Summary
In Hampton, the Court noted that Delaware's statute differed from the Indiana statute at issue in Jackson because it provided for a prima facie hearing that could result in dismissal of the charges and held that the defendant's habeas petition was unripe because a prima facie hearing had not yet been requested.
Summary of this case from State v. TopolskiOpinion
C.A. No. 99M-11-002.
Submitted: June 22, 2000.
Decided: September 29, 2000.
Upon Consideration of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus DENIED
David W. Jones, Esq., Dover, Delaware. Attorney for Petitioner.
Stephen R. Welch, Jr., Dover, Delaware. Attorney for Respondent.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the petitioner's petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, the State's response, and the record of the case, it appears that:
1. On or about May 6, 1996, the petitioner, Arthur S. Hampton, was indicted on a charge of murder in the first degree. He underwent psychological and psychiatric examinations to determine his competency, and on August 7, 1997 counsel for the State and the defendant appeared in open court and agreed that Mr. Hampton was not competent to stand trial. A subsequent report signed by Dr. Seward and Dr. Sacre, a psychologist and psychiatrist, respectively, stated that Mr. Hampton is "irreversibly incompetent" to stand trial. Nothing has occurred in his criminal case since. Mr. Hampton has now filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that his continued, indefinite commitment, where there is no expectation that he will ever be able to stand trial, violates his rights to equal protection and due process, and subjects him to cruel and unusual punishment. For the reasons which follow, the Court concludes that Mr. Hampton's petition should be dismissed without prejudice. There is another remedy available to Mr. Hampton under 11 Del. C. § 404 which allows him to seek dismissal of the charges unless the State is able to show that it has sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case against him. He must first resort to that remedy. If he is unsuccessful in obtaining his release through that procedure, he may refile his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and seek a decision on the merits of the issues raised in his current petition.
No actual judicial determination of Mr. Hampton's competency has occurred. However, both the State and counsel for the defendant continue to acquiesce in their agreement that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. It is also noted that during most of the pendency of the criminal proceeding Mr. Hampton was at the Delaware Psychiatric Center where he was taken for his evaluations in June 1997. In September 1999, Mr. Hampton was transferred without court order to the infirmary at a Department of Correction facility. The Court's understanding is that Mr. Hampton suffers from a serious physical illness and that the Correction infirmary is better able to provide for his care and comfort. Upon motion by counsel for Mr. Hampton, the Court will consider whether he should be ordered returned to the Delaware Psychiatric Center. The Court is not inclined, however, at this time to address this issue absent a request from petitioner's counsel.
2. Since the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, his criminal case is governed by 11 Del. C. § 404. That section provides that one determined to be incompetent to stand trial shall be held at the Delaware State Hospital until he is capable of standing trial. Upon motion of that defendant, the court may conduct a hearing to determine whether the State has sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of the defendant's guilt. If not, the charges are to be dismissed, and such dismissal acts as a judgment of acquittal. If the State meets its burden, the defendant continues to be held until he is capable of standing trial. The statute does not provide for any scenario that ever results in the defendant being released if the State meets its burden and if he never becomes competent to stand trial.
3. In his present petition, the defendant relies upon the United States Supreme Court case of Jackson v. Indiana. In that case the State of Illinois statute governing pre-trial detention of persons incompetent to stand trial provided, in substance, simply that any person charged with a crime who was incompetent to stand trial was to remain committed until that person became competent to stand trial. The mere filing of a criminal charge against a person incompetent to stand trial, therefore, could result in the person being committed indefinitely, theoretically for life, without any further hearing. In that case the Supreme Court held that the indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant solely on account of his incompetency violates his rights to equal protection and due process. In the context of that particular case, the Supreme Court further held that if it appeared that the defendant would never be competent, the State must either institute a civil commitment proceeding of the type required to commit any other citizen, or release him.
406 U.S. 715, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, 92 S.Ct. 1845 (1972).
4. The Delaware statute contains a procedural step not contained in the Illinois statute involved in Jackson. In that case the defendant was clearly in a position where as long as he was incompetent his commitment was legally indefinite. There was no right to any further hearing or any avenue by which he might be released. The Delaware statute, by contrast, does provide a procedure which gives the defendant the right to seek a judicial review of the evidence against him which might lead to his being acquitted and, therefore, released. Because of this remedy, it is not at all legally clear at this point that the defendant's commitment is indefinite. The defendant need only file a motion, not a burdensome requirement. Accordingly, the holding in Jackson is not applicable to this case and nothing in the rationale of that case persuades this Court that there has been any violation of the defendant's equal protection or due process rights at this stage of the criminal proceeding. If the defendant requests a hearing pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 404 (a) and the State does present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case against him, then the constitutional claims which the defendant makes become ripe for adjudication. A criminal defendant should first exhaust his remedies under the criminal statutes or rules before proceeding by habeas corpus.
The defendant argues that the statute provides only that upon request the court "may" hold a hearing. The Court finds it highly unlikely that any defendant would be denied a hearing once requested. However, at this point the defendant has not yet made the request.
Rocker v. State, Del. Supr., 240 A.2d 141 (1968), Curran v. Wooley, Del. Supr., 104 A.2d 771 (1954), State v. Hawkins, Del. Gen.Sess, 183 A. 626 (1936); Curran v. Wooley, Del. Super., 101 A.2d 303 (1954) affirmed 104 A.2d 771.
5. Therefore, the petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.