Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the School Board's adjudication is in violation of the Student's constitutional rights, whether it is in accordance with the law or whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Hamilton v. Unionville-Chadds Ford School District, 552 Pa. 245, 714 A.2d 1012 (1998). Student contends that the School Board erred in expelling him because the School District charged him with a violation of the Computer Use Policy and a violation of state law.
Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or violated constitutional rights. 2 Pa.C.S.A. § 754(b); Hamilton v. Unionville-Chadds Ford School District, 552 Pa. 245, 714 A.2d 1012 (1998). We initially note that this matter is technically moot.
Thus, "[s]tatutes pertaining to the same subject matter are to be considered as one if possible," Girard Sch. Dist. v. Pittenger, 392 A.2d 261, 265 (Pa. 1978), and "in harmony with the existing law, and as part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence," In re Peplinski's Estate, 29 A.2d 271, 275 (Pa.Super. 1944). Examples of statutes that have been construed as in pari materia include:Hamilton v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist., 714 A.2d 1012, 1015 (Pa. 1998) ("[D]istrict code and the middle school code are `in pari materia'," because "both portion of the school codes in question relate to disciplinary procedures, and thus involves the same subject matter."); Carroll v. Ringgold Edu. Ass'n, 680 A.2d 1137, 1141 (Pa. 1996) ("Public Employee Relations Act is to be read `in pari materia' with the addition of Article XI-A of the Public School Code, but PERA is repealed insofar as it is clearly inconsistent with the addition of Article XI-A of the Act."); Girard Sch. Dist. v. Pittenger, 392 A.2d 261, 265 (Pa. 1978) ("Sections 510 et al. of the School Code and the statement of the State Board on Student Rights and Responsibilities should, in fact, be considered as `in pari materia."); Barret v. Com., Dept. of Ed., 414 A.2d 763 (Pa.Commw.Ct. 1980) ("Article XI and Article XIX of the Public School Code were enacted contemporaneously, and 24 P.S. § 19-1926, makes specific reference to the employment rights set out in Article XI. These provisions ar
Thus, "[s]tatutes pertaining to the same subject matter are to be considered as one if possible," Girard Sch. Dist. v. Pittenger, 392 A.2d 261, 265 (Pa. 1978), and "in harmony with the existing law, and as part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence," In re Peplinski's Estate, 29 A.2d 271, 275 (Pa.Super. 1944). Examples of statutes that have been construed as in pari materia include:Hamilton v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist., 714 A.2d 1012, 1015 (Pa. 1998) ("[D]istrict code and the middle school code are `in pari materia'," because "both portion of the school codes in question relate to disciplinary procedures, and thus involves the same subject matter."); Carroll v. Ringgold Edu. Ass'n, 680 A.2d 1137, 1141 (Pa. 1996) ("Public Employee Relations Act is to be read `in pari materia' with the addition of Article XI-A of the Public School Code, but PERA is repealed insofar as it is clearly inconsistent with the addition of Article XI-A of the Act."); Girard Sch. Dist. v. Pittenger, 392 A.2d 261, 265 (Pa. 1978) ("Sections 510 et al. of the School Code and the statement of the State Board on Student Rights and Responsibilities should, in fact, be considered as `in pari materia."); Barret v. Com., Dept. of Ed., 414 A.2d 763 (Pa.Commw.Ct. 1980) ("Article XI and Article XIX of the Public School Code were enacted contemporaneously, and 24 P.S. § 19-1926, makes specific reference to the employment rights set out in Article XI. These provisions ar
This policy is equally applicable to the severability of municipal ordinances. See Hamilton v. Unionville — Chadds Ford Sch. Dist., 714 A.2d 1012, 1014 n. 2(Pa. 1998). Not only does Pennsylvania public policy favor severability, but the Ordinance contains a severability clause.
40 Pa.C.S. § 1171.3. According to Superior, the UIPA and § 8371 are in pari materia, in that they both relate to the same class of persons and things and should be construed together as one statute. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932(b); see also Hamilton v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist., 552 Pa. 245, 714 A.2d 1012, 1014 (1998). Superior emphasizes the legislative history of § 8371, specifically that the statute was intended to undo the decision in D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 494 Pa. 501, 431 A.2d 966, 970 (1981), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly declined to recognize a private cause of action against an insurer for bad faith, leaving it for the legislature to determine whether such an action was necessary to supplement the state enforcement mechanisms of the UIPA.
Most courts, however, review school disciplinary decisions using a more deferential standard. See, e.g.,Tucson Pub. Sch., Dist. No. 1 v. Green ex rel. Askew, 17 Ariz.App. 91, 94, 495 P.2d 861, 864 (1972); Satan Fraternity v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 156 Fla. 222, 225, 22 So.2d 892, 893 (1945); Wilson v. Hinsdale Elementary Sch. Dist. 181, 349 Ill.App.3d 243, 248, 284 Ill.Dec. 847, 810 N.E.2d 637, 642 (2004); S. Gibson Sch. Bd. v. Sollman, 768 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Ind.2002); Davis v. Hillsdale Cmty. Sch. Dist., 226 Mich.App. 375, 379-81, 573 N.W.2d 77, 79 (1997) (per curiam); Busch v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 261 Neb. 484, 488, 623 N.W.2d 672, 677 (2001); [364 N.C. 374] Hamilton v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist., 552 Pa. 245, 247, 714 A.2d 1012, 1014 (1998). Even the Supreme Court of Wyoming, one of the few state courts to apply strict scrutiny in this context, acknowledges that " school districts are in the best position to judge the student's actions in light of all the surrounding circumstances and tailor the appropriate punishment to fit the unique circumstances of each student's situation."
Accordingly, because both subsections relate to PennDOT's authority to conduct accident investigations and safety studies, they are in pari materia and must be construed together. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932; Hamilton v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist., 714 A.2d 1012, 1015 (Pa. 1998) (middle school discipline code and discipline section of school district's student code were in pari material because both applied to same subject matter, even though they did not apply to the same class of persons); Rosen v. Bureau of Prof'l Occupational Affairs, State Architects Licensure Bd., 763 A.2d 962, 965-66 (Pa.Commw. 2000) (Architects Licensure Law and the Engineer, Land Surveyor and Geologist Registration Law should be read in pari materia because the primary purpose of both statutes is the same). In light of the plain language of subsection (a), I, unlike the majority, do not believe that subsection (b) is clear and free from ambiguity as it relates to whether the privilege at issue here is absolute and applies to criminal prosecutions as well as civil proceedings.
" In fact, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932(b) mandates that "[s]tatutes in pari materia shall be construed together, if possible, as one statute." See Kelly v. City of Philadelphia, 115 A.2d 238, 245 (Pa. 1955) (statutes in pari materia should be construed concurrently whenever possible and if they can be made to stand together, effect should be given to both as far as possible); see also Lewis v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 793 A.2d 143, 149 (Pa. 2002); Hamilton v. Unionville-Chadds Ford School District, 714 A.2d 1012, 1015 (Pa. 1998). Here, both the Heart and Lung Act and the Workers' Compensation Act relate not only to the same person, but also to the same thing — compensation for a work-related injury. Thus, the two statutes are in pari materia.
In examining such a claim we observe that "wherever possible effect shall be given to both the general and specific provisions. It is only where the conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable that the specific provision prevails over the general." Hamilton v. Unionville-Chadds Ford School Dist., 714 A.2d 1012, 1014 (Pa. 1998), citing 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1933. "[I]t is clear that statutes are to be construed together whenever possible and, unless an irreconcilable conflict exists, effect is to be given to all provisions." Id. Simply put, the Arbitration Act does not prohibit an arbitrator from including as part of his or her award penalties, interest, attorney fees and expenses.