Opinion
No. 04-06-00046-CV.
Delivered and Filed: December 13, 2006.
From the 229th District Court, Duval County, Texas Trial Court No. DC-02-186-B, Honorable Alex William Gabert, Judge Presiding.
Opinion by: Rebecca Simmons, Justice Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice, Rebecca Simmons, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AFFIRMED
This appeal arises from two orders dated August 4, 2005 and November 10, 2005, respectively, denying Appellants Sharon J. Hamilton and Dream Leader Minerals, Ltd.'s second motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees George B. Hamilton, III and Hamilton-Encinos Minerals, Ltd. We affirm.
Factual Background
This case involves a dispute over mineral interests in property located in Duval County. In 1969, O.L. Richardson, et al. conveyed to George Hamilton, III ("George") their interest in certain real property in Duval County, subject to prior mineral interests, and excepting and reserving to themselves a fractional "perpetual but non-participating royalty" interest in all of the oil, gas and other minerals. In 1999, George executed an oil and gas lease in favor of EOG Resources, Inc., reserving to himself a fractional royalty of the oil, gas, and sulpher. In 2000, George and his then-wife Sharon conveyed the real property to Hamilton-Encinos Minerals, Ltd. ("Hamilton-Encinos "), a limited partnership owned by the couple.
In 2002, Morris Resources, Ltd. and others ("Morris") filed an action in Duval County against George, Sharon, and their limited partnerships, seeking a determination of the amount of royalties payable to the Hamiltons and others under the EOG lease. Later that same year, Sharon and George were divorced in the 111th District Court of Webb County. As part of the property agreement, Sharon received "[a] participating, non-executive 15% mineral interest" in the property held by Hamilton-Encinos.
The Hamiltons' controversy over their mineral interest arose during the Morris lawsuit, when Sharon claimed her 15% mineral interest obtained in the divorce, was not burdened by any overriding royalty interest owned by Morris, because Hamilton-Encinos conveyed to her a 15% interest unburdened by any interest of Morris. The Hamiltons' controversy, which was severed from the Morris suit into a separate suit between George and Sharon and their respective limited partnerships, involved the interpretation of two deeds: (1) a 2000 conveyance from George and Sharon to Hamilton-Encinos, and (2) a 2002 conveyance from Hamilton-Encinos to Sharon.
In the first deed (the "Hamilton-Encinos Deed"), executed in 2000, George and Sharon granted, transferred, and conveyed to Hamilton-Encinos:
. . . all rights, title and interest in our oil, gas, other minerals, royalties, rentals and executive leasing privileges in, on, and under and appurtenant to [the real property] subject to all valid and subsisting restrictions, conditions, easements, mineral reservations, leases and other documents of record, but includes all present and reversionary rights of lessor under any current, valid oil, gas and/or mineral lease covering all or any part of the above property.
(emphasis added)
The second deed was executed in 2002 as part of the Hamiltons' divorce settlement agreement (the "Divorce Deed"). Hamilton-Encinos granted, conveyed, and transferred to Sharon:
. . . subject to the reservations herein after set out, an undivided fifteen (15%) percent of all of the mineral interests (including delay rentals, royalties and other benefits hereafter accruing under each currently existing, valid and subsisting Oil, Gas and/or Mineral Lease) conveyed to Hamilton-Encinos Minerals, Ltd. in that certain Deed dated February 13, 2000 from George Buchanon Hamilton, III (sometimes known as George B. Hamilton, III) and Sharon J. Hamilton to Hamilton-Encinos Minerals, Ltd. . ..save and except all executive leasing rights which are reserved by Grantor, however Grantee shall be entitled to her proportionate share or part of bonuses, delay rentals, shut-in royalties and other mineral related payments provided for in oil, gas and mineral leases which payments shall be made directly to Grantee.
Sharon subsequently conveyed her interest to her limited partnership, Dream Leader Minerals, Ltd. In the trial court, both parties moved for summary judgment on their respective interpretation of their mineral interests. The court found that Sharon's 15% mineral interest was subject to all of the reservations and limitations in the Hamilton-Encinos Deed and the Divorce Deed. Thus, the court held that Sharon's mineral interest was subject to the Morris' overriding royalty interest, thereby granting George's motion and denying Sharon's motion.
Jurisdiction
As a preliminary matter, Sharon complains the Duval court did not have jurisdiction over the dispute because the Divorce Deed was part of the divorce proceedings, and its construction was necessarily incident to the divorce. Therefore, according to Sharon, the Webb County divorce court was the only court that could construe the Divorce Deed.
A. Standard of review
The Texas Family Code provides that a court that enters a divorce decree has the continuing power to enforce or "clarify" the decree if the dispute is "incident to or related to" the underlying divorce. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § § 9.002, 9.006 (Vernon 2006); see also Underhill v. Underhill, 614 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd, n.r.e.) citing Day v. Day, 603 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. 1980). The divorce court's power to enforce or clarify the decree does not include the power to modify the decree. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.002 (Vernon 2006).
B. Analysis
Clearly, this controversy is no longer "incident to or related to" the divorce decree. See Day v. Day, 603 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Tex. 1980); Miller v. Miller, 376 S.W.2d 80 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1964, writ ref'd, n.r.e.). In Miller, Mr. Miller executed a deed to Mrs. Miller pursuant to their divorce. A subsequent boundary dispute arose regarding the deeded land. The Bastrop County court held that "all provisions of the divorce decree have been carried out, insofar as the land in controversy is concerned. [Mr. Miller] executed a deed conveying the land to [Mrs. Miller]. Obviously a boundary line dispute or construction of the deed could not be resolved" by an enforcement order from the divorce court. Id. at 81-82.
Sharon conveyed her mineral interest to a limited partnership following the divorce. The construction of the mineral interest now held by Dream Leader, Ltd., a third party to the divorce, is not incident to or related to a divorce decree and does not require the continuing power of the divorce court to enforce the decree. Because this case does not present any dispute incident to the divorce, the Duval County trial court was vested with jurisdiction to hear the case.
Deed Construction
A. Standard of review
Both sides moved for summary judgment based on their interpretations of the Divorce Deed. When both sides move for summary judgment, as in this case, an appellate court should review the summary judgment evidence for both sides and determine all questions presented. FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000). The appellate court then renders the judgment the trial court should have entered. Id. Summary judgment is granted when a party conclusively establishes that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and therefore, the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a. B. Analysis
Neither party asserted that either the Divorce Deed or the Hamilton-Encinos Deed was ambiguous. We therefore determine the parties' intent by examining the "four corners" of the deeds. Middleton v. Broussard, 504 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tex. 1974).
George argues that the conveyance in the Divorce Deed was limited to whatever was conveyed to Hamilton-Encinos. Since the interest conveyed in the Hamilton-Encinos Deed was "subject to … all documents of record," George concludes that the interest conveyed to Sharon was also subject to all documents of record. Therefore, Sharon's 15% interest would be subject to the royalty interests previously reserved or excepted, including those in the O.L. Richardson 1969 conveyance and 1999 EOG lease.
Sharon argues that she was conveyed a 15% net interest that is not subject to other reserved interests. She argues that the Divorce Deed conveyed her interest "subject to the reservations herein after set out" but then failed to specify the same reservations recited in the deed from George and Susan to Hamilton-Encinos. Under Sharon's interpretation, the only reservation in the Divorce Deed is a "save and except" clause for leasing rights.
In its plainest terms, the Divorce Deed language grants Sharon an undivided 15% of whatever mineral interests Hamilton-Encinos received under the 2000 conveyance from George and Sharon. The parties do not dispute that when the Hamilton-Encinos Deed was executed, there were outstanding royalty interests under the EOG lease. Because Hamilton-Encinos' interest was burdened by other royalty interests, we conclude Sharon's interest was also so burdened. Sharon only received a 15% interest in the mineral interest conveyed to and actually owned by Hamilton-Encinos. See Averyt v. Grande, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tex. 1986). Accordingly, Appellants' second point of error is overruled.
In the Hamilton-Encinos Deed, the mineral interest was subject to "all valid and subsisting restrictions, conditions, easements, mineral reservations, leases and other documents of record. . . ."
Conclusion
This dispute was not incident to or related to the parties' divorce and consequently, the Duval County trial court had jurisdiction. After considering all the summary judgment evidence, George conclusively established that no genuine issue of material fact existed, and he was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Conversely, we cannot say that Sharon demonstrated that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court properly granted George's motion for summary judgment and denied Sharon's motion. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.