Hameed v. Jones

20 Citing cases

  1. Sain v. Capra

    15 Civ. 5315 (CS)(AEK) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2021)   Cited 2 times

    Grounds Three and Four of the Petition can be construed, in part, as an argument that Petitioner's right to appear and testify before the grand jury was violated. But such claims are not cognizable on federal habeas review, because the right to appear before the grand jury is secured by New York State law-specifically, C.P.L. § 190.50(5)(a)-rather than by the federal constitution, and “‘federal habeas corpus is not, of course, available simply by virtue of a violation of state criminal law.'” Cates v. Senkowski, No. 02-cv-5957 (LAK), 2003 WL 1563777, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2003) (quoting Hameed v. Jones, 750 F.2d 154, 160 (2d Cir. 1984)). Indeed, on direct appeal, the Appellate Division rejected Petitioner's arguments regarding the purported deprivation of his right to testify before the grand jury without any reference to federal law or the U.S. Constitution, see Sain I, 111 A.D.3d at 965, and federal habeas courts cannot re-

  2. People v. Ford

    145 Misc. 2d 308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989)   Cited 3 times

    Had the court not selected any alternate jurors and mistrial was necessitated by the illness of a deliberating juror, no double jeopardy rights would have been violated (Boisen vUnited States, 181 F. Supp. 349; State v Roberson, 225 La. 74, 72 So.2d 265; State v Heathcoat, 119 N.J.L. 33, 194 A 252; see also, Annotation, 84 ALR2d 1288, 1300, § 6 [b]). Even where the court has an alternate available but chooses not to substitute the alternate for an ill juror, thereby necessitating a mistrial, defendant's double jeopardy rights would not be violated (Hameed v Jones, 750 F.2d 154, cert denied 471 U.S. 1136). Therefore, nothing in the Double Jeopardy Clause mandates the existence of alternate jurors or, if such be available, the substitution of an incapacitated juror.

  3. United States v. Wells

    790 F.2d 73 (10th Cir. 1986)   Cited 4 times

    579, 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). We find no error in the conclusion of the trial judge that a sufficient showing had been made for a mistrial here since it is well settled that the legitimate unavailability of a juror creates a situation of "manifest necessity" in which retrial is permitted. See, e.g., Hameed v. Jones, 750 F.2d 154, 161 (2d Cir. 1984) (juror becoming emotionally overwrought during deliberations), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 2677, 86 L.Ed.2d 695 (1985); Cherry v. Director, State Board of Corrections, 635 F.2d 414, 420 (5th Cir.) (juror's mother died during first day of trial), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 840, 102 S.Ct. 150, 70 L.Ed.2d 124 (1981). In the unusual circumstances here, where the six veniremen had been excused but were reconvened, the trial judge had discretion to declare a mistrial rather than obtain a juror who had been out of the courtroom, due to the potential for prejudice.

  4. Blond v. Graham

    No. 9:12-cv-1849-JKS (N.D.N.Y. Jun. 5, 2014)   Cited 8 times

    In addition, to the extent Blond asserts that the trial court failed to comply with CPL § 270.35, Repondent correctly notes that he raises an issue purely of state law. See Hameed v. Jones, 750 F.2d 154, 160 (2d Cir. 1984); Faria v. Perez, 04-CV-2411, 2012 WL 3800826 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2012). As such, this claim does not present a federal question cognizable on habeas corpus review.

  5. Faria v. Perez

    04-CV-2411 (RRM) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2012)   Cited 5 times

    35 for the proposition that the trial court lacked the discretion Petitioner asked it to invoke, and was instead required to remove the alleged sleeping juror despite her expressly stated desire to have that juror remain empanelled on the jury, Respondents correctly note that Petitioner raises an issue purely of state law. See Hameed v. Jones, 750 F.2d 154, 160 (2d Cir. 1984). As such, this claim does not present a federal question cognizable under habeas corpus review.

  6. Pillco v. Bradt

    10 Civ. 2393 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2010)   Cited 10 times

    See Haynes v. Butler, 825 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1987). Cf. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) ("[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions."); Hameed v. Jones, 750 F.2d 154, 160 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Federal habeas corpus is not, of course, available simply by virtue of a violation of state criminal law.") (citing Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425 (1905)).White v. Keane, 969 F.2d 1381, 1383 (2d Cir. 1992).

  7. Logan v. Unger

    No. 04-CV-0536 (VEB) (W.D.N.Y. Jun. 23, 2009)   1 Legal Analyses

    Thus, claims arising out of a state court sentencing decision are not normally cognizable on federal habeas review. Haynes v. Butler, 825 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1014 (1988); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (errors of state law are not grounds for habeas relief) (citing Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)) (additional citation omitted)); Hameed v. Jones, 750 F.2d 154, 160 (2d Cir. 1984) (same), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1136 (1985). A claim that a sentence is excessive is cognizable on federal habeas review only if that sentence is outside the range prescribed by state statutory law, see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948); White v. Keane, 969 F.2d 1381, 1383 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) (a sentence within statutory limitations is not subject to appellate review), or if a legal error "resulted in the improper exercise of the sentencer's discretion and thereby deprived the petitioner of his liberty," Haynes, 825 F.2d at 924 (citing Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980)) (additional citation omitted)).

  8. Bennefield v. Superintendent Robert Kirkpatrick

    NO. 06-CV-6104 (DGL) (VEB) (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2008)   Cited 2 times

    *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 24, 2007) (citing Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 496 (1972) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury does not apply in a state prosecution.") (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (holding that the words "due process of law," in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, do not necessarily require an indictment by a grand jury in a prosecution by a state for murder); People v. Iannone, 45 N.Y.2d 589, 594 n. 3 (N.Y. 1978) ("The right to indictment by a Grand Jury in New York is dependent solely upon [the] State Constitution. . . .") (citations omitted in original)). Courts in this circuit consistently have recognized that a defendant's right to a grand jury is a matter of New York state law. E.g., Rohit, 2007 WL 1540268, at *4 (citing Mirrer v. Smyley, 703 F. Supp. 10, 11-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("The right to a grand jury is a matter of New York State law and as such is not reviewable on a petition for habeas corpus.") (citing Hameed v. Jones, 750 F.2d 154, 160 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1136 (1984)). These courts have held that such claims alleging the abridgment of such a right are therefore not cognizable on habeas review since, as the Supreme Court has "stated many times . . . federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law."

  9. MIKEL v. ZON

    04-CV-6448 (CJS) (VEB) (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2007)   Cited 2 times

    It is well-settled that "[e]rrors of state law are not reviewable on a habeas petition unless they rise for some other reason to the level of a denial of rights protected by the United States Constitution." Mirrer v. Smyley, 703 F.Supp. 10, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd 876 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. den. 493 U.S. 850, 110 S.Ct. 148 (1989); see also, Hameed v. Jones, 750 F.2d 154, 160 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Federal habeas corpus is not, of course, available simply by virtue of a violation of state criminal law."), cert. den. 471 U.S. 1136, 105 S.Ct. 2677 (1985).

  10. Larweth v. Conway

    493 F. Supp. 2d 662 (W.D.N.Y. 2007)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that petitioner did not meet "the rigorous standard . . . of demonstrating that defense counsel's failure to inform him of the period of post-release supervision [was] objectively unreasonable and created a reasonable probability that, had he known of the post-release supervision, he would have chosen not to plead guilty and instead would have proceeded to trial."

    Claims arising out of a state court sentencing decision are thus not typically cognizable on federal habeas review. Haynes v. Butler, 825 F.2d 912, 923 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1014 (1988); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (reaffirming that errors of state law are not grounds for habeas review) (citing Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Hameed v. Jones, 750 F.2d 154, 160 (2d Cir. 1984). A claim attacking a state sentence of imprisonment generally is not cognizable on federal habeas review if the sentence is within the state's statutorily established limits.