Opinion
No. 05-18-01337-CV
05-11-2020
JARROD C. HAMMONDS, Appellant v. DALLAS COUNTY, PARKLAND HOSPITAL DISTRICT, DALLAS COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, DALLAS COUNTY SCHOOL EQUALIZATION FUND, DUNCANVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, AND CITY OF DUNCANVILLE, Appellees
On Appeal from the 95th District Court Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. TX-16-01886
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Schenck, Osborne, and Reichek
Opinion by Justice Reichek
Jarrod Hammonds appeals the trial court's order to disburse to various taxing units in Dallas County the excess proceeds from the tax sale of his real property. Appellant contends the taxing units (1) did not have standing to bring the claims for excess proceeds and (2) have received "adequate monies" from the tax sale. For reasons set out below, we affirm the trial court's order.
BACKGROUND
Appellees Dallas County, Parkland Hospital District, Dallas County Community College District, Dallas County School Equalization Fund, Duncanville Independent School District, and City of Duncanville sued appellant to recover unpaid and delinquent ad valorem taxes for tax years 2014 to 2016 on property in Duncanville, Texas. Appellant failed to answer the suit, and, in May 2017, the trial court awarded a default judgment in appellees' favor in the amount of $12,951.99. After appellant failed to pay the judgment, the trial court ordered the property sold to satisfy the lien. The property was sold at a sheriff's sale on May 1, 2018 for $118,500.
Four months later, appellees filed a petition for excess proceeds seeking to recover taxes that had accrued for tax year 2017. According to the petition, at the time of the May 2017 judgment, the 2017 taxes had not been billed. The taxing units sought $5,313.05. The motion was supported by a copy of a delinquent tax statement from the Dallas County Tax Assessor Collector. The statement showed the total due as $5,313.05 if paid by October 1, 2018 and as $5,357.31 if paid by October 31, 2018.
On October 18, 2018, the trial court ordered excess funds in the amount of $5,357.31 distributed to appellees pursuant to the Texas Tax Code. A week later, the trial court ordered the remaining funds distributed to appellant. Appellant, representing himself, brought this appeal.
ANALYSIS
In two issues, appellant asserts the taxing units (1) do not have standing or authority to bring claims for excess proceeds and (2) have received adequate monies from the tax sale.
With respect to his first issue, appellant has not explained why the taxing units do not have standing or authority in this action. Instead, his brief generally references law related to defects in service of process and exemption of household goods from ad valorem taxation. He does not assert that he was not properly served in this action nor does he explain the relevance of the law regarding exemption of certain personal property from taxation. But, to the extent he is arguing the taxing units were without standing or authority in this action, he is incorrect. The tax code gives the taxing authorities standing to make a claim for excess proceeds. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.04(a) ("A person, including a tax unit . . . , may file a petition in the court that ordered the seizure or sale setting forth a claim to the excess proceeds."); see also Dallas County City of Grand Prairie v. Sides, 430 S.W.3d 649, 654 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). We overrule the first issue.
In his second issue, appellant asserts the taxing units received "adequate monies" from the tax sale, suggesting they were not entitled to excess proceeds for delinquent taxes, interest, or penalties that accrued after the judgment but before the sale. Again, we disagree.
The taxing units filed a petition for excess proceeds stating a claim for 2017 taxes that accrued after the judgment was rendered. Appellant did not file any opposition or challenge to the merits of the claim.
Section 34.04 of the tax code, entitled "Claims for Excess Proceeds," provides as following:
(c) At the hearing the court shall order that the proceeds be paid according to the following priorities to each party that establishes its claim to the proceeds:
* * *
(2) to a taxing unit for any taxes, penalties, or interest that have become due or delinquent on the subject property subsequent to the date of the judgment or that were omitted from the judgment by accident or mistake;
* * *
(5) to each former owner of the property, as the interest of each may appear, provided that the former owner:
See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.04.(A) was a defendant in the judgment[.]
Under the clear language of the statute, the taxing units were entitled to delinquent taxes, penalties, or interest that became due after the judgment, and had a higher priority to the funds than appellant. Appellant provides no legal basis to disregard this statute; he simply argues the taxing entities have been paid enough. We conclude the trial court did not err in distributing excess proceeds to appellees. We overrule the second issue.
We affirm the trial court's order disbursing excess proceeds.
/Amanda L. Reichek/
AMANDA L. REICHEK
JUSTICE 181337F.P05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 95th District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. TX-16-01886.
Opinion delivered by Justice Reichek; Justices Schenck and Osborne participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the trial court's Order Disbursing Excess Proceeds is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellees DALLAS COUNTY, PARKLAND HOSPITAL DISTRICT, DALLAS COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, DALLAS COUNTY SCHOOL EQUALIZATION FUND, DUNCANVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, AND CITY OF DUNCANVILLEE recover their costs of this appeal from appellant JARROD C. HAMMONDS. Judgment entered May 11, 2020