Opinion
A22-0421
09-12-2022
Hazem M. Hamdan, Appellant, v. Tim Walz, et al., Respondents, Eman S. Hegazy, Appellant, Joan Gabel, et al., Respondents.
Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CV-21-4670
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Larson, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. This case concerns various disputes surrounding dental care that was provided to Eman S. Hegazy at an outpatient clinic affiliated with the University of Minnesota School of Dentistry. The district court dismissed the case pursuant to rule 12.02(e) of the rules of civil procedure. We affirm.
2. On September 23, 2019, Hegazy visited the dental school's outpatient clinic for a wisdom-tooth extraction. Four days later, she had emergency surgery at a hospital to drain an infection arising from the extraction. Upon her discharge from the hospital, she was prescribed an antibiotic, which caused her to suffer acute colitis, which led to a second hospitalization.
3. In late December 2019, Hegazy and her husband, Hazem M. Hamdan, filed complaints with the state board of dentistry against four dentists who are adjunct instructors at the dental school. In July 2020, the board concluded "that the evidence of the case did not provide a sufficient basis for the Board to take disciplinary or corrective action" against the dentists. Hegazy and Hamdan thereafter sent multiple pieces of correspondence to the board, persons employed by the office of the attorney general, the governor, and the interim dean of the dental school. Hegazy and Hamdan sought, among other things, information and documents related to the dental care provided to Hegazy and the complaints that she and her husband had filed with the board.
4. In September 2021, Hegazy and Hamdan commenced this action by serving and filing a 26-page pro se complaint with 200 pages of attachments. The named defendants are the governor, the attorney general, the president of the University of Minnesota, the interim dean of the dental school, and the executive director of the board of dentistry. The pro se complaint does not identify causes of action with reference to legal theories. The focus of the complaint is the investigation conducted by the board of dentistry. The complaint is secondarily concerned with the actions or inactions of other defendants who allegedly "ignore[d] Plaintiffs' pleas" for "intervention."
5. The defendants associated with the university and the defendants associated with the state filed separate motions to dismiss pursuant to rule 12.02(e) of the rules of civil procedure. After a hearing in January 2022, the district court filed an order in March 2022 in which it granted both motions and dismissed the action.
6. Hegazy and Hamdan appeal. This court applies a de novo standard of review to a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 12.02(e). DeRosa v. McKenzie, 936 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2019). That rule provides that a district court may grant a motion to dismiss if a complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). To state a claim for relief, a complaint need only "contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. "A claim is sufficient against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader's theory, to grant the relief demanded." Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Minn. 2014).
7. Hegazy and Hamdan's 49-page pro se brief identifies seven issues. We have thoroughly reviewed the parties' briefs and the district court record, and we conclude that the district court did not err by granting the motions to dismiss, for reasons that may be summarized as follows.
8. First, appellants argue that the district court erred by concluding that Hamdan does not have standing to assert the claims alleged in the complaint. "Standing is a legal requirement that a party have a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court." McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing, 808 N.W.2d 331, 338 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). Standing exists if a plaintiff has suffered an injury-in-fact or if conferred by statute. Garcia-Mendoza v. 2003 Chevy Tahoe, 852 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Minn. 2014). In this case, Hamdan has not suffered an injury-in-fact because only Hegazy was a patient of the dental school, and all subsequent interactions with the defendants concerned her rights, not Hamdan's rights. Accordingly, Hamdan has not alleged "a concrete and particularized invasion of a legally protected interest" that may be traced to the challenged actions of the defendants and redressed by a favorable judicial outcome. See id. (quotation omitted). In addition, there are no statutes that confer standing on him. Thus, the district court did not err by ruling that Hamdan does not have standing. We will review the remaining issues only with respect to Hegazy's claims.
9. Second, Hegazy argues that the district court erred by concluding that she has not stated a claim based on the board's alleged wrongful disclosure of her medical records. She contends that the authorization form by which the board shared her medical records during its investigation is invalid because it contains an electronic signature. The district court reasoned that the board's use of an electronic signature complies with section 325L.18 of the Minnesota Statutes, which gives state agencies broad discretion to determine the manner, format, and control processes and procedures relating to electronic signatures. See Minn. Stat. § 325L.18(a), (b) (2020). On appeal, Hegazy contends that the board's alleged disclosure is a violation of the Minnesota Health Records Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 144.291-.298 (2020 &Supp. 2021), and the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01-.90 (2020 &Supp. 2021). But the health-records act expressly permits the disclosure of health records if there is "specific authorization in law," Minn. Stat. § 144.293, subd. 2(2), which encompasses the authority in section 325L.18. Similarly, the data-practices act expressly permits the disclosure of medical data between governmental entities if "access is authorized," Minn. Stat. §§ 13.384, subd. 3(a), .05, subd. 9, which also encompasses the authority in section 325L.18. Thus, the district court did not err by ruling that Hegazy did not state a claim based on the board's alleged wrongful disclosure of her medical records.
10. Third, Hegazy argues that the district court erred by concluding that she has not stated a claim based on the board's alleged failure to comply with procedural provisions in chapter 214 of the Minnesota Statutes, which governs health-related licensing boards, including the board of dentistry. See Minn. Stat. § 214.103 (2020); see also id., § 214.01 subd. 2. The district court reasoned that chapter 214 does not authorize a private cause of action, either expressly or impliedly. Hegazy does not challenge the district court's reasoning on that point. Thus, the district court did not err by ruling that Hegazy did not state a claim based on the board's alleged failure to comply with chapter 214.
11. Fourth, Hegazy argues that the district court erred on the ground that the board and the dental school did not properly respond to requests that she submitted pursuant to the data-practices act in July 2020. The district court did not analyze such a claim. The district court reasonably did not perceive such a claim given the manner in which appellants presented their arguments in their memorandum of law in opposition to the motions to dismiss. Accordingly, the argument is forfeited because Hegazy did not properly preserve it in the district court. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).
12. Fifth, Hegazy argues that the district court erred on the grounds that the dental school did not adhere to academic standards and violated the patient's bill of rights. The district court did not analyze such a claim or claims. Hegazy did not clearly assert any such claim in the district court. In the memorandum she filed in the district court, Hegazy made two fleeting references to the patient's bill of rights in section 144.651 of the Minnesota Statutes, but she did not argue that any one of the numerous rights in the statute was violated. See Minn. Stat. § 144.651, subds. 4-33 (2020). Accordingly, the argument is forfeited because Hegazy did not properly preserve it in the district court. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582.
13. Sixth, Hegazy argues that the district court erred on the ground that the dental school might have informed a credit-reporting agency of an unpaid bill. The district court did not analyze such a claim. Hegazy did not clearly assert such a claim in the district court. Accordingly, the argument is forfeited because Hegazy did not properly preserve it in the district court. See id.
14. Seventh, Hegazy argues that the district court erred on the ground that she has a constitutional right to a remedy pursuant to article I, section 8, of the Minnesota Constitution, which provides, "Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive to his person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformable to the laws." Minn. Const. art. I, § 8. The district court did not analyze such a claim. Hegazy did not assert such a claim in the district court. Accordingly, the argument is forfeited because Hegazy did not properly preserve it in the district court. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582. In any event, the argument is without merit. The Remedies Clause "does not guarantee redress for every wrong" but prevents the state legislature "from abrogating recognized common-law causes of action." State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 873-74 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). Hegazy is not constitutionally entitled to a remedy because she has not stated a viable claim for relief.
15. In sum, the district court did not err by granting respondents' motions to dismiss pursuant to rule 12.02(e).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's judgment is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Dated: September 9, 2020