Opinion
NO. 12-11-00057-CR
01-31-2012
JAMES ARLIE HAMPTON, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE 392ND
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
HENDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
James Arlie Hampton appeals his conviction for murder, for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for life and fined $10,000. In two issues, Appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Sometime during the first week of January 2010, someone used a high-powered rifle to shoot and kill Corey David. His body was dumped in a burn pit on the property where Appellant lived just outside of Athens, Texas. The body was not found until January 7, 2010, when an investigator from the Henderson County Sheriff's Office located it there, burned and under a discarded box spring mattress and other garbage. The investigating officers then tried to piece together the last few days of David's life.
As far as the investigators were able to determine, David was last seen alive at Appellant's house. David was involved in an unusual relationship with Mandy Hampton, Stacey Harlan, and Appellant. Appellant and Hampton had two children who lived in a mobile home on property owned by Hampton's family. Occasionally, Hampton and Appellant resided together, albeit in separate bedrooms, in the mobile home. At other times, one or the other of them would live somewhere else. The two were still married but did not consider themselves to be in a relationship. Hampton and David had been in a romantic relationship until October 2009.Appellant was romantically involved with Harlan. Adding to the unusual nature of the relationship, at various times in the past, David, Hampton, and Appellant had resided in the same home at the same time. At other times, David and Hampton resided in a recreational vehicle behind the mobile home. The mobile home was located on property owned by Hampton's family. Others lived on the property, and there was a communal burn pit that was used to burn trash.
In October 2009, David and Hampton had a physical confrontation. David choked Hampton, and Hampton hit David with a beer bottle. Although they remained friends, Hampton stated that this incident ended their romantic relationship.
On New Year's Eve 2009, David was in Longview while Hampton, Harlan, and Appellant were celebrating the New Year in the mobile home near Athens. On January 1, 2010, Hampton and Harlan drove to Longview to get David because he needed a place to stay. Hampton, Harlan, and David planned to return to the mobile home, but they were forced to change their plans because Appellant was upset and did not want David around. Appellant told Harlan, "There will be problems if [David] comes back to the house." So Hampton, Harlan, and David instead drove to Harlan's house in Tool, Texas.
Very early on the morning of January 2, 2010, Harlan visited Appellant in Athens. When she got to the mobile home, Appellant was outside pacing with a rifle. Appellant was clearly angry with Harlan because she had gone to Longview to pick up David. Harlan returned to her home in Tool. Still early in the morning, Hampton then visited Appellant in Athens. Hampton convinced Appellant to allow David to come to the mobile home. David went to the mobile home, and by all accounts, Appellant and he interacted without significant conflict during the day.
On the morning of January 3, Hampton and David were sleeping in the same bed when Appellant awakened Hampton. Although Hampton and Appellant were separated, they had agreed to not be in bed with another person around the children or each other. Appellant informed Hampton that she "broke the rule" and that he was unhappy about it. Hampton knew that Appellant was angry. Appellant and Hampton continued bickering regarding the incident the entire day.
Later that evening, Appellant informed David that he needed to find another place to stay immediately. David tried to stay with family in the area, but he was unable to do so. Appellant then left the mobile home to go to Harlan's house and told Hampton that David needed to be somewhere else when he returned.
While Appellant was gone, Hampton took Appellant's guns out of his closet and put them in her room. She removed all of the guns that were in Appellant's closet. However, Appellant also owned a .308 rifle that was of sentimental value to him, and he kept it separate from his other guns. Hampton thought she took all of the guns, but she was not sure that she had taken the .308 rifle.
Before Appellant returned, David left the mobile home and went to Hampton's grandmother's house, which is located on the same property. When Appellant returned, he noticed that Hampton had taken his guns that had been in his closet, and Appellant and Hampton argued. Hampton did not want to continue the argument and did not want to have Appellant in her room so she boarded up the door and the windows to her bedroom. Before she finished boarding up the windows, she sent a text message to David, and he returned to her room through one of the windows. Hampton and David talked to one another that night in the room before they went to sleep.
On the morning of January 4, 2010, Hampton was awakened by Appellant knocking on her bedroom door. Appellant needed Hampton for something, but he could not get into her room because of the boards. David was still in Hampton's room. Hampton began removing the boards from her door so she could talk to Appellant, but she had difficulty because of the thorough job she had done affixing the boards to her door. To help her, Appellant retrieved another drill bit and passed it to her under the door. While she was working to remove the boards, David exited the mobile home through one of Hampton's bedroom windows with the intent to return to Hampton's grandmother's home. After she removed the boards, Hampton opened her door and walked into the living room. As she did so, she saw Appellant enter the mobile home through the front door.
Appellant's daughter woke up on the morning of January 4 to the sound of gunshots coming from the area behind the mobile home. This was unusual to her because Appellant usually did target practice in front of the mobile home. She also heard Appellant say something about wasting bullets.
Later that day, Appellant left the property for a short but undefined period of time. While he was gone, Hampton went to her grandmother's house to see David, but he was not there. Soon thereafter, David's sister reported David missing to the Henderson County Sheriff's Office. Officers went to the property to investigate David's whereabouts. They interviewed Appellant and Hampton, and they searched the property, eventually finding David's body in the burn pit.
Appellant was arrested and charged with murder. Appellant pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury found Appellant guilty of murder. During the punishment phase of the trial, the jury was asked to determine if Appellant acted under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. The jury did not make that finding and assessed a sentence of imprisonment for life and a fine of $10,000. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly, and this appeal followed.
EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY
In his first and second issues, Appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's judgment. Specifically, Appellant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove that he, rather than some unknown person, committed the murder of David and is legally insufficient to support the jury's finding that the evidence did not show Appellant acted under the influence of sudden passion. Applicable Law
In this case, to prove that Appellant was guilty of murder, the State was required to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant intentionally or knowingly caused David's death or intended to cause serious bodily injury and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused David's death. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1), (2) (West 2011).
The offense of murder is a first degree felony. Id. § 19.02(c). However, the offense is a second degree felony if a defendant proves that he acted under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause by a preponderance of the evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial. Id. § 19.02(d). "Sudden passion" means passion directly caused by and arising out of provocation by the individual killed or by another acting with the person killed that arises at the time of the offense and is not solely the result of a former provocation. Id. § 19.02(a)(2). "Adequate cause" means a cause that would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection. Id. § 19.02(a)(1). Standard of Review
As for the legal sufficiency of the State's evidence of each element of the crime charged, legal sufficiency is the constitutional minimum required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sustain a criminal conviction. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2786-87, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); see also Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality opinion). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. Under this standard, a reviewing court does not sit as a thirteenth juror and may not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Instead, a reviewing court defers to the fact finder's resolution of conflicting evidence unless that resolution is not rational in light of the burden of proof. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899-900. The duty of a reviewing court is to ensure that the evidence presented actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed the crime. See Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a charge would include one that "accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant is tried." Id.
However, the standard is different when a defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's negative finding on an affirmative defense for which the defendant has the burden of proof. Cleveland v. State, 177 S.W.3d 374, 388 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd); see also Cover v. State, 913 S.W.2d 611, 619 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1995, pet. ref'd). In that instance, we evaluate the jury's negative finding by examining the record for evidence that supports the jury's finding while ignoring all evidence to the contrary. Cleveland, 177 S.W.3d at 387. If no evidence supports the negative finding, we then examine the entire record to determine whether the affirmative defense is established as a matter of law. Id.
In most cases, sudden passion is "resolved exclusively by the jury's assessment of whether the witness is credible." Id. at 389. For an appellant to successfully satisfy the high standard that a jury's determination is not supported by legally sufficient evidence, the sudden passion issue must be established by evidence not subject to a credibility determination, such as a stipulation of evidence by the parties. Id.Murder
First, we consider whether there is legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Appellant murdered David. David died from at least one and probably two gunshot wounds that were through and through wounds, meaning that the bullet passed completely through his body. The bullets were not recovered, and so while the State was able to prove that the death was caused by a gunshot from a high-powered rifle, it was unable to establish the exact kind of high-powered rifle used or to match the shooting to a specific rifle. Further, because David's body was burned after his death, additional potential evidence linking the actual rifle used to kill David may have been lost. Nevertheless, Appellant concedes that the State presented sufficient evidence that David was murdered by being shot by a high-powered rifle.
Appellant argues that the State failed to carry its burden to show that he was the person who shot David. Although the State relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, the State presented a strong case that Appellant murdered David on the morning of January 4, after David exited Hampton's bedroom through a window.
The State presented evidence that Appellant prepared for a confrontation with David even before David arrived. Kevin Dooley, who was Appellant's longtime friend, testified that Appellant spread weapons throughout the property in preparation for a fight with David. Another friend, Jason Herndon, testified that he was talking to Appellant before David came to the mobile home and Appellant said, "[T]here's going to be a problem between me and [David]." Appellant then pulled a shotgun from behind a chest of drawers and indicated that the shotgun could take care of the "problem." Herndon testified that Appellant was joking and laughing during this conversation, but the jury was free to assign its own reasonable conclusions to Appellant's statements. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899-900.
Appellant's preparation for a confrontation with David was further reinforced by testimony that Appellant did not want David in the mobile home. He told Hampton and Harlan not to bring David to the mobile home. On the night that he thought David was arriving, Appellant paced outside carrying a rifle. Although there was no confrontation between Appellant and David on January 3, 2010, Appellant continued to make clear to everyone that David was not welcome in his home and that it was necessary for David to leave.
The jury could infer that Appellant knew David was still in the mobile home the morning of January 4. Hampton's cousin, Steven Bray, was residing at Hampton and Bray's grandmother's house. He testified that David left his backpack at the house when David returned to the mobile home the night of January 3. However, later that night, someone had taken the backpack. Bray assumed that Appellant entered the house and took the backpack. Additionally, Hampton and David were talking in her bedroom when he returned to the mobile home. The walls of the mobile home are thin, and Appellant could have heard Hampton and David talking.
Further, Appellant was an excellent marksman and had access to a high-powered rifle when David was exiting the mobile home. Hampton testified that David exited through the window and then Hampton exited her bedroom. Shortly thereafter, Hampton saw Appellant enter through the front door. Additionally, Appellant's daughter testified that Appellant's .308 rifle was special to him and kept separate from the other guns. She further testified that her mother did not take that gun when she gathered Appellant's guns and took them to her bedroom.
Perhaps most probative of Appellant's guilt is the evidence that Appellant's daughter woke up Monday morning to gunshots coming from outside the back of the mobile home. This was unusual to her because Appellant usually did target practice outside the front of the mobile home. She also heard Appellant say something about wasting bullets. She had not heard him say that before when he did target practice. The investigating officers found a gun case near the back corner of the house, and also near Appellant's daughter's bedroom.
The State's case was further strengthened by David's actions before his death. Before David died, he indicated that he was nervous being in Appellant's home. He texted his sister and requested that she call him. When she called him, David was scared and he told her, "Sh[*]t is really weird here."
David's DNA was found on a glove, a toboggan, and a blue pickup truck that was kept on the property. Appellant's DNA was also found on the glove. David's body was found in the burn pit on the property, and Appellant admitted that he had burned trash in the burn pit on January 5, 2010.
Finally, after David's sister filed a missing person report, investigating officers contacted Appellant. Appellant was extremely nervous when the officers questioned him. He told the officers that he had last seen David on the night of January 3, 2010, and that David was walking to the road to meet his sister. Then, when Appellant was arrested, he asked if Hampton was being arrested for murder too.
There is evidence contrary to the verdict. First, Appellant attempted to explain David's DNA on the gloves and the truck as possibly being from previous work David did on the property. There was testimony that various people worked on the property. However, no one testified that David worked with gloves on the property or rode in the blue pickup truck that was kept on the property.
Appellant further points to testimony that it was difficult to see David's body in the burn pit as evidence that he did not know David was in the burn pit when he burned trash on January 5, 2010. Appellant is correct that the evidence shows someone hid David's body in the burn pit. But he ignores a significant amount of evidence pointing to him as the person most able to accomplish that task.
Next, Appellant argues that his daughter was mistaken regarding the timing of her hearing him say something about wasting bullets. Appellant presented testimony that either he or David made the comment about wasting bullets at another time when he was target shooting in the front of the trailer. However, Appellant's daughter's testimony was much different. She remembered his making the remark on the morning of January 4, 2010, and coming from behind the mobile home.
Appellant also presented evidence that he was wearing only a pair of black shorts and playing a video game in the living room shortly after his daughter heard the gunshots. This evidence is not inconsistent with Appellant's having killed David moments earlier. Regardless, the jury was free to weigh the conflicting evidence and make its determination of the actual facts. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899-900.
Hampton did not hear any gunshots after David left her room through the window. Further, Hampton changed her testimony as to whether Appellant was in the mobile home when she opened the door. Again, though, the jury was free to believe her testimony that she saw Appellant enter the mobile home from the front door after she exited her bedroom. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899-900.
Appellant also presented testimony from Richard Huffman that Bray told him David got into a light-colored truck. Huffman believed that Bray told him this on a Sunday before David's body had been found. The Sunday before David's body was found was January 3, 2010. Thus, even if the jury believed Huffman's testimony, the jury also knew that David was in the mobile home on Monday morning, January 4, 2010.
Finally, David had written some notes that were dark in nature and made the suggestion that he may have committed suicide. However, the investigating officer did not detect a suicide threat within those notes, and the manner in which David died was inconsistent with suicide.
Having examined the aforementioned evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the murder of David. Therefore, we hold that the evidence is sufficient under the Jackson v. Virginia standard to support the trial court's judgment. Appellant's first issue is overruled. Sudden Passion
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the jury's failure to find that he acted with sudden passion is not supported by the evidence. Examining the record for evidence that supports the jury's finding while ignoring all evidence to the contrary, we see that Appellant had been angry with David for several days. Before David came to the mobile home, Appellant was preparing for a confrontation and, at one point, was pacing outside with a rifle. Further, the jury heard evidence from which it could have concluded that Appellant knew David was still on the property. Specifically, Bray testified that he thought Appellant had found David's backpack sometime during the night of January 3, 2010, or early morning of January 4, 2010. Also, Appellant was in the mobile home when David climbed through the window and could have heard him at that time. Further, David and Hampton were talking in Hampton's bedroom both the night of January 3, 2010, and the morning of January 4, 2010, and Appellant could have heard them either time through the thin walls in the mobile home.
Based on this evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Appellant acted not with sudden passion but in a deliberate and controlled manner. The jury could have determined that Appellant knew David was in Hampton's bedroom and simply waited for his opportunity to kill him. Therefore, there is evidence that supports the jury's finding.
The result does not change when we examine the evidence supporting a finding of sudden passion. Appellant provided a statement to the investigating officers that when he returned on the night of January 3, 2010, he did not realize that David was still on the property. Instead, he said that he saw Bray, Hampton, and his two children in the mobile home when he got home. Appellant presented no other evidence of sudden passion, but instead simply gave the jury the opportunity to assume that Appellant was surprised to find David in Hampton's bedroom on the morning of January 4, 2010. Appellant's evidence falls far short of the unusual circumstances necessary to find the evidence insufficient to support a jury's negative finding as to sudden passion. See, e.g., Cleveland, 177 S.W.3d at 387.
We overrule Appellant's second issue.
DISPOSITION
Having overruled Appellant's first and second issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
BRIAN HOYLE
Justice
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.
(DO NOT PUBLISH)
JANUARY 31, 2012
NO. 12-11-00057-CR
JAMES ARLIE HAMPTON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Appeal from the 392nd Judicial District Court
of Henderson County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. B-17,793)
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.