Opinion
2:23-CV-01151-NR-CRE
03-08-2024
KHALIL K. HAMMOND, Plaintiff, v. SUPERINTENDENT MICHAEL ZAKEN, DEPUTY STEPHEN BUZAZ, DEPUTY MARK DIALESANDRO, CAPTAIN KENNEDY, MAJOR SWITZER, CAPTAIN HINTEMEYER, LIEUTENANT JUAREZ, CO-1 FERGUSON, CO-1 STEWART, SECRETARY JOHN E. WETZEL, JOHN/JANE DOES 1-3, Defendants,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Cynthia Reed Eddy, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. RECOMMENDATION
This civil action was initiated pro se by Plaintiff Khalil K. Hammond against Defendants who are various officials of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.
II. REPORT
a. Background
Presently pending before the Court is a motion by Plaintiff for a preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order. (ECF No. 34). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for consideration. (ECF Nos. 34 and 40). For the reasons below, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order be denied.
Plaintiff is in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) at State Corrections Institution at Phoenix (“SCI Phoenix”). He brings this prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various Corrections Officials and three unidentified defendants alleging, inter alia, that his placement on the Restricted Release List (“RRL”) and confinement in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) and mental health treatment has violated his First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and violated Pennsylvania law. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, declaratory relief and injunctive relief for, among other things, immediate release into general population and to be granted parole at his next review.
In his motion for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order, Plaintiff argues that his prolonged placement in solitary confinement has exacerbated his mental health issues, including “psychosis and random episodes of serious self[-]harm and/or suicide attempts[.]” (ECF No. 34) at ¶ 3.B. Plaintiff requests the following:
(1) placement into general population of SCI Phoenix and on the Residential Treatment Unit, or into another less-restrictive housing placement;
(2) to prevent Defendants from performing unspecified “circumventive reviews” for his mental health; and
(3) provide an in-depth psychiatric assessment and thereafter place Plaintiff on a “stability Code ‘D' roster” so he can obtain meaningful mental health treatment.(ECF No. 34) at ¶¶ 4-9. Defendants respond that Plaintiff is currently housed in the Intermediate Management Unit. ECF No. 40 at ¶ 5 n.1. Defendants have also separately moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim (ECF No. 23), which has not yet been responded to by Plaintiff or decided by the Court. (ECF No. 31) (Plaintiff's response due March 11, 2024).
b. Standard of Review
Inmate pro se pleadings, like those filed here, which seek extraordinary, or emergency relief, in the form of injunctions and restraining orders are governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are judged against exacting legal standards. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained:
Four factors govern a district court's decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction: (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief, (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest.Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1985)).
A preliminary injunction is not granted as a matter of right. Kerschner v. Mazurkewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982). It is an extraordinary remedy. Given the extraordinary nature of this form of relief, a motion for preliminary injunction places precise burdens on the moving party. As a threshold matter, “it is a movant's burden to show that the ‘preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.' ” Emile v. SCI-Pittsburgh, No. CIV A 04-974, 2006 WL 2773261, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2006) (quoting Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992)). Thus, when considering such requests, courts are cautioned that:
[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (emphasis deleted). Furthermore, the Court must recognize that ‘an [i]njunction is an equitable remedy which should not be lightly indulged in, but used sparingly and only in a clear and plain case.' Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union #53, 520 F.2d 1220, 1230 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909 (1977). As a corollary to the principle that preliminary injunctions should issue only in a clear and plain case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed that “upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937).Emile, 2006 WL 2773261, at *6.
Accordingly, for an inmate to sustain his burden of proof that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, he must demonstrate both a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and that he will be irreparably harmed if the requested relief is not granted. Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1998). If the movant fails to carry this burden on either of these elements, the motion should be denied since a party seeking such relief must “demonstrate both a likelihood of success on the merits and the probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989).
These limitations on the power of courts to enter injunctions in a correctional context are further underscored by statute. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 limits the authority of courts to enjoin the exercise of discretion by prison officials, and provides that:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
With respect to preliminary injunctions sought by inmates, courts are also instructed that:
Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the principles of comity . . . in tailoring any preliminary relief....18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).
Furthermore, it is well settled that “[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on the merits.” Anderson v. Davilla, 125 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1997). Therefore, in a case such as this, where the inmate-“Plaintiff's request for immediate relief in his motion for preliminary injunction necessarily seeks resolution of one of the ultimate issues presented in [the] . . . Complaint, ... [the] Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable harm if he is not granted a preliminary injunction, because the ultimate issue presented will be decided either by this Court or at trial.” Messner v. Bunner, No. CIV.A. 07-112, 2009 WL 1406986, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 19, 2009).
c. Discussion
Judged against these exacting standards, Plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief fails. Plaintiff must show the irreparable injury that he will suffer “cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following trial.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989) (“The preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm”). While the Court does not in any way diminish Plaintiff's complaints, Plaintiff has not established that he will suffer irreparable injury if he is not granted the injunctive relief, as the relief sought directly relates to and is inextricably intertwined with the merits of the ultimate issues in this lawsuit.
In his complaint, Plaintiff complains that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by placing him on the RRL and confining him in the RHU for an unspecified period of time and seeks the Court to declare those actions unconstitutional and to release him into general population and grant him parole at his next review. In his motion for injunctive relief, he similarly seeks transfer to a lower-security housing placement and for a psychiatric evaluation. Ruling on the motion for preliminary injunctive relief might be perceived as speaking in some way to the ultimate issues in this case. In such instances, the Court should refrain from prematurely granting such relief. The ultimate issues regarding Plaintiff's claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment, and his procedural and substantive due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment for his placement in on the RRL and in the RHU will be decided either by the Court upon consideration of Defendants' pending motion to dismiss, a subsequent motion for summary judgment or at trial. Accordingly, at this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff has not established that he will suffer irreparable harm if the motion is not granted.
Further, the Court notes that Defendants' interests and the public interest in penological order could be adversely affected if the Court began dictating the treatment for Plaintiff, who is one inmate out of thousands in the state prison system. Therefore, consideration of “whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and . . . whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest,” Gerardi, 16 F.3d at 1373, also weighs heavily against Plaintiff in this case. Accordingly, granting this extraordinary relief could harm the public's interest and the interests of the opposing parties.
As a result, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order be denied.
d. Conclusion
Based on the above, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order (ECF No. 34) be denied.
Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and the Local Rules for Magistrates, because Plaintiff is not a registered ECF user, the parties have until March 27, 2024 to object to this report and recommendation. Unless otherwise ordered by the District Judge, responses to objections are due fourteen days after the service of the objections. Failure to file timely objections will waive any appellate rights. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).