Opinion
Argued March 10, 1977
June 3, 1977.
Workmen's compensation — Sufficiency of findings of fact — Remand — Scope of appellate review — Inconsistent findings — Capricious disregard of competent evidence — Disability.
1. In a workmen's compensation case remand to the fact-finder for more specific findings on the nature of the work-related injuries sustained is unnecessary where the relationship of the disability of the claimant and the work-related injury is covered by the findings which are sufficient to permit a proper review. [402]
2. In a workmen's compensation case where the party with the burden of proof failed below, review by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania is to determine only whether the findings of fact are consistent with each other and he conclusions of law and whether competent evidence has ben capriciously disregarded, and where competent evidence supports the challenged determination that a claimant remains disabled as a result of compensable injuries it cannot be found that evidence was capriciously disregarded on that issue. [402-3]
Argued March 10, 1977, before Judge CRUMLISH, JR., KRAMER and ROGERS, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 1267 C.D. 1976, from the Order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board in case of Harry B. Gallagher v. Hammermill Paper Company, No. A-70829.
Petition with Department of Labor and Industry to terminate workmen's compensation agreement. Petition dismissed. Petitioner appealed to the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board. Dismissal affirmed. Petitioner filed petition for review in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania Held: Affirmed.
Ruth V. Simon, with her Stephen J. Harlen and Joseph R. Thompson, for petitioners.
No appearance for respondents.
Hammermill Paper Company (Appellant) appeals a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirming a referee's denial of Appellant's petition to terminate benefits to Harry B. Gallagher (Claimant).
In February of 1974, Claimant injured his left knee as a result of a work-related fall. Testimony of record discloses that Claimant was diabetic and in August of 1974 he developed diabetic neuropathy in both legs. Medical testimony also reveals that Claimant presently suffers from traumatic arthritis. The referee, after a hearing and depositions of experts medical witnesses, denied Appellants petition to terminate benefits. Upon appeal, the Board affirmed.
Appellant raises two issues for our consideration. First it contends that the Board erred in failing to remand to the referee for more specific findings of fact as to the injuries sustained by Claimant as a result of his fall. Next, it contends that the record is devoid of substantial evidence to support the finding that Claimant continues disabled as a result of the injuries suffered in his 1974 work-related fall. We reject both arguments and affirm.
Although the referee's findings of fact may have been inartfully drawn, we agree with the Board that a remand is unnecessary. A thorough review of the referee's findings convinces us that they were indeed sufficient to enable the Board to perform its proper function of review. See Page's Department Store v. Velardi, 464 Pa. 276, 346 A.2d 556 (1975). The findings of fact essential to a determination of Claimant's current disability and the relationship of this disability to the 1974 work-related injury are included in the referee's decision.
As to Appellant's second argument, we reiterate the limitation of our review power: where the party with the burden of proof failed below, we may only determine whether the findings of fact are consistent with each other and with the conclusions of law, and whether there has been a capricious disregard of competent evidence. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Sullivan, 22 Pa. Commw. 386, 348 A.2d 925 (1975). The record made before the referee convinces us that Appellant's second contention must likewise fall. Sufficient, competent evidence supports the referee's finding that Claimant is still totally disabled as a result of his initial work-related injuries, and hence, it cannot be successfully argued that the referee capriciously disregarded competent evidence.
Accordingly, we
ORDER
AND NOW, this 3rd day of June, 1977, the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board is hereby affirmed.