Rather, it applies across the law of personal property. See, e.g., Nesbitt v. Lewis, 335 S.C. 441, 517 S.E.2d 11, 14 (Ct.App. 1999) (ownership of dog); Hammond v. Halsey, 287 S.C. 46, 336 S.E.2d 495, 497 (Ct.App. 1985) (ownership of cannon); Clanton's Auto Auction Sales, Inc. v. Harvin, 238 S.C. 352, 120 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1961) (ownership of automobile). The unusual circumstances of this case do, however, provide a notable illustration of why such a presumption exists in the first place.
Therefore, the party out of possession has the burden of proof as to ownership. Hammond v. Halsey, 287 S.C. 46, 49, 336 S.E.2d 495, 497 (S.C.Ct.App. 1985). The State contends that this rule does not apply to the instant matter because Plaintiff is on notice that the Documents are government property in that they are addressed to or by government officials.
The Willcox court then observed that the presumption arising from possession spans the spectrum of personal property. 467 F.3d at 413 (citing Hammond v. Halsey , 287 S.C. 46, 49, 336 S.E.2d 495 [Ct. App. 1985] [ownership of canon]; Clanton's Auto Auction Sales, Inc. v. Harvin , 238 S.C. 352, 357, 120 S.E.2d 237 [1961] [ownership of automobile]).
In an action to quiet title, the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title, not on the alleged weakness of the defendant's title. See Haithcock v. Haithcock, 123 S.C. 61, 115 S.E. 727 (1923); Hammond v. Halsey, 287 S.C. 46, 336 S.E.2d 495 (Ct.App. 1985). One claiming title by deed has no greater title than the original grantor in the chain of title upon which he relies.