Opinion
NO. 14-15-00768-CR
04-25-2017
DONNIS RAY HANCOCK, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 178th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1471570
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A single issue is raised in this appeal from a conviction for stalking: whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction. We conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
The complainant worked as a hotel clerk. After the complainant rebuffed appellant's romantic advances during one of his stays at the hotel, appellant began to call the complainant at work. Despite the complainant's requests that he leave her alone, appellant's calls persisted for several years, and they often contained disturbing and threatening content.
In addition to calling the complainant, appellant harassed her by shining a laser light at her chest from across the street, by leaving her messages and notes, by sending her emails with sexually explicit content, by sitting in his car in the hotel parking lot, by banging on the hotel windows and yelling at her when she would hide in her manager's office, and by following her after she left work.
The manager of the hotel told appellant to leave the premises several times and sought a criminal trespass warning. The complainant and her coworkers also called police on the occasions that appellant came to the hotel. Police eventually apprehended appellant and arrested him for stalking. A jury convicted appellant of that offense and the trial court assessed punishment at twenty-five years' imprisonment.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Standard of Review. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The evidence is legally insufficient when the record contains no evidence, or merely a "modicum" of evidence, probative of an element of the offense. See Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Although we consider everything presented at trial, we do not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. See Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Because the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight given to their testimony, any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the verdict. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Our review includes both properly and improperly admitted evidence. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We also consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, as well as any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. Id. Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
The Offense. To obtain a conviction for stalking, the State was required to prove the following essential elements: (1) appellant knowingly engaged in conduct on more than one occasion and pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct directed specifically at the complainant; (2) appellant knew or reasonably should have known that the complainant would regard this conduct as threatening the infliction of bodily injury; (3) the conduct caused the complainant to be placed in fear of bodily injury; and (4) the conduct would cause a reasonable person to be placed in fear of bodily injury. See Tex. Penal Code § 42.072(a); Pomier v. State, 326 S.W.3d 373, 379 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
We examine the evidence as it relates to each of these elements separately.
Conduct. There is legally sufficient evidence that appellant engaged in conduct directed specifically at the complainant.
First, appellant called, emailed, and sent letters to the complainant over a period of several years. Sometimes he would call the complainant up to twenty times per night. His statements included the following:
• "I will fuck you up";
• "I will pimp you out";
• "Watch your back, bitch";
• "Dead or alive, I'm going to fuck you up"; and
• "Fuck the police and you will die." His emails also contained explicit content, including a photo of his erect penis.
Second, appellant sought out the complainant at the hotel, even after she rebuffed his romantic advances. Appellant shined a laser at the complainant's chest from across the street. Appellant also banged on hotel windows, asking for the complainant to come outside and see him. Appellant did not stay away from the hotel despite numerous requests to do so by the complainant, the hotel manager, and other hotel employees.
Threatening. Appellant knew or should have known that the complainant would have regarded this conduct as threatening the infliction of bodily injury. Appellant's statements over the phone—e.g., "I will fuck you up" and "You will die"—convey threats by their plain terms. Furthermore, appellant knew or should have known that the complainant would have regarded this conduct as threatening because the complainant, the hotel manager, and other hotel employees repeatedly asked him to leave the complainant alone; he should have known by their protests that his conduct was unwanted. Cf. McGowan v. State, 375 S.W.3d 585, 591 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref'd) ("Appellant's decision to ignore these warnings from his stepbrother and law enforcement officers reveals appellant's knowledge regarding his conduct.").
Causation. There is also legally sufficient evidence that appellant's conduct caused the complainant to fear the infliction of bodily injury. The complainant testified that she believed appellant was "capable of anything, raping [her], hurting [her]." The complainant testified that, after she received the email with the sexually explicit picture, she was afraid that appellant was going to "fuck [her] up and rape [her]." Appellant's conduct even made the complainant fearful enough to call the police.
Reasonable Person. Appellant's conduct would also cause a reasonable person to fear the infliction of bodily injury. Appellant engaged in a pattern of behavior that demonstrated an unwelcome obsession with the complainant. Even after being warned repeatedly to stay away from the complainant, appellant followed her around, and his conduct escalated to the point of becoming threatening. If this conduct had been directed at just an ordinary person, not specifically the complainant, that person would reasonably be placed in fear of bodily injury. See Werner v. State, 412 S.W.3d 542, 549-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (a person's fear was reasonable after her ex-boyfriend used illegal tracking devices, followed her around, and made intimidating statements).
Appellant's Response. Appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient because he did not send any emails to the complainant that explicitly threatened the infliction of bodily injury. This argument lacks merit because it does not acknowledge the evidence that appellant explicitly threatened the complainant over the phone that he would "fuck [her] up." When this statement is considered alongside appellant's other conduct—especially the sexually explicit email—the evidence supports a finding that appellant threatened the complainant with bodily injury.
Appellant also argues that his statement that he would "fuck [her] up" was at most ambiguous, and thus, did not demonstrate that he actually threatened to inflict bodily injury. But in accordance with our standard of review, we must view the statement in the light most favorable to the verdict, which means that we must conclude that the statement did convey an actual threat.
We conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support every essential element of the offense.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
/s/ Tracy Christopher
Justice Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Jamison, and Donovan.
Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).