To render evidence of extrinsic offenses admissible for any of these purposes, the state must show that the defendant was the perpetrator of the extrinsic offenses, and that there is a sufficient similarity or connection between the extrinsic offense and the offense charged, such that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. Walraven v. State, supra, at 408; Kilgore v. State, supra, at 296; Hamilton v. State, 239 Ga. 72, 73 ( 235 S.E.2d 515) (1977). Therefore, the issue before us is whether there is sufficient evidence tying Williams to the perpetration of the independent crimes and whether the independent crimes were similar or logically connected to the offenses charged so that proof of the former tends to prove the latter.

[Cits.]" Hamilton v. State, 239 Ga. 72, 75 ( 235 S.E.2d 515) (1977). A certified copy of Rakestraw and Brown's indictment containing their pleas of guilty clearly identifies them as the perpetrators of the independent crime.

[Cit.]" Hamilton v. State, 239 Ga. 72, 75 ( 235 S.E.2d 515). Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to identify her as the perpetrator of the independent crime.

In the prosecution for a particular crime, evidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed another crime wholly distinct, independent and separate from that for which he is on trial even though it be a crime of the same sort, is irrelevant and inadmissible unless there be some logical connection between the two from which it can be said that proof of one tends to establish the other. See Moore v. State, 221 Ga. 636, 637 ( 146 S.E.2d 895); Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261 ( 71 S.E.2d 615); Hamilton v. State, 239 Ga. 72, 75 ( 235 S.E.2d 515). Here the evidence established the defendant as the perpetrator of the independent crime. There was considerable similarity in the modus operandi as between the two even though generally the other crimes were performed with an accomplice, Ronnie Lewis. The totality of the evidence here was sufficient to show identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind and course of conduct.

Under the exception to the rule, the evidence of the independent crime is admissible only for the purpose of showing identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind, and course of conduct. Hamilton v. State, 239 Ga. 72, 75 ( 235 S.E.2d 515) (1977). A thorough examination of the facts in this case shows that there is no similarity or connection between Edwards' prior conviction for aggravated assault and the offense for which he was being tried, murder.

In addition, the state's evidence established gunshot wounds to the head as the cause of the victims' deaths, rather than neck injuries or strangulation. At trial and on appeal, it is the appellant's contention that since, under certain circumstances, similar-crimes evidence can be admitted by the state in order to establish the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime charged, see, e.g., Hamilton v. State, 239 Ga. 72 ( 235 S.E.2d 515) (1977), by a parity of reasoning, the defense should have been allowed to introduce evidence of the extrinsic crime here, in order to establish that, as between the various parties to these crimes, the party who actually committed the murder was an accomplice of the appellant, and not the appellant himself. However, as held in Div. 1, supra, the evidence authorized the appellant's convictions with respect to all indicted offenses, regardless of whether or not he was found to be the actual perpetrator of the murders.

"`"On a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed another crime wholly distinct, independent, and separate from that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same sort, is irrelevant and inadmissible, unless there be shown some logical connection between the two from which it can be said that proof of the one tends to establish the other." [Cit.]'" Hamilton v. State, 239 Ga. 72, 75 ( 235 S.E.2d 515) (1977). (b) Johnson's claim of a right to a severance is unfounded.

Although he prohibited the prosecution from cross-examining the defendant regarding any sexual relationship with any third person unconnected with the case, the trial court admitted the defendant's statement on the grounds that it had been made voluntarily. However, regardless of whether the statement was voluntarily given, since it was not relevant nor admissible for impeachment or for any other proper purpose (e.g., to show motive, scheme, or plan, Hamilton v. State, 239 Ga. 72 ( 235 S.E.2d 515) (1977)), it is our view that its only purpose was to attempt to show bad character. In the absence of interjection of the issue of character by the defendant, this evidence was inadmissible.

Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, supra, p. 359 (1a) and cits. The prerequisite of evidence that the defendant was in fact the perpetrator of the independent crime ( Hamilton v. State, 239 Ga. 72, 75 ( 235 S.E.2d 515) (1977) and cit.) was met by the in-court identification of the defendant as the perpetrator. Both crimes were similar in that (1) both victims originally encountered the appellant at a night club; (2) there was no immediate hostility between the appellant and the victims; (3) both victims were passengers in a black Cadillac driven by the appellant on the night of the respective crimes committed upon them; (4) the encounter between the respective victims and the appellant was at night; (5) the appellant had been, by his own admission, using cocaine on the night of the kidnapping, aggravated assault and rape, and had been drinking beer and liquor and smoking marijuana on the night during which Patrick Jackson was last seen alive; (6) both victims were stabbed multiple times in the chest and back; and (7) both victims were left in vacant fields to die.

Once the identity of the defendant is shown to be the same as that of the perpetrator of an independent crime of sufficient similarity that proof of that crime tends to prove the offense charged, evidence of the independent crime may be introduced to show identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind and course of conduct. Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749 ( 312 S.E.2d 40) (1983); Head v. State, 246 Ga. 360 ( 271 S.E.2d 452) (1980); Hamilton v. State, 239 Ga. 72 ( 235 S.E.2d 515) (1977). Identity of the appellant as the perpetrator of both incidents was shown.