Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-117-JJB-RLB
10-06-2016
RAYMOND HAMILTON (#9000135020) v. SID J. GAUTREAUX, III, ET AL.
NOTICE
Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge's Report has been filed with the Clerk of the United States District Court.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have fourteen (14) days after being served with the attached Report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which have been accepted by the District Court.
ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on October 6, 2016.
/s/ _________
RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The pro se plaintiff, an person formally confined at the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison ("EBRPP") filed this proceeding pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sheriff Sid Gautreaux and Warden Dennis Grimes complaining that his constitutional rights have been violated due to interference with his right of access to the courts. He prays for monetary relief.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A, this Court is authorized to dismiss an action or claim brought by a prisoner who is proceeding in forma pauperis or is asserting a claim against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity if satisfied that the action or claim is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. An action or claim is properly dismissed as frivolous if the claim lacks an arguable basis either in fact or in law. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992), citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 24-25 (5th Cir. 1995).
A claim is factually frivolous if the alleged facts are "clearly baseless, a category encompassing allegations that are 'fanciful,' 'fantastic,' and 'delusional.'" Id. at 32-33. A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory, "such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist." Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998). The law accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim which is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the factual allegations. Denton v. Hernandez, supra, 504 U.S. at 32. Pleaded facts which are merely improbable or strange, however, are not frivolous for purposes of § 1915. Id. at 33; Ancar v. Sara Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 1992). A § 1915 dismissal may be made any time, before or after service or process and before or after an answer is filed, if the court determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue; or the action is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1999 (5th Cir. 1986).
The plaintiff alleges that defendants Sheriff Sid Gautreaux and Warden Dennis Grimes interfered with the plaintiff's right to access to the courts by: (1) failing to transport the plaintiff to court on October 15, 2014, October 27, 2014, September 29, 2015, and October 7, 2015; (2) failing or refusing to provide requested law library access; (3) failing or refusing to provide the plaintiff with adequate assistance from persons trained in the law to assist in the preparation of writs and petitions; (4) failing or refusing to provide notarial services, word processing, and copy machine access; (5) failing or refusing to allow access to legal information regarding state or federal rules of court, civil procedure or evidence, civil litigation, or constitutional law; (6) failing or refusing to provide a subordinate employee with proper training and allowing said employee to screen the plaintiff's request forms to filter out those pertaining to civil rights litigation or constitutional law; and (7) failing or refusing to provide the plaintiff with the same access to courts and due process rights as those afforded to other pretrial detainees or inmates housed in other facilities.
First, it is unclear whether the plaintiff has named the defendants herein in both their individual and their official capacities. As to any claims the plaintiff may be asserting against the defendants in their official capacities, section 1983 does not provide a federal forum for a litigant who seeks the recovery of monetary damages against state officials acting in their official capacities, specifically because these officials are not seen to be "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). Additionally, in Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991), the United States Supreme Court addressed the distinction between official capacity and individual capacity lawsuits and made clear that a suit against a state official in his official capacity for monetary damages is treated as a suit against the state and is therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 25. Accordingly, the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages asserted against the defendants in their official capacities is subject to dismissal. In contrast, the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages asserted against the defendants in their individual capacities remains viable because a claim against a state official in his individual capacity, seeking to impose liability for actions taken by the official under color of state law, is not treated as a suit against the state. Of course, the plaintiff must prove a deprivation of a constitutional right to obtain any relief.
Turning to the plaintiff's claims asserted against the defendants in their individual capacities, the plaintiff is not entitled to the recovery of compensatory damages in this case because he has not alleged a physical injury sufficient to support such recovery. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), a prisoner plaintiff is barred from the receipt of compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury in the absence of some showing of physical injury. Accordingly, this aspect of the plaintiff's claim should be rejected. Although the plaintiff might still be entitled to recover nominal or punitive damages, see Hutchins v. McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193, 198 (5th Cir. 2007), he would need to establish some constitutional violation by the defendants in order to merit such recovery.
Regarding the plaintiff's allegations that his constitutional rights have been violated due to the defendants' alleged interference with his right of access to the courts, a substantive right of access to the courts has long been recognized. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 347 (1996), citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). Specifically, access to the courts is incorporated into the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances. Driggers v. Cruz, 740 F.3d 333, 336-37 (5th Cir. 2014) citing Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731 (1983). In its most obvious and fundamental manifestation, this right protects an inmate's physical access to the courts. Thus, for example, prison officials may not block or refuse to transmit, through procedural devices or otherwise, the transmission of legal documents that prisoners wish to send to the courts. Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) (striking down a state regulation prohibiting prisoners from filing petitions for habeas corpus without the approval of a state official); Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 310-11 (5th Cir. 1986) (prison officials may not deliberately delay mailing legal papers when they know that such delay will effectively deny a prisoner access to the courts). Nor can they take other actions—such as confiscating or destroying legal papers—that would have a similar effect. See Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 429 (5th Cir. 1994), citing Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 811 (5th Cir.1 989). The fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts also requires that prison authorities assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). This right extends to pretrial detainees as well as to convicted inmates. Boyd v. Nowack, 2010 WL 892995, *2 (E.D. La. March 11, 2010), citing United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 743 (7th Cir. 1988).
The right of access to the courts, however, "guarantees no particular methodology but rather the conferral of a capability—the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts." Lewis v. Casey, supra, 518 U.S. at 356. Further, in order to prevail on a claim of interference with access to the courts, an inmate claimant must be able to show that has he suffered some cognizable legal prejudice or detriment as a result of the defendant's actions. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1328 (5th Cir. 1996). In addition, the plaintiff must be able to show that the defendant had an intent to interfere with the plaintiff's right to submit pleadings to the courts or was otherwise deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's wish to do so. See Herrington v. Martin, 2009 WL 5178340, *2 (W.D. La., Dec. 23, 2009) (recognizing that "[a]n 'access to courts' claim is actionable only if the deprivation stemmed from intentional conduct on the part of the defendant; 'access to courts' claims premised on a defendant's mere negligence or inadvertence are not cognizable under § 1983"). Finally, an inmate's right to seek access to the courts is limited to the making of non-frivolous claims involving the assertion of legitimate constitutional rights. Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 311 (5th Cir. 1997). Therefore, because the right to access to the courts "rest[s] on the recognition that the right is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court," Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002), "the underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint." Id.
In the present matter, the Complaint fails to state a claim for denial of access to the courts for several reasons. The Complaint is composed entirely of generalized allegations of denial of access. The plaintiff has not identified with specificity any particular cause of action in which his rights were impeded. Nor has the plaintiff alleged that the deprivations stemmed from intentional conduct on the part of the defendants. Moreover, the plaintiff has not alleged to have suffered any legal prejudice or detriment as a result of the defendants' actions. As such, the Complaint fails to state a claim for denial of access to the courts.
To the extent the plaintiff is complaining that his right to equal protection has been violated, in order to successfully establish an equal protection claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that prison officials acted with a discriminatory purpose. Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577 (5th Cir. 1995). Discriminatory purpose in an equal protection context implies that the decision maker selected a particular course of action at least in part because of, and not simply in spite of, the adverse impact it would have on an identifiable group. Id. A violation of the equal protection clause occurs only when the governmental action in question classifies or distinguishes between two or more relevant persons or groups. Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1257 (5th Cir. 1988).
In the instant matter, the plaintiff has alleged in a conclusory fashion that the defendants deprived the plaintiff, an indigent pretrial detainee, of equal protection of the laws by failing or refusing to afford the plaintiff with the same rights afforded to other pretrial detainees and inmates housed in other facilities. The plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants' actions were taken because of an adverse impact they would have on indigent pretrial detainees. As such, the plaintiff has failed to allege the defendants' action were taken for a discriminatory purpose and the Complaint fails to state a claim for a violation of his right to equal protection.
Finally, to the extent that the plaintiff's allegations may be interpreted as seeking to invoke the supplemental jurisdiction of this court over potential state law claims, a district court may decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction if a plaintiff's state law claims raise novel or complex issues of state law, if the claims substantially predominate over the claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, or for other compelling reasons. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In the instant case, having recommended that the plaintiff's federal claims be dismissed, the Court further recommends that the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction be declined.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the Court decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state law claims, and that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, as legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. It is further recommended that the plaintiff's Motion to Order Service (R. Doc. 6) be denied as moot.
The plaintiff is advised that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) provides that, "In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section [Proceedings in forma pauperis] if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury." --------
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on October 6, 2016.
/s/ _________
RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE