Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00369
12-15-2020
H/HARRY HAMILTON (Black Horse), Plaintiff, v. LANCE HAMILTON, et al., Defendants.
(MARIANI, J.)
() REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a pro se civil rights action. The plaintiff, Harry Hamilton, filed his fee-paid pro se complaint on March 3, 2020. It alleges civil rights claims against various defendants arising out of an altercation that occurred between himself and his minor son on March 3, 2018.
We note that the complaint does not allege that Hamilton had legal or physical custody of his minor son.
Two sets of defendants have appeared and moved to dismiss.
The SCPD Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint as against them as unintelligible and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rules 8 and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 11.) They have filed a brief in support of their motion. (Doc. 12.) Despite multiple extensions, the plaintiff has failed to file a brief in opposition. (See Doc. 14; Doc. 20.)
The SCPD Defendants are: State College Police Department; Nicholas Graves; Craig Ripka; and Keith Robb.
Defendant Centre County Domestic Relations ("CCDR") has moved to dismiss the complaint as against it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 17.) CCDR has filed a brief in support of its motion. (Doc. 18.) Despite having been granted an extension, the plaintiff has failed to file a brief in opposition. (See Doc. 20.)
I. DISCUSSION
A. Centre County Domestic Relations
Liberally construed, the complaint appears to seek judgment against CCDR based on its efforts to either obtain information or garnish funds from the plaintiff's NFL pension in connection with his child support obligations. See generally Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-46 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing a court's obligation to liberally construe pro se pleadings and other submissions).
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the existence of subject matter jurisdiction when challenged under Rule 12(b)(1). See Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991). A defendant may challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in one of two fashions: it may attack the complaint on its face or it may attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, relying on evidence beyond the pleadings. See Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). Where a defendant attacks a complaint as deficient on its face, "the court must consider the allegations of the complaint as true." Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. "In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) facial attack, the court may only consider the allegations contained in the complaint and the exhibits attached to the complaint; matters of public record such as court records, letter decisions of government agencies and published reports of administrative bodies; and 'undisputably authentic' documents which the plaintiff has identified as a basis of his claims and which the defendant has attached as exhibits to his motion to dismiss." Medici v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 09-CV-2344, 2010 WL 1006917, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2010). However, when a motion to dismiss attacks the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, "no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations," and "the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. This case falls into the former category.
CCDR seeks dismissal on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. A Rule 12(b)(1) motion is the proper mechanism for raising the issue of whether Eleventh Amendment immunity bars the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 694 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984)).
The Eleventh Amendment provides a state and its agencies with immunity from suit in federal court unless the state expressly waives immunity or Congress abrogates the Eleventh Amendment in legislation designed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472-74 (1987). This immunity applies even to claims seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, at 100 (1984). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived its rights under the Eleventh Amendment, and Congress did not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment when enacting § 1981 or § 1983. Hollihan v. Pa. Dep't of Corrs., 159 F. Supp. 3d 502, 510 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (§ 1983); Barnes v. Pa. Dep't of Corrs., 706 F. Supp. 2d 593, 604 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (§ 1981); see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 (1979).
The pro se complaint cites various other federal statutes, but none appear apposite to the claims asserted against CCDR.
The Court of Common Pleas for Centre County and its departments are state agencies entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 2005). Under Pennsylvania law, each court of common pleas is required to have a domestic relations section, which is part of the state court and "thus not a county agency." See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Probation & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 201 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Rogers v. Buck Cty. Domestic Relations Section, 959 F.2d 1268, 1271 n.4 (3d Cir. 1992)). Thus, as a part of the Centre County Court of Common Pleas and an arm of the state, defendant CCDR is entitled to immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Sheils v. Bucks Cty. Domestic Relations Section, 921 F. Supp. 2d 396, 400, 404 (E.D. Pa. 2013); cf. Law Offices of Christopher S. Lucas & Assoc. v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 320 F. Supp. 2d 291, 295 (M.D. Pa. 2004) ("[T]he Disciplinary Board, an agency of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and a part of the 'unified judicial system', is an arm of the state which cannot be sued.").
Accordingly, it is recommended that the plaintiff's claims against defendant CCDR be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
B. Police Department Defendants
The plaintiff has named the four SCPD Defendants in the caption of his pro se complaint. The complaint is confusing and largely unintelligible. The plaintiff appears to assert civil rights claims against the SCPD Defendants based on an incident on March 3, 2018, which gave rise to charges that the plaintiff abused his minor son, Lance. The SCPD Defendants allegedly questioned Lance and other, unidentified witnesses, and photographed Lance with his shirt off (presumably to document injuries). The plaintiff appears to allege that these investigatory actions violated the Fourth Amendment rights of his son and the other, unidentified witnesses. The plaintiff further alleges that the SCPD Defendants failed to provide each of these non-party individuals with a Miranda warning before questioning them. The complaint suggests that the charges against the plaintiff were subsequently dismissed. The complaint alleges no other conduct by the SCPD Defendants, and it includes no individualized allegations at all with respect to these defendants.
In their brief in support, the SCPD Defendants indicate that the charges have, in fact, been expunged.
The plaintiff lacks standing to pursue any claim concerning the rights of his son and other, unidentified witnesses questioned by the SCPD Defendants on or after March 3, 2018. To establish constitutional standing, a litigant must demonstrate: (1) a concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, injury in fact; (2) a causal link between the injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) that a favorable ruling would redress the injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). In addition to these three constitutional elements, there are three prudential limits on standing: (1) the plaintiff must assert its own rights and interests and may not rely on the rights and interests of others; (2) the federal courts will not adjudicate "abstract questions of wide public significance"; and (3) the plaintiff's complaint must fall within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute in question. Valley Forge Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982). Here, Hamilton cannot demonstrate an injury in fact because the civil rights he seeks to vindicate did not belong to him, and he may not assert claims based on the rights and interests of his son and others. Moreover, a non-lawyer plaintiff, appearing pro se, is not permitted to represent other parties, even family members, in federal litigation. See Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991) (non-lawyer not permitted to represent his minor children); Williams v. United States, 477 Fed. App'x. 9, 11 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (non-lawyer holding power of attorney under state law not permitted to represent her father pro se in federal litigation).
To the extent the plaintiff seeks more generally to assert a malicious prosecution claim against the SCPD Defendants, see generally Mala, 704 F.3d at 244-46, he has failed to state an intelligible claim, much less a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Each factual averment in the complaint "must be simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). A district court may dismiss a complaint that does not comply with Rule 8 if the "complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised." Ruther v. State Ky. Officers, 556 Fed. App'x 91, 92 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Simmons v. Abuzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)). Moreover, to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Conclusory statements and naked assertions will not suffice. Id.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility." Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). In deciding the motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Although the Court must accept the fact allegations in the complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). Nor is it required to credit factual allegations contradicted by indisputably authentic documents on which the complaint relies or matters of public record of which we may take judicial notice. In re Washington Mut. Inc., 741 Fed. App'x 88, 91 n.3 (3d Cir. 2018); Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1075 (E.D. Pa. 2017); Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 588-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
With respect to the SCPD Defendants, the allegations of the instant complaint are too vague and ambiguous to support a claim for relief. The complaint consists largely of disjointed, conclusory allegations that the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated, with nothing to tie those conclusory claims to any actual conduct or policies of particular defendants. Whatever cognizable civil rights claims the plaintiff might have against the SCPD Defendants, those claims are too obscured by the vague and unintelligible writing submitted by the plaintiff for the Court to discern the contours of such claims, much less their plausibility.
Accordingly, it is recommended that the plaintiff's claims against the SCPD Defendants be dismissed as vague and unintelligible, pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
We further recommend that these claims be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend, as it is clear from the plaintiff's litigation history with these defendants that any amendment would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). In particular, we note that claims against defendants State College Police Department, Keith Robb, and Craig Ripka appear also to be barred by the doctrine of res judicata (or claim preclusion). Although it is unclear whether res judicata would extend to bar claims against defendant Nicholas Graves, these claims against Graves would appear to be barred by collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion). See Metro. Edison Co. v. Pa. Pub. Utility Comm'n, 767 F.3d 335, 351 (3d Cir. 2014) (outlining Pennsylvania's five-prong test for issue preclusion). Moreover, we note that this is the plaintiff's second attempt to litigate the very same claims against defendant Graves, a virtually identical prior lawsuit having been dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. See Hamilton v. Hamilton, No. 4:19-CV-01517 (M.D. Pa. dismissed Jan. 30, 2020).
As noted by the defendants as an alternative basis for dismissal, the plaintiff previously brought a federal lawsuit against these same defendants in October 2018. The complaint in that action included allegations concerning the same incident involving the plaintiff's minor son, and the action was ultimately dismissed with prejudice on May 8, 2019. See Hamilton v. Robb, Civil No. 3:18-CV-1915, 2018 WL 8244882 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2018), report and recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 2028518 (M.D. Pa. May 8, 2019), appeal dismissed, 2020 WL 6059661 (3d Cir. July 20, 2020). See generally Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir. 1991) (outlining three-factor test for claim preclusion).
See Huertas v. City of Philadelphia, 188 Fed. App'x 136, 137 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting that "[o]ther courts have declined to assume that privity exists between a municipality and its officers or other employees, especially where, as here, the added defendants are sued in both their personal and official capacities").
Indeed, the complaint in this action is almost a verbatim copy of Hamilton's prior complaint. (Compare Doc. 1 (complaint in this action) with Doc. 12-3 (complaint filed in Case No. 4:19-CV-01517).)
II. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that:
1. The motion to dismiss by defendants State College Police Department, Nicholas Graves, Craig Ripka, and Keith Robb (Doc. 11) be GRANTED;
2. All claims against defendants State College Police Department, Nicholas Graves, Craig Ripka, and Keith Robb be DISMISSED with prejudice as vague and unintelligible, pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
3. The motion to dismiss by defendant Centre County Domestic Relations (Doc. 17) be GRANTED;
4. All claims against by defendant Centre County Domestic Relations be DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and
5. The matter be remanded to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for further proceedings with respect to the remaining defendants. Dated: December 15, 2020
s/Joseph F . Saporito , Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States Magistrate Judge NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated December 15, 2020. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Failure to file timely objections to the foregoing Report and Recommendation may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. Dated: December 15, 2020
s/Joseph F . Saporito , Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States Magistrate Judge