Maximum Supervision Order necessarily incorporated those conditions. Ms. Aldridge did not merely enforce the Administrative Order, as argued by Mr. Handy. Rather, she operated under the authority of the county court judge and the direction of the Maximum Supervision Order, meaning that her activities were "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process," Tripati, 784 F.2d at 348; see also Whitesel, 222 F.3d at 868. And she was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity so long as she "acted within the general subject matter of [her] jurisdiction," even if she "exceeded [her] authority or committed grave procedural errors." Whitesel, 222 F.3d at 868 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Mr. Handy's Rule 59(e) motion did not demonstrate that the district court misapprehended the facts or the law regarding Ms. Aldridge's entitlement to qualified immunity, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 59(e) motion as to Ms. Aldridge.
B. Municipal Liability
Mr. Handy's Rule 59(e) motion further argued that the Administrative Order was a regulation or policy statement adopted by the City. Before this court, Mr. Handy reiterates that the Administrative Order "is the rules and regulations of Denver for the establishment of [Denver Pretrial Services]," Aplt. Opening Br. at 21, and he argues that his municipal liability claims against the City should survive dismissal because he plausibly alleged that parts of the Administrative Order are unconstitutional.
The district court dismissed the claims against the City on the ground that Mr. Handy could not plead that Ms. Aldridge committed a constitutional violation, given that she was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. To be sure, the general rule is that to plead a claim for municipal liability, a plaintiff "must make a threshold showing of an underlying constitutional violation by an individual officer." Wilkins v. City of Tulsa, 33 F.4th 1265, 1277 (10th Cir. 2022). The district court, however, erred in applying this rule to dismiss the claims against the City in these circumstances.
Ms. Aldridge's entitlement to quasi-judicial immunity does not mean that Mr. Handy cannot establish that she committed a constitutional violation. Rather, it means that even if he shows that she did commit a constitutional violation, he cannot obtain judicial relief from her. But if Mr. Handy can show she committed a constitutional violation, even an immunized one, he could still seek relief from the City under one or more theories of municipal liability. Cf. Watson v. City of Kan. City, 857 F.2d 690, 697 (10th Cir. 1988) (recognizing, where individuals were entitled to qualified immunity, "there is no inherent inconsistency in allowing a suit alleging an unconstitutional policy or custom to proceed against the city when the individuals charged with executing the challenged policy to [injure] the plaintiff have been relieved from individual liability"); see also Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 782-83 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining that qualified immunity for individual defendants based on a lack of clearly established law does not preclude a plaintiff from pursuing municipal liability, unlike qualified immunity based on finding no constitutional violation). The district court erred in failing to recognize, in deciding the Rule 59(e) motion, that it gave an incorrect reason for granting judgment in favor of the City.
Nevertheless, that does not mean that we are required to reverse the denial of the Rule 59(e) motion. "We may affirm the district court on any ground supported by the record, even one not addressed by the district court or presented on appeal." Frey v. Town of Jackson, 41 F.4th 1223, 1240 (10th Cir. 2022). Here, the defendants presented an alternative ground for affirmance before the district court, which they also have argued before this court-that Mr. Handy failed to show that the Administrative Order is a policy or procedure adopted by the City.
"To state a claim for municipal liability, a plaintiff must allege (1) a constitutional violation (2) caused by (3) a municipal policy or custom." Id. at 1238. Among other circumstances, a "policy or custom" includes "a formal regulation or policy statement" or "the decisions of employees with final policymaking authority." Id. at 1238 n.12 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Handy asserts that the Administrative Order represents a policy or custom of the City. But he has not plausibly pleaded that the Administrative Order is a policy or procedure adopted by the City, or that it was a decision of a City employee with final policymaking authority. Rather, it is evident that the Administrative Order is a policy or procedure of the Second Judicial District of the Colorado state court system, which was adopted by a state judicial officer.
Both the district courts and the county courts are part of the state court system. See Colo. Const. Art. VI, §§ 1, 9, 17; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-6-101. Colorado divides the state into judicial districts, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-5-101, and the Second Judicial District is "composed of the city and county of Denver," id. § 13-5-103(1). As stated above, the Administrative Order was issued by Michael A. Martinez, in his capacity as the Chief Judge of the Second Judicial District. The fact that the Second Judicial District is contiguous with the City does not mean that the Administrative Order was a policy or procedure of the City. Instead, it was a policy or procedure of the state judicial district. See Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating that municipal judge's authority was established by state law, and his activities were "not done under the auspices of the City and could not be interpreted as promulgating municipal policy" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Eggar v. City of Livingston, 40 F.3d 312, 316 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Because Judge Travis was functioning as a state judicial officer, his acts and omissions were not part of a city policy or custom."); Woods v. City of Mich. City, 940 F.2d 275, 279 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Since Superior Court judges in Indiana are considered to be officials of the state, Woods' claim that Judge Keppen is an official of the city or county, or that his bond schedule is an act that Michigan City or LaPorte County have 'officially sanctioned or ordered' is unfounded." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Mr. Handy nonetheless points to the Colorado statute regarding pretrial services programs, which provides:
[A]ll counties and cities and counties are encouraged to develop a pretrial services program in consultation with the chief judge of the judicial district in an effort to establish a pretrial services program that may be utilized by the district court of such county or city and county. Any pretrial services program must be established pursuant to a plan formulated by a community advisory board created for such purpose and appointed by the chief judge of the judicial district....The plan formulated by such community advisory board must be approved by the chief judge of the judicial district prior to the establishment and utilization of the pretrial services program.Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-106(3). He argues that in adopting the Administrative Order, "Judge Martinez acted on behalf of Denver and the 'community advisory board' administratively, as a local governing body for the municipality, in the establishment and adoption of the rules and regulations for [Denver Pretrial Services]." Aplt. Opening Br. at 23-24, 26-27.
The plain language of the statute refutes this interpretation. Although the community board serves in an advisory capacity, it is the "chief judge of the judicial district" who approves a pretrial services program "that may be utilized by the district court." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-106(3). And it is the "chief judge of the judicial district" who appoints the members of the community advisory board. Id. Thus, the statute contemplates that the project will be implemented by the state courts, not the interested counties or cities and counties. "A municipality cannot be liable for judicial conduct it lacks the power to require, control, or remedy, even if that conduct parallels or appears entangled with the desires of the municipality." Eggar, 40 F.3d at 316.
Mr. Handy failed to plausibly plead that the Administrative Order was a policy or procedure of the City. That order therefore could not be a ground for imposing municipal liability on the City. It follows that it would be futile to remand for the district court to reconsider the Rule 59(e) motion as to the City.
Finally, for the same reason, it would be futile to allow Mr. Handy to amend his complaint to rely on the Administrative Order. Because denial of leave to amend is proper where amendment would be futile, see Frey, 41 F.4th at 1240, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the portion of the Rule 59(e) motion challenging the denial of leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
We dismiss the appeal from the district court's dismissal order, and we affirm the district court's denial of Mr. Handy's Rule 59(e) motion. We grant Mr. Handy's motion to proceed without prepayment of costs or fees on appeal.
[*] After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.