Opinion
NO. 03-14-00111-CR
02-24-2016
Roland Hampton, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF BELL COUNTY, NO. 2C12-05292, HONORABLE JOHN MICHAEL MISCHTIAN, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant Roland Hampton of driving while intoxicated. See Tex. Penal Code § 49.04. The trial court assessed punishment at 180 days' confinement, suspended the imposition of the sentence, and placed appellant on community supervision for a period of 18 months. On appeal, appellant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial on that basis. We will affirm the trial court's judgment.
DISCUSSION
The record shows that after appellant was convicted and sentenced for driving while intoxicated, he filed a motion seeking to substitute new counsel for his trial counsel. The trial court granted appellant's motion, and appellant's new counsel filed a motion for new trial, alleging that appellant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. After a hearing at which appellant, trial counsel, and the arresting officer testified, the trial court denied appellant's motion for new trial. This appeal followed.
In his brief on appeal, appellant divides his argument into two issues, arguing that (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and (2) the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for new trial, which was based on his claim of ineffective assistance. Because the substance of the two issues is the same, and because the ruling from which appellant appeals is the denial of the motion for new trial, we address the two issues as one: whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Appellant contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to obtain appellant's medical records, which would have supported appellant's claims that he had physical injuries and limitations that prevented him from properly doing field-sobriety tests. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice suffered by the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The appellant must first demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 307. The appellant must then show the existence of a reasonable probability—one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome—that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel's deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 308. Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700; see Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Appellate review of counsel's representation is deferential; we must apply a presumption that counsel's conduct was not deficient. Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 307-08; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. To rebut that presumption, a claim of ineffective assistance must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the meritorious nature of the claim. See Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Where, as here, the trial court denies a motion for new trial alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, we use an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing the trial court's decision. See Riley v. State, 378 S.W.3d 453, 457 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Ramirez v. State, 301 S.W.3d 410, 415 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.). We reverse the trial court's decision only if it was clearly erroneous and arbitrary. Riley, 378 S.W.3d at 457. "A trial court abuses its discretion if no reasonable view of the record could support the trial court's ruling." Id. We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id. We may not substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court and must uphold the trial court's ruling if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.
On appeal, appellant asserts that he proved the first Strickland prong—that his trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms—because his trial counsel failed to obtain updated medical records from the Department of Veterans Affairs that would have supported appellant's claim that he could not properly do field-sobriety tests due to his age, arthritis, and problems with his knee, ankle, and back. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, appellant presented medical records from 2010 and 2011 showing, among other things, that he had ongoing issues with his knee, back, and ankle. Trial counsel testified that the only medical records he reviewed before trial were records that appellant brought to him and were "fairly old," including some "from '04, '05 and '07." He testified that he did not use the records at trial because he did not think they would be helpful. Trial counsel conceded that he could have tried to obtain the updated records but did not do so.
Even if we assume, without deciding, that trial counsel's failure to obtain the updated medical records amounted to deficient performance under Strickland's first prong, appellant's argument nevertheless fails under Strickland's second prong. See Ex parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d 891, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ("The two prongs of Strickland need not be analyzed in a particular order."); Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (failure to prove prejudice prong of Strickland test "precludes any relief"). To determine whether prejudice occurred, we look to the record and determine whether it demonstrates a reasonable probability that the admission of the updated medical records would have caused a different result at trial. See Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ("The question of prejudice turns on the facts that the record shows.").
Here, the record demonstrates that the arresting officer pulled appellant over at approximately 1:30 a.m. on June 13, 2012, after he observed appellant driving on a dividing line between two lanes and moving from one lane to another without using a turn signal. The officer testified that after stopping appellant and approaching his car, he noticed that appellant "spoke with "slurred speech." The officer also testified that he "smelled a very strong odor of alcoholic beverages, and it appeared to be coming from [appellant's] person." The officer testified that he first conducted a horizontal-gaze-nystagmus test on appellant's eyes and observed six out of six possible "clues" indicating that appellant was intoxicated. The officer further testified that appellant was unable to adequately perform several of the components of the "walk-and-turn" test and the "one-leg stand" test. The officer set forth specific examples of appellant's poor performance on the tests, including balance issues and multiple attempts to complete a test. The officer testified that he formed the opinion that appellant was intoxicated based on the totality of the circumstances. He further testified that he requested that appellant provide a blood specimen, but appellant declined. The officer testified that appellant was not given the opportunity to take a breath test. A video recording of the traffic stop and field-sobriety-tests was admitted for the jury's review.
Appellant testified that he was at a bar watching a basketball game on the night of his arrest. He testified that he was there from approximately 9 p.m. to approximately 1 a.m. He was with three other people, and the group was buying pitchers of beer. He testified that he believed he had three or four glasses of beer throughout the time he was at the bar. One of the friends with whom appellant was at the bar on the night of his arrest testified that there were at least four people in their group at the bar, and the group drank a total of about three pitchers of beer. Appellant's friend further testified that appellant did not seem intoxicated that night.
Appellant testified about his medical conditions, including stating that he suffered from gout, arthritis, bad knees, and an injured back bone; that he "was given a total of 50 percent disability from [the Department of Veterans Affairs]" due to these physical conditions; and that he told the officer he had bad knees and would not be able to perform the field-sobriety tests properly. Appellant testified that he declined to take a blood test because he was already under arrest when he was asked to take the test. During defense counsel's opening statement and closing arguments, he argued that appellant had "50 percent VA disability" that affected his ability to do the field-sobriety tests, and he asked the jury to take appellant's disabilities into consideration in evaluating his performance on the tests. The State argued during closing arguments that appellant could have, but did not, provide medical records to support his claims of disability.
Taking the record of the underlying trial into consideration, we now turn to the updated medical records to assess how they might have affected the outcome of the trial. Although the records show ongoing issues with appellant's knee, back, and ankle—issues that would have been helpful in supporting his claims that his physical limitations caused him to struggle with field-sobriety tests—they also make reference to appellant's alcohol use in ways that would likely have been detrimental to his defense. Specifically, records from September 29, 2010, show that an alcohol-screening test conducted on appellant was deemed "positive" and that appellant stated that he drank alcohol two to three times per week, had three or four alcoholic beverages each time, and had six or more drinks in a day on a "weekly" basis. Records from the same date also stated that "[m]edical problems associated with alcohol use were reviewed with the patient. Specifically the following were reviewed: Liver disease, psychiatric disorders, depression. The patient was advised about recommended limits and to drink below them. Will discuss again at next visit."
Records from April 11, 2011, list "heavy alcohol use" as one of the issues addressed and then state, "SATP referral — patient refusing" and "patient advised to d/c use." Records from the same date state that appellant "drinks 3 beers daily, states he drinks 8 beers daily on Sat and Sun." The records further state that appellant was advised to decrease or completely stop drinking alcohol when taking certain medications prescribed to him. In records dated June 10, 2011, one of the conditions listed was "Alcohol Abuse," and the associated notes state that appellant "declined [substance abuse treatment program] consult, advised to drink below recommended limits."
Even without the field-sobriety tests that required physical movement, there was considerable evidence of appellant's intoxication admitted at trial, including evidence that: (1) appellant and his friends were drinking pitchers of beer that night; (2) appellant believed he drank three or four glasses of beer; (3) he slurred his speech during the traffic stop; (4) he smelled of alcohol during the traffic stop; and (5) he showed all six clues indicating intoxication during the horizontal-gaze-nystagmus test. In addition, appellant raised the issue of his physical limitations at trial through his testimony and his counsel's arguments, and the jury members were able to view the video of his traffic stop and field-sobriety tests, weigh the testimony about his disabilities, and make their own determinations about whether he was intoxicated.
Because the updated medical records contained considerable harmful evidence along with the helpful evidence, because there was evidence of appellant's intoxication other than his performance on the field-sobriety tests requiring physical movement, and because appellant raised the issue of his physical limitations at trial, appellant does not satisfy his burden of proving that there was a reasonable probability that the admission of the records would have changed the outcome of his trial. See Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 240-41 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (defendant failed to satisfy prejudice prong of Strickland because absent alleged deficient performance, jury would have heard considerable additional evidence supporting defendant's guilt, thus making conviction even more likely); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (to establish prejudice, defendant must show that counsel's error was so serious that it deprived defendant of fair trial). We therefore conclude that appellant does not satisfy the Strickland standard, and we overrule his sole issue.
CONCLUSION
Having determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for new trial, we affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.
/s/_________
Cindy Olson Bourland, Justice Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Goodwin and Bourland Affirmed Filed: February 24, 2016 Do Not Publish