Opinion
Civil No. 1:CV-04-2264.
December 21, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is Petitioner Hamilton's petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner, an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution-Schuylkill in Minersville, Pennsylvania, alleges that the calculation of his Good Conduct Time ("GCT") is being miscalculated by the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). According to Petitioner, the BOP is misinterpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). Petitioner, who is proceeding pro se, requests the court to affirm his interpretation of § 3624(b) and order a recalculation of his sentence. The parties have fully briefed the issues, and the matter is ripe for disposition. For the reasons stated below the court will deny Petitioner's petition. I. Background
This case revolves around legal issues and not matters of fact, therefore the court need not delve too deeply into the factual background of this case. In brief, Petitioner was sentenced in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina to a 200 month term of imprisonment followed by a five year term of supervised release for Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine Base (Crack), a Schedule II Narcotic Controlled Substance. (Resp. to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1.) Petitioner's sentence was subsequently modified to a term of 180 months. ( Id.) Petitioner was placed in custody of the BOP on August 29, 1994. ( Id.) Petitioner is currently scheduled to be released April 13, 2007, contingent upon his GCT. ( Id.) Petitioner filed the instant petition on October 12, 2004 under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
II. Legal Standard
Because Petitioner seeks to correct the computation of his federal prison sentence, it is a proper action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Section 2241 is the only statute that confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging not the validity but the execution of his sentence."); Mitchell v. Dep't of Corr., 272 F. Supp. 2d 464, 476 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (noting that, in the Third Circuit, "a challenge to the recalculation of a sentence [is] properly cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241"). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), a writ of habeas corpus may extend to any person "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." Because Petitioner is proceeding pro se, the court will construe his submissions liberally in an effort to review his claims to the fullest extent permissible under federal habeas law. See, e.g., Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2002).
III. Discussion
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) provides in part that
a prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year other than a term of imprisonment for the duration of the prisoner's life, may receive credit toward the service of the prisoner's sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner's term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term, subject to determination by the Bureau of Prisons that, during that year, the prisoner has displayed exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations.
Additionally, § 3624(b) provides that "credit for the last year or portion of a year of the term of imprisonment shall be prorated and credited within the last six weeks of the sentence."
Petitioner asserts that the BOP has misinterpreted § 3624(b). According to Petitioner, the term "term of imprisonment" refers to the actual length of the sentence imposed in the judgment and commitment order. Petitioner contends that the BOP has made a fundamental error and substituted "year served" for "term of imprisonment." (Pet'r's Reply to Gvt. Opp'n to Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2.) Under Petitioner's logic, a ten year or 120 month sentence would result in 540 days of eligible GCT. Essentially, an inmate would be eligible for 54 days per year sentenced, irrespective of time actually served. Therefore, an inmate could receive GCT for the tenth year, even though the inmate did not actually serve any portion of the tenth year.
The BOP's interpretation of § 3624(b) is articulated in BOP Program Statement 5880.28, Sentence Computation Manual ( CCCA of 1984), which states, "54 days of GCT may be earned for each full year served on a sentence in excess of one year, with the GCT being prorated for the last partial year." (See Resp. to the Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex. 2 at 2.) Under the BOP's interpretation, an inmate who is sentenced to ten years would receive approximately 470 days of GCT. The BOP's calculation provides that an inmate is eligible for 54 days of GCT at the end of each year served and a prorated amount of GCT for the portion of the last year served. Accordingly, an inmate, serving a ten year sentence could be released 260 days into the ninth year. The inmate could receive 54 days of GCT for each of the first eight years, 38 days prorated GCT for the time served in the ninth year, and no GCT for the tenth. The inmate would receive no GCT for time not served.
Petitioner argues that the term "term of imprisonment" is unambiguous and that no Chevron deference is owed to the BOP's interpretation of § 3624(b). Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). It is a well founded principle that a court must give substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute. Id. The Supreme Court has stated that "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843.
Petitioner cites to White v. Scibana, 314 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Wis. 2004) to support his interpretation of § 3624(b). However, that decision was recently overturned in White v. Scibana, No. 04-2410, slip op. at 4 (7th Cir. Dec. 2, 2004) (holding that "[w]e defer to the Bureau's reasonable interpretation of the statute, which awards the credit for each year served in prison rather than each year of the sentence imposed"). The court knows of no other decision that supports Petitioner's interpretation. Alternatively, there are numerous decisions supporting Respondent's position. See generally Hill v. Nash, No. 3:CV-02-1022, slip op. (M.D. Pa., Jan. 30, 2003) (unpublished), appeal dismissed, No. 03-1392, slip op. (3d Cir., Aug. 29, 2003) (unpublished); Baldwin v. Angeline, No. 3:CV-03-114, Slip op. (M.D. Pa., Apr. 2, 2004) (unpublished); Graves v. Bledsoe, 334 F. Supp. 2d 906 (W.D. Va. Aug. 19, 2004); Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood, 272 F. 3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001).
Petitioner's interpretation of the statute is not consistent with its plain meaning. Section 3624(b) provides that only 54 days of GCT may be awarded per year and that GCT may only be awarded at the end of the year, with the exception of the last year. Under petitioner's interpretation an inmate would be eligible for GCT before the end of a year or in excess of 54 days per year. Because such an apparent inconsistency exists between Petitioner's interpretation and the statute's plain meaning the court finds that there is an ambiguity. The court further finds that the BOP's construction of the statute is permissible, given the plain meaning of the statute. Therefore, the court defers to the BOP's interpretation of § 3624(b).
Petitioner also argues that the plain meaning of the legislative history supports his interpretation of § 3624(b). As the court has stated, the plain meaning of the statute contradicts Petitioner's interpretation. Therefore, the court will not address the legislative history of § 3624(b). Additionally, Petitioner asserts, in the alternative, that the rule of lenity should be applied in this case. The Supreme Court has stated that "we have always reserved lenity for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to the "language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies" of the statute. Moskal v. U.S., 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980)). In the instant case the statute's plain language removes any reasonable doubt. Therefore, the rule of lenity does not apply.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing the court will defer to the BOP's interpretation of § 3624(b). As a result, the court finds that the BOP is properly calculating Petitioner's sentence. Accordingly, the court will dismiss Petitioner's request for habeas corpus relief. An appropriate order will issue.