Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Scott, 846 S.W.2d 832, 833 n. 2 (Tex. 1993). Naylor contends that if we determine that the September 18 judgment was not a nunc pro tunc judgment, we are, in effect, determining that it was invalid and, thus, should follow the holdings of Hamrah v. Hamrah, 547 S.W.2d 308 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and cases of like ilk holding if a judgment nunc pro tunc is invalid, it must be reversed and vacated, leaving the original judgment in force. If that were true, under Tex.R.Civ.P. 5, he contends, the appeal from that original judgment was not timely perfected and we must dismiss it for want of jurisdiction.

If the only effect of the judgment nunc pro tunc (which is filed after the trial court has lost its plenary power) is to enlarge the time for filing a Motion for a New Trial or an appeal bond, then it has no effect and the appeal must be taken from the original order. Hamrah v. Hamrah, 547 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rodriguez v. Valdez, 521 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Point of Error No. One is overruled. The cost bond was filed untimely some eight months after the signing of the first judgment, and the case is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Neither party complains that the judgment nunc pro tunc was, for any reason, improperly entered; it is nowhere contended that the error corrected was anything but a clerical error properly amended by a Rule 316 correction. The entry of the judgment nunc pro tunc did not extend the time in which to perfect appeal. Brazos Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Callejo, 734 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.App. 1987, no writ); Hamrah v. Hamrah, 547 S.W.2d 308 (Tex.Civ.App. 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The point of error brought forward on appeal pertained to the original judgment and could have been presented in an appeal from the original judgment.

Further, the fact that the Clerk of this Court received and marked the transcript as "filed" does not render the Court with authority to consider it in contravention of Tex.R.App.P. 54(a). See Blackman v. Housing Authority, 152 Tex. 21, 254 S.W.2d 103, 104 (1953); Hamrah v. Hamrah, 547 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). It should be noted that the date on which the Clerk marked the transcript as "filed" is well beyond the period in which this Court may consider a motion for extension of time to file a late transcript, and, therefore, the "filing" of the transcript could not have been the cause behind appellant's failure to move for an extension. At the time the transcript was "filed," it was already late.

There is no materiality restriction in Rule 329b(h). Indeed, the inclusion of the phrase "in any respect" by the 1981 amendments apparently was inserted to change the ruling in cases such as Hamrah v. Hamrah, 547 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which held that a change in the judgment must be material in order to start the appellate timetable running from the second judgment. Guittard, Other Significant Changes in the Appellate Rules, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 667, 670 (1981).

The judgment signed by the trial court, based on the jury verdict, was for a definite amount of attorney's fees, and appellant's fourth point of error is overruled. See International Security Life Insurance Co. v. Spray, 468 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1971); Hamrah v. Hamrah, 547 S.W.2d 308 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Seureau v. Mudd, 515 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In its second point of error, appellant argues that appellee was not entitled to attorney's fees under Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 2226 (Supp.

Merely setting out the subdivisions of art. 1995 did not add anything to the original decree. Hamrah v. Hamrah, 547 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n. r. e.). A trial court may not make an order that simply affirms a former judgment and thereby enlarge the time period for perfecting appeal.