Opinion
No. 2:19-cv-0851 JAM DB P
07-24-2019
JONATHON ANDREW HAMPTON, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Defendants.
ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges his rights were violated during his 2009 criminal trial and requests immediate release from custody. Presently before the court is plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2), motion for injunctive relief (ECF No. 7), and his complaint for screening (ECF No. 1). For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, dismiss the complaint with leave to amend, and recommend that his motion for injunctive relief be denied.
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.) Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.
Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff's trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month's income credited to plaintiff's prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff's account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
SCREENING
I. Legal Standards
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more that "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" it must contain factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). "A person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)
To determine whether a complaint states a claim, the court looks to the pleading standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). "Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions," none of which applies here. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).
Plaintiff's complaint is 206 pages long, contains over 53 pages of handwritten allegations, and numerous exhibits. The complaint is neither short nor plain, and therefore does not comply with Rule 8. Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 415 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021 (1985) (confusing and conclusory complaint exceeding 70 pages with attachments, was subject to dismissal for want of a short and plain statement of the claim); Hollis v. York, No. 1:09-cv-0463 OWW SMS, 2011 WL 3740811 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011) (A 34-page complaint with 34 pages of exhibits "that lists multiple unrelated incidents and contains legal argument" violates Rule 8); Simmons v. Akanno, No. 1:09-cv-0659 GBC PC, 2010 WL 5186690 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2010) (A 33-page complaint with 53 pages of exhibits violates Rule 8); Knapp v. Cate, No. 1:08-cv-1779 SKO PC, 2010 WL 3521871 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2010) (A 26-page complaint with 60 pages of exhibits violates Rule 8).
Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with Rule 8(a). Twenty-five pages is more than sufficient for plaintiff to identify his claims and set forth specific facts in support of those claims. Accordingly, the amended complaint should not exceed twenty-five pages in length, and it may be stricken from the record if it violates this page limitation.
II. Amending the Complaint
Plaintiff is advised that in an amended complaint he must clearly identify each defendant and the action that defendant took that violated his constitutional rights. The court is not required to review exhibits to determine what plaintiff's charging allegations are as to each named defendant. All claims must be included in the body of the complaint. The charging allegations must be set forth in the amended complaint, so defendants have fair notice of plaintiff's claims. That said, plaintiff need not provide every detailed fact in support of his claims. Rather, plaintiff should provide a short, plain statement of each claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
Any amended complaint must show the federal court has jurisdiction, the action is brought in the right place, and plaintiff is entitled to relief if plaintiff's allegations are true. It must contain a request for particular relief. Plaintiff must identify as a defendant only persons who personally participated in a substantial way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional right. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another's act or omits to perform an act he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation).
In an amended complaint, the allegations must be set forth in numbered paragraphs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Plaintiff may join multiple claims if they are all against a single defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). If plaintiff has more than one claim based upon separate transactions or occurrences, the claims must be set forth in separate paragraphs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
The federal rules contemplate brevity. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that "nearly all of the circuits have now disapproved any heightened pleading standard in cases other than those governed by Rule 9(b)"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 84; cf. Rule 9(b) (setting forth rare exceptions to simplified pleading). Plaintiff's claims must be set forth in short and plain terms, simply, concisely and directly. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) ("Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. E.D. Cal. R. 220. Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, all prior pleadings are superseded.
By signing an amended complaint, plaintiff certifies he has made reasonable inquiry and has evidentiary support for his allegations, and for violation of this rule the court may impose sanctions sufficient to deter repetition by plaintiff or others. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
After filing the complaint, plaintiff filed a motion requesting injunctive relief and requesting the court grant the relief sought in the petition for writ of mandamus included in the complaint. (ECF No. 7.) Based on review of plaintiff's filings in this action, it appears that plaintiff seeks release from prison and an order directing the California Supreme Court to assemble en banc to resolve questions of law relevant to plaintiff's ongoing state habeas proceedings. (ECF Nos. 1, 4, 7.) ////
I. Legal Standards
A. Injunctive Relief
A party requesting preliminary injunctive relief must show that "he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The propriety of a request for injunctive relief hinges on a significant threat of irreparable injury that must be imminent in nature. Caribbean Marine Serv. Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988).
Alternatively, under the so-called sliding scale approach, as long as the plaintiff demonstrates the requisite likelihood of irreparable harm and can show that an injunction is in the public interest, a preliminary injunction may issue so long as serious questions going to the merits of the case are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in plaintiff's favor. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-36 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the "serious questions" version of the sliding scale test for preliminary injunctions remains viable after Winter).
The principle purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is to preserve the court's power to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the merits. See 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2947 (3d ed. 2014). Implicit in this required showing is that the relief awarded is only temporary and there will be a full hearing on the merits of the claims raised in the injunction when the action is brought to trial. Preliminary injunctive relief is not appropriate until the court finds that the plaintiff's complaint presents cognizable claims. See Zepeda v. United States Immigration Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985) ("A federal court may issue an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the claims . . . .").
In cases brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any preliminary injunction must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Further, an injunction against individuals not parties to an action is strongly disfavored. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969) ("It is elementary that one is not bound by a judgment . . . resulting from litigation in which he is not designated as a party . . . .").
However, the fact that injunctive relief is sought from one not a party to litigation does not automatically preclude the court from acting. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 16519(a) permits the court to issue writs "necessary or appropriate in aid of their jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." The All Writs Act is meant to aid the court in the exercise and preservation of its jurisdiction. Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1979). The United States Supreme Court has authorized the use of the All Writs Act in appropriate circumstances against persons or entities not a party to the underlying litigation. United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977).
Further, preliminary injunctive relief is not appropriate until the court finds that the plaintiff's complaint presents cognizable claims. See Zepeda v. United States Immigration Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985) ("A federal court may issue an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; [however] it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court.").
B. Writ of Mandamus
"The writ of mandamus is a 'drastic and extraordinary' remedy 'reserved for really extraordinary causes.'" In re Van Dusen, 654 F.3d 838, 840 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1947)). See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289 (1988) ("This Court repeatedly has observed that the writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for extraordinary situations."). Moreover, "federal courts are without power to issue writs of mandamus to direct state courts or their judicial officers in the performance of their duties." Clark v. Washington, 366 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1966); see also Demos v. U.S. Dist. Court, 925 F.2d 1160, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that federal courts lack jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to state courts and that such petitions "are frivolous as a matter of law").
II. Analysis
Plaintiff may not pursue release from prison in a § 1983 action. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 479 (1973) ("Release from penal custody is not an available remedy under the Civil Rights Act"); Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 875 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Where a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his confinement, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus."). Additionally, preliminary injunctive relief is not appropriate because plaintiff has not yet stated a cognizable claim. Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 727.
Therefore, the court will recommend that plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief be denied. Plaintiff's request for a writ of mandamus must also be denied because this court does not have the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to any state court. Demos, 925 F.2d at 1161-62.
CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.
2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court's order to the Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.
3. Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed with leave to amend.
4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled "First Amended Complaint."
5. Failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed.
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief and petition for writ of mandamus (ECF No. 7) be denied.
These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Any response to the objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in waiver of the right to appeal the district court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). Dated: July 24, 2019
/s/_________
DEBORAH BARNES
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DLB:12
DLB:1/Orders/Prisoner/Civil.Rights/hamp0851.scrn+pi