Hammond v. Sanders

2 Citing cases

  1. Cochran v. White

    269 Ga. App. 182 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 4 times

    But the purpose of a declaratory judgment in such a case is "to guide and protect [executors] from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to some future act or conduct." Hammond v. Sanders, 210 Ga.App. 307, 308 ( 436 SE2d 45) (1993). When the rights of the parties have already accrued and no uncertainty exists that requires the court's guidance, a declaratory judgment is not authorized.

  2. Norman v. Gober

    292 Ga. 351 (Ga. 2013)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that although the caveat to a will was filed by a child, when "it appear[ed] possible that one or more of the beneficiaries of the [w]ill sought to destroy it," the co-executors were entitled "to determine whether the caveat can and should be attributed to other beneficiaries before distributing the assets from the estate" and, if so, "whether the in terrorem clause [could] be applied" to those unnamed parties

    However, executors may not seek direction “on imaginary difficulties or from excessive caution,” OCGA § 23–2–92, or where the rights of the parties have already accrued and no uncertainty remains. See, e.g., Hammond v. Sanders, 210 Ga.App. 307, 436 S.E.2d 45 (1993). Appellants contend that the mere possibility that someone other than Caveator was behind the previous caveat is too speculative to warrant discovery into family finances and communications.