Opinion
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, David L. Minning, Judge. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC339584.
Johnny Earl Hammond, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Johnson & Chambers and Thomas G. Chambers for Defendant and Respondent.
VOGEL, Acting P.J.
Johnny Earl Hammond bought a car and financed it through WFS Financial, Inc. When Hammond failed to insure the car, WFS purchased insurance and sought reimbursement from Hammond. Hammond responded with a lawsuit against WFS but lost, and the case is now before us on Hammond’s appeal from a judgment in favor of WFS. We affirm.
FACTS
In February 2005, Hammond purchased a used Honda Civic from Elmore Toyota. WFS financed the car, and Hammond signed a conditional sales contract in which he agreed, among other things, to pay for the car over a period of 60 months (at $277.78 per month) and to obtain and maintain comprehensive and collision insurance for the Honda. Hammond failed to obtain the required insurance and ignored WFS’s several requests for proof of insurance. As permitted by the contract, WFS obtained a one-year policy for $1,103 from MeritPlan Insurance Company and notified Hammond that he could either reimburse WFS for the full amount or, if he preferred, make monthly payments during the term of the policy. When Hammond did not respond, WFS set up an eight-month payment schedule and notified him of his obligation to pay $424.92 per month. Hammond made the car payments but did not pay for the insurance.
Instead, Hammond (appearing pro se) sued WFS for breach of contract, violations of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. and Civil Code section 2981 et seq., unjust enrichment, fraud, unfair business practices, and submission of false information to credit reporting agencies. Hammond’s complaint describes WFS’s “Force[d] Placement Insurance” charges and suggests that the contractual provision allowing WFS to insure the car when the buyer breaches his obligation to do so constitutes a wrongful act. By way of example, Hammond alleged that WFS “devised and implemented a comprehensive scheme to violate the [conditional sales contract], concealed material facts from [Hammond] and committed other wrongs through a common course of conduct. This Dirty scheme was facilitated by a secret discount arrangement with MeritPlan Insurance Company [with whom] WFS . . . placed forced place[ment] comprehensive and collision insurance on the subject motor vehicle. . . .”
WFS answered and cross-complained for possession of the Honda and the sums still owed, then (in May 2006) moved for summary judgment. Over Hammond’s opposition (which admitted the facts but claimed without legal support that he was not obligated to reimburse WFS for the insurance premium), the motion was granted. Hammond appeals from the judgment thereafter entered.
DISCUSSION
Hammond’s only argument on appeal is that WFS violated subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 2982.8. He is wrong.
Subsequent section references are to the Civil Code.
Section 2982.8 provides that if a buyer obligated under the terms of a conditional sale contract to maintain insurance on a vehicle fails to do so, any amounts advanced by the financing company to procure the insurance may be the subject of finance charges. (§ 2982.8, subd. (a).) Subdivision (b) of section 2982.8 provides that these amounts are secured in the same manner as the debt for the vehicle if the financing company “notifies the buyer in writing of his or her option to repay those amounts in any one of the following ways:
“(1) Full payment within 10 days from the date of giving or mailing the notice.
“(2) Full amortization during the term of the insurance.
“(3) If offered by the [financing company], full amortization after the term of the conditional sale contract, to be payable in installments which do not exceed the average payment allocable to a monthly period under the contract.
“(4) If offered by the [financing company], a combination of the methods described in paragraphs (2) and (3), so that there is some amortization during the term of the insurance, with the remainder of the amortization being accomplished after the term of the conditional sale contract, to be payable in installments which do not exceed the average payment allocable to a monthly period under the original terms of the contract.
“(5) If offered by the [financing company], any other amortization plan.
“If the buyer neither pays in full the amounts advanced nor notifies the [financing company] in writing of his or her choice regarding amortization options before the expiration of 10 days from the date of giving or mailing the notice by the [financing company], the [financing company] may amortize the amounts advanced on a secured basis . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
Undisputed evidence establishes that on May 2, 2005, WFS sent a letter to Hammond giving him the two required options -- payment in full by check or money order, or monthly payments amortized over the balance of the term of the insurance policy. The other possibilities set out in section 2982.8, subdivision (b), are authorized but not required and may be offered by the financing company or not. They were not offered by WFS. In short, WFS did everything it was required to do.
Summary judgment was properly granted.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: ROTHSCHILD, J., JACKSON, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.